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ABSTRACT 
 At this time, we have a century of jurisprudential and philosophical discussions on the 
metaphysical nature of rights.  We have almost half a century of moral theory arguing for the 
moral rights of animals.  Surprisingly, these two literatures have not intersected much.  This 
leaves open whether the nature of rights could preclude the possibility of animal rights.  It also 
leaves open what the nature of animal rights would be, should any of the moral arguments for 
animal rights be successful in their tasks.  In this project, I explore these questions and show that 
animal rights must be conceived of as a limited form of human rights.  Animals possess only 
passive rights (i.e. claim-rights protected by immunities) which function to advance their 
interests, in general.  So conceived, it becomes clear why the moral arguments for animal rights 
have been grounded in deontological moral theories (e.g. varieties of Kantianism, 
contractarianism) rather than in consequentialist moral theories.  Finally, even with a precise 
understanding of the nature of and grounds for the moral rights of animals, challenges remain 
regarding the ultimate force and place of animal moral rights among human moral rights. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 In the early twentieth century, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, one of 
legal jurists, published what can easily be considered a foundational work on the concept of the 
legal right.
1
  work has resulted in a century of nuanced and technical debate among 
legal and moral scholars on the nature of rights as such.  Such discourse has produced theories of 
rights that are orthogonal to concrete views of what legal and moral rights there are, but yet 
capture fundamental features common to all legal and moral rights.  In this way, Hohfeld set the 
stage for the development of a metaphysics of rights. 
In the 1970s, following the civil rights movement of the sixties, there emerged an animal 
rights movement.  This political movement began with its foundations in the idea of animal 
liberation, the goal being to reduce and eliminate unnecessary animal suffering caused by 
humans.
2
  However, it quickly became apparent that animal suffering could not capture all that 
was objectionable about our treatment of animals.  To understand what was objectionable about 
our treatment of animals, we had to conceive of the possibility that animals are possessors of 
moral rights.
3
  We had to conceive of the possibility that animals are ends-in-themselves, 
deserving of moral respect and not to be used by humans as mere means to human ends.  Since 
 argument for animal rights, animal rights have continued to be a 
central topic in applied moral and political philosophy.
4
 
                                                 
1
 Hohfeld (1913). 
2
 Singer (2002).  A note on terminology: Throughout this project, -human 
s.  This means an individual 
who is a member of the human species and has fully developed mental capacities that are typically associated with 
individuals of the human specie
intend to capture those individuals who are members of the human species, but who lack substantial mental 
capacities that are typically associated with individuals of the human species, e.g. infants, the severely cognitively 
disabled, the vegetative.   
3
 Regan (1983). 
4
 See, e.g., Korsgaard (2018); Rowlands (2009); Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011); Warren (1997). 
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While a metaphysics of rights ought to be readily applicable to all rights, including 
animal rights, there has been no thorough exploration of the metaphysics of animal rights.  The 
theory of rights discussions have largely ignored animal rights and instead have focused on their 
favorite puzzles in the realm of the legal and moral rights of humans.  The (moral) animal rights 
theorists have largely ignored the inquiry into the nature of animal rights as their primary goal 
has been simply to ground human (moral) obligations to animals.  This is shortsightedness by 
both literatures.  First, a theory of rights should be capable of accepting animal rights.  Failure of 
the metaphysics of rights to conceptually accommodate animal rights indicates either a problem 
with the metaphysics or a problem with the moral argument for animal rights.  For the sake of 
this project, I do not take the moral arguments for animal rights as definitive without objection, 
but I do take them to be good reasons for us to take seriously the possibility that animals have 
moral rights.  So, our metaphysics of rights should take animal rights seriously.  Second, an 
argument for the moral rights of animals should know what the nature of those rights amounts to.  
I think a lack of detail and precision in this area leaves animal rights views vulnerable to 
practical problems.  In particular, animal rights theories struggle to identify reasons why human 
and animal rights may not be perfectly identical, and they struggle to explain how conflicts of 
human and animal rights are to be resolved without appealing to (what I think could be framed 
as) a hidden speciesism.  A theory of the nature of rights (both human and animal) can provide 
more insight into these problems for the animal rights theorist. 
So, in general, this project aims to break down the barriers between these two literatures 
and allow each to illuminate the other.  The project will proceed in three chapters, with a brief 
conclusion.  In the Chapter Two, I will focus on the first part of the nature of rights debate: the 
form of rights.   (the claim-right, privilege, 
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power, and immunity relations) that capture the analytical form of rights.  I will argue that 
animal rights are properly conceived of as only passive rights.  They contain only the passive 
Hohfeldian relations, i.e. the claim-right and immunity relations.  This means that animal rights 
are a subset of human rights.  Animal rights are best understood to be unalterable claim-rights 
correlative to human duties to animals to act (or refrain from acting) in certain ways. 
 In Chapter Three, I will move to the second part of the nature of rights debate: the 
function of rights.  I will discuss the traditional divide on the function of rights between the will 
and interest theories as well as several recent attempts to overcome that divide.  I will frame this 
discussion around a recent metadebate in the function of rights literature about whether the 
function of rights is meant to identify the correct combinations of Hohfeldian relations or 
whether the function of rights is meant to explain the directedness of duties correlated with 
claim-rights.  Inside of this metadebate, I will be able to highlight an important active right for 
humans, namely the bilateral privilege, that animals do not possess as part of their rights.  This is 
an important difference between the nature of human and animal rights that, I think, has 
implications for the conflicts of human and animal rights.  Ultimately, I will conclude that 
animal rights must be considered to function to promote the interests of animals, in the general 
case.   
 In Chapter Four, I will transition to discussing the role of rights in moral theory and the 
substantive moral arguments for animal rights.  Rights are best understood in the context of 
deontological moral theories because deontological moral theories can readily accommodate 
directed duties (and therefore the claim-right relation) as well as privileges (in particular, 
privileges to not maximize the Good and to prefer oneself over others in certain cases).  In this 
way, deontological moral theories solve challenges to consequentialist moral theories through 
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rights, conceived of as Hohfeldian relations.  Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that the three 
moral arguments for animal rights that I examine are 
Kantian/natural rights view, Kantian/virtue ethical view, and 
Kantian/contractarian view). 
 In concluding the project, I briefly touch upon the conflict of rights problem that animal 
rights pose.  I have two broad concerns.  On the one hand, I am concerned that our way of 
resolving conflicts of human and animal rights negates the equality of a rights view by making 
claim-rights (protected by immunities) with humans as the duty bearers and because the 
existence of claim-rights against humans necessarily curtails our bilateral privileges, I am 
concerned that extending rights to animals disrupts the balance between claim-rights and 
privileges for humans.  Claim-rights among humans create the conditions for the possibility of 
humans exercising their bilateral privileges, which are fundamentally how humans realize their 
discretion, freedom, and self-determination.  However, animal claim-rights do not seem to work 
in this way.  Ultimately, I conclude that, notwithstanding their limited form and function and the 
unresolved conflicts of rights issue, animal rights do produce a distinctively powerful moral 
considerability for animals. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE FORM OF RIGHTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter, I will begin my discussion of the nature of animal rights.  I will begin 
constituent relations.  This analysis is facially neutral with respect to who has rights (the scope of 
rights) and what rights there are 
I will argue that animal rights are more limited than the rich form of rights that we have in 
relations among humans because animal rights include only the claim-right relation and the 
immunity relation, i.e. passive rights.  This comes from the fact that animals lack certain 
capabilities that are fundamental to being a privilege holder and a power holder and thereby lack 
those capabilities fundamental for possessing privileges and powers, i.e. active rights.   
II. HOHFELD S RELATIONS 
 
1
 his system of jural relations has been widely influential in the 
literature on rights generally (both legal and moral).
2
  There have been staunch defenders of 
3
 however, I elect to 
ad of rights because it 
specific issues that arise there. 
                                                 
1
 Hohfeld (1913, 20).  
2
 See, e.g., Hurd and Moore (2018, 5 6); Kramer et al. (2000); Thomson (1990); Wenar (2005); Sreenivasan (2005); 
Wenar (2013); Wellman (1985). 
3
 See, e.g., MacCormack (1977, 199 202); Raz (1986, 183 186); Waldron (1993, 15 17). 
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 s definitional/conceptual
4
 and disambiguates between four 
distinct relations that, individually or in combination, may be what is meant by a given rights 
claim.
5
  For the purposes of this project, to tease apart which relations are meant by a given 
rights 
6
  Within the four Hohfeldian relations are contained 
eight statuses, four of which are (typically) beneficial to the rights claim holder and four of 
which are (typically) detrimental to the rights claim bearer.
7
  The four beneficial statuses are: (1) 
the claim-right,
8
 (2) the privilege, (3) the power, and (4) the immunity.  The four detrimental 
statuses are: (1*) the duty, (2*) the no-claim-right,
9
 (3*) the liability, (4*) the disability.  The 
four beneficial statuses are correlatives with the four detrimental statuses (i.e. 1 to 1*, 2 to 2*, 3 
to 3*, and 4 to 4*) to create the four Hohfeldian relations.
10
  So, (1) and (1*) entail each other; 
(2) and (2*) entail each other, and so on.  We can consider the beneficial statuse
-
right, privilege, power, and immunity holder, whereas another entity may be a duty, no-claim-
                                                 
4
 See Kramer (2000, 22). 
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right not to 
Rights claims, a
some way, shape, or form.  Rights claims are usually imprecise in everyday speech, as the examples above 
demonstrate.  However, they can be made more 
in this and the following chapter.  In philosophical discussions of rights, many theorists mean only the claim-right 
relation by the term right. 
6
 See Wellman (1985) (approaching rights as complexes  of Hohfeldian relations). 
7
 Often, a rights claim does not identify the rights claim bearer.  For example, animal rights theorists may assert that 
has a right to life.  
However, the rights claim does not state who the rights claim bearer is.  Fundamental to the Hohfeldian scheme is 
that rights claims, as combinations of the Hohfeldian relations, are relational.  This relational aspect of rights claims 
may not hold true for rights that are non-Hohfeldian in nature (e.g. some moral rights).  See Hurd and Moore (2018, 
318). 
8
 
rights claims ar -right, but rather means 
rights claim.  To resolve this ambiguity, I will adopt the term claim-right to signify the beneficial status correlative 
to the duty, and I will not use claim-right and right synonymously (although I may occasionally opt for right instead 
of rights claim). 
9
 - -
no-claim- -
right and the no-claim-right. 
10
 Halpin (2019b) calls these active and passive statuses; however, because I use the terms active and passive to 
categorize the Hohfeldian relations, I will stick with the terms beneficial and detrimental.   
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right, liability, and disability bearer.  In addition to the correlativity relation between the statuses 
which creates the four Hohfeldian relations, the statuses also relate to one another via opposition 
(1 to 2*, 2 to 1*, 3 to 4*, and 4 to 3*).  What this means will become clearer as I work through 
the Hohfeldian relations one at a time. 
 A. THE CLAIM-RIGHT RELATION 
 First and foremost of the Hohfeldian statuses are the claim-right and the duty.  These 
statuses create the foundational Hohfeldian relation.  This relation is the preoccupation of much 
(if not all) of the will/interest theory debate on the function of rights.
11
  It is the preoccupation of 
much of the force of rights debate and worries about conflicts of rights.  It is also the relation that 
se deontic moral theories rely on the 
notion of the moral duty.
12
  Deontic moral theories prescribe what actions are morally required 
13
  The claim-right relation is able to pick out the 
morally required and the morally forbidden because it contains within it the duty bearer status.  
-right held by one entity is correlated to (and equivalent 
to)
14
 a duty borne by another (not necessarily distinct) entity.  More precisely we can define the 
claim-right relation thus: 
 CLAIM-RIGHT RELATIONdef: A has a claim-
 
There are a couple of things to note 
-
                                                 
11
 See Chapter Three. 
12
 See Chapter Four. 
13
 But see Thomson (1990, Part I) who argues that the duty correlative to the claim-right is not synonymous with the 
moral ought.   
14
 Hohfeld (1913, 32). 
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right against B, it can be the case that B has a duty to A to perform some action (a positive right) 
or that B has a duty to A to abstain from performing some action (a negative right).  For 
-right against B means 
.  On the other hand, A 
also has a claim-right against B to not be assaulted (wrongly).  This means that B is under a duty 
not -right and the 
claim-right relation is considered a first-order Hohfeldian 
relation.  In the claim-
 an action or an abstention from action. 
Second, A and B need n
across all four of the Hohfeldian relations.  While the relations require two placeholders for two 
entities, as that is a fundamental property of something being a relation, there is nothing in 
We can see how this works in the 
-place 
relation that does not conceptually prohibit x and y being the same number.  Of course, if x and y 
 for all x, ~Gxx).  But the reflexive 
relation, Gxx, is not inconceivable.  In the case of the claim-right relation, not only is it 
conceivable that A and B are the same entity, the reflexive relation may hold over a set of 
myself, it is both conceivable and possibly true that I also have a claim-right against myself to 
not kill myself (i.e. for all A, claim-right to not kill(AA) may be a true statement where A scopes 
over all moral agents).
15
   
                                                 
15
 Kant was a staunch defender of the position that we each have moral duties to ourselves not to kill ourselves.  For 
a contemporary discussion of the Kantian duty not to commit suicide, see Velleman (1999).  I take no substantive 
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 Finally, and more controversially, is the issue of just how to interpret the relationship 
between the claim-right held by A and the duty borne by B.  I have constructed the definition 
16
 and I will use this 
language in the remaining three Hohfeldian relations.  However, Hohfeld himself does not use 
such formal language.
17
  He simply calls the claim-right and the duty correlatives (and therefore, 
equivalents).
18
  There has been substantial debate over correlativity in the literature on Hohfeld, 
particularly with respect to the claim-right relation, although all of the beneficial statuses at least 
system of relations.  I will say more about correlativity throughout this section. 
 B. THE PRIVILEGE RELATION 
 -[claim-
19
  The initial discussion of the claim-right relation introduced the idea of correlativity 
between the beneficial and detrimental statuses (claim-right and duty).  Here, I will be able to 
introduce the notion of opposition (also contentious in the literature) between the statuses across 
the relations by examining the statuses within the privilege relation and their relation to the 
statuses within the claim-righ
privilege relation in terms of the privilege and its correlative, the no-claim-right. 
PRIVILEGE RELATIONdef: -claim-
right that A ~
20
   
                                                                                                                                                             
view on whether we each do have such a duty to ourselves.  I only note here that the structure 
allows duties directed to the self because the structure of the relations allows reflexivity, i.e. the identity of the 
relata.   
16
 Halpin (2019, 231). 
17
 Hohfeld (1913); Hohfeld (1917). 
18
 Hohfeld (1913, 32). 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 See ibid, 32 33. 
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 To better understand this relation, I -claim-right that A 
-claim-right 
not the case that B has a claim-
21
  Given the definition of the claim-
a claim-
hat B has a claim-
familiar definition of the Hohfeldian privilege relation: 
 PRIVILEGE RELATIONdef2
 
The statuses within the privilege relation also scope over -
order relation like the claim-right relation.  However, different from the claim-right relation and 
staying true to Hohfeld,
22
 the privilege and no duty statuses scope over opposite (i.e. negated) 
actions.  Similar to the claim-
 
as to B.  Note how the privilege takes the affirmative action but the no duty takes the negation of 
the affirmative action.  If there are individuals in the park who may also wish to sit in this spot 
but have not yet done so when A goes to sit in this spot, then A has a privilege to sit in this spot 
in the park as to each of those persons individually.  This means A has multiple privileges: one 
as to each individual person who may want to sit in this spot in the park.  Additionally, A is not 
                                                 
21
 See Hurd and Moore (2018, 313).   
22
 Hohfeld viewed the privilege to enter land as the negation of the duty to stay off the land (i.e. not to enter land).  
Hohfeld (1913, 33).  Kramer (2019, 215 17) argues that Hohfeld was mistaken to understand the no-claim-right as 
containing the negation of the content of the privilege.  As will be made clearer in this section, I disagree with 
Kramer and agree with Hurd and Moore on this point of Hohfeldian interpretation.   
11 
 
the only one with a privilege to sit in this spot in the park.  If B enters the park, sees that the spot 
is empty, and decides to sit down there, B is free to do so because B also has a privilege as to A 
to sit in that spot.  Once B has sat in that spot in the park, A no longer has a privilege as to B to 
sit in that spot in the park.  In fact, at that point, A now has a duty, and B a claim-right, that A 
not sit in that spot in the park, thereby giving B an entitlement to freely enjoy the spot to which 
both had a privilege until one took it.  
ty 
of actions that we choose not to do in the moment.  For example, B drops her groceries on the 
ground in the parking lot on the way to her car.  A sees this, but A has a privilege as to B not to 
assist B i  and therefore has no duty to B to assist B in picking up 
y consider this rude, unkind, or suberogatory 
 duty owed to B.  Lacking in 
such a duty, A has a privilege as to B to abstain from helping B.  Many interactions between 
people are like this: it would be pleasant and kind to provide assistance to folks in need but there 
is no obligation to them to do so.  This is because, even if we believe we have some Good 
Samaritan duties, they are not very broad or wide-ranging, but rather relatively narrow.  In such 
cases where a Good Samaritan duty is lacking (many to most situations), individuals possess a 
privilege to abstain from action.   
The privilege relation is also constructed as between two entities, not necessarily distinct, 
similarly to the claim-right relation.  While it is somewhat controversial whether there exist 
duties to the self, we certainly enjoy privileges as to ourselves.
23
  If I have no duty to myself to 
not play tennis, then I clearly have a privilege to play tennis as to myself.  While this sounds 
                                                 
23
 Indeed, if we do not have any duties to ourselves, then we necessarily have privileges as to ourselves with respect 
to every possible action, . 
12 
 
system, it is crucial that the definitions of the relations be constructed with two entities, one 
which holds the beneficial status and one which bears the detrimental status.  This is 
linguistically awkward in the case of the privilege because the detrimental status, the no-claim-
right, is really a lack or absence of the holding of a claim-right.
24
  So, it is strange to say an entity 
is bearing the absence or lack of something.  However, it is a feature of the structure of the 
privilege relation that is worth emphasis.
25
   
There is one final feature of the privilege relation that I have not yet highlighted, though I 
have implicitly accepted and applied it, and that is the way in which the privilege is opposed to 
the duty.  This opposition is not a mere negation of the duty, but rather a negation of the duty-not 
ineliminable because one negation scopes over the duty and the other scopes over the action, 
which is operated on by the duty.  This is different than the opposition of the no-claim-right to 
the claim-
indicative of two different kinds of correlativity is an open question.
26
   
Hurd and Moore argue that by opposition, Hohfeld intended the opposing statuses (i.e. 
the privilege and the duty) to be logical contradictories, i.e. Aristotelian/deontic opposites.
27
  
Pairs of logical contradictories cannot both be true or both be false.  So, in essence, pairs of 
                                                 
24
 This is not to say that one does not possess the status of the no-claim-right bearer.  See Hurd and Moore (2018, 
307); Kramer (2019, 220 21).  There are many statuses that are possessed in virtue of the absence of something.  
of the absence of having wealth.  Being childless and being poor are real properties of individuals.  I, for one, 
certainly possess the property of childless and the property of poor (for California, anyway).  Why individuals may 
not be considered to possess the property -claim- -right 
for Hurd and Moore (2019, 271 72) remains mysterious to me.  
25
 See, e.g., Wenar (2005, 225); Kramer (2000, 10) (
 
26
 See Hurd and Moore (2018); Halpin (2019). 
27
 See Hurd and Moore (2019, 262 63).   
13 
 
logical contradictories carve up the complete space of logical possibility into mutually exclusive 
realms.  That conclusion is easy to see between the claim-right and the no-claim-right.  The 
entire space of claim- A has a claim-right 
 it is not the case that A has a claim-  
We can perform the same analysis with respect to the privilege.  The entire space of 
to say 
is not the case t I think approaching the problem from this 
perspective, it is natural to think  
Such an intuition relies on an 
implicit understanding of the privilege as a deontic option.  This implicit understanding is 
certainly not unreasonable or uncommon in our ordinary discourse on individual freedom and 
liberty.  We often say you are at liberty or free 
Privileges as options (i.e. complete lack of duty or obligation) are connected to freedom 
and liberty because freedom stands opposed to duty and obligation (using these terms loosely 
here).  But I think it is incorrect to interpret the technical Hohfeldian privilege as the deontic 
option because of our commonsense intuitions regarding the relationship between the privilege 
and individual freedom.
28
  The Hohfeldian privilege needs to stand as a logical contradictory to 
the duty to stand in opposition to the duty
                                                 
28
 See Kramer (2019) who argues that Hohfeld was wrong to not interpret the privilege as the deontic option.  Hurd 
Hurd and Moorean interpretation of Hohfeld if one holds that privileges are necessarily bilateral privileges.  
However, such a move clearly changes the logic of the system.  Ibid.  I will note that, though I adopt the Hurd and 
 
of privileges lies.  I am not concerned that the Hohfeldian system might require additional axioms (e.g. the necessity 
of bilateralness for privileges to be morally significant active rights) to produce moral significance (and neither was 
Hohfeld).  I say more about unilateral and bilateral privileges in Chapter Three.   
14 
 
 .  With this in 
mind, I will proceed to discuss the remaining two Hohfeldian relations.  
 C. THE POWER RELATION 
 The claim-right and privilege relations constitute the first-order Hohfeldian relations.  
They govern actions directly because the statuses contained within the relations scope over an 
action (or an abstention from action).  The claim-right relation either requires an affirmative 
action or requires an abstention from action while the privilege relation permits an action.  
Claim-rights and privileges cover the spectrum of moral statuses that a particular action may 
have, i.e., actions may be morally required, morally forbidden, or morally permissible as 
between two (not necessarily distinct) entities.
29
  The second-order relations, the power relation 
and the immunity relation, contain correlative statuses that scope over, not actions, but the first-
order relations.  As second-order relations, the power and immunity relations describe the way in 
which first-order relations may (or may not) be altered. 
 
30
  Following my previous 
definitional structure, which makes the relation between the correlatives explicit, I define the 
power thus: 
 POWER RELATIONdef -order Hohfeldian relation,
31
 nd 
 
 While this definition of the power is the same, structurally speaking, as the definitions of 
the claim-right and privilege above, it is not as obvious what the power actually is.  This comes 
from the comfort with which we use the concept of the duty as a canonical moral and legal 
                                                 
29
 I note that this interpretation of privileges as permissions prevents carving up the possibility space of actions for 
 
30
 Hohfeld (1913, 44). 
31
 - -order Hohfeldian relation by 
being either the beneficial status holder, the detrimental status bearer, or both. 
15 
 
concept.  The claim-right and the privilege are defined in terms of duties and lack of duties.  
Here, the liability is a less familiar concept than the duty, and so more should be said to 
adequately elucidate the concept of the power.  Put simply, for A to be a power holder, A has to 
-
liability bearer, B exists in a passive stat
alteration of his first-order Hohfeldian relation.
32
   
 Like the claim-right and privilege relations, the liability bearer may be the power holder 
himself or another individual, i.e. there may be reflexive power relations.  Interestingly, if the 
power holder is altering a first-order relation between himself and a distinct entity, both the 
power holder and the distinct entity are liability bearers in two distinct power relations.  In such a 
case, a single exercise of a power affects the Hohfeldian statuses of two entities with respect to 
one action.  This is because the power operates on the first-order relations, which have beneficial 
and detrimental statuses usually (but not necessarily) held by two distinct entities.  In essence, by 
operating on one first-order status, the power necessarily operates on its correlative status.  Any 
exercise of a power that affects the duty (by creating, altering, or eliminating a duty) necessarily 
affects the claim-right (by creating, altering, or eliminating the correlative claim-right). Any 
exercise of a power that affects the privilege necessarily affects the no-claim-right in the same 
way.  For example, if I promise to, e.g., meet my friend for dinner, I create a duty for myself, and 
I necessarily and simultaneously create a claim-right correlative to that duty in my friend.  This 
means that I hold a power as to myself as a liability bearer (liable to have a duty created) and as 
to my friend as a liability bearer (to have a claim-right created).  In this way, there are two 
                                                 
32
 See liability and not a duty.  It is a liability to 
have a duty created.  The latter would arise only when, in exercise of their powers, the parties litigant and court 
officers, had done w  
16 
 
 
for each.   
  or 
33
  It is 
only the former cases, where the change in the relation is due to the volitional control of human 
beings, which Hohfeld considered to be exercises of the power.  However, this requirement still 
contains some ambiguity regarding the object of the volition.  Human beings can will to bring 
about a certain set of facts which happen to change the relations or they can will to change the 
relations themselves.  Perhaps Hohfeld intended both to be exercises of the power.  For example, 
when I promise to meet my friend for dinner, I am willing a change in the relation between 
myself and my friend.  Where there was no claim-right (in my friend) and duty (on me), there 
now is a claim-right and a duty.  But human beings can also will things in the world that more 
indirectly alter the relations.  For example, a person can will the actions that result in conceiving 
and producing a child without willing that there now be new claim-rights and duties brought into 
existence.  However, having a child does in fact create new claim-rights (in the child) and duties 
(on the parents) that did not exist prior to the conception and birth of the child.  The heart of this 
distinction is the idea that an agent can either will a change in the relations themselves or will a 
change in the states of affairs of the world that just so happen to change the relations.
34
  I will 
return to this issue when I consider whether animals possess powers. 
 D. THE IMMUNITY RELATION 
 The fourth and final Hohfeldian relation is the immunity relation.  The immunity is 
correlative to the disability. 
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 Ibid, 44. 
34
 See Hurd (1996, 126 34) on the content of the mental state required to will the change in the first-order 
Hohfeldian relation. 
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 IMMUNITY RELATIONdef -order 
  
 -
35
 so A has an immunity as to B with respect 
to some first-order Hohfeldia  to create, alter, or 
36
  The power and the disability, therefore, stand in opposition to one another as 
statuses.  This means that the immunity and the liability will also stand in opposition: where 
there is no liability, there will be immunity.  For example, in the United States, individuals have 
the right to refuse to speak while undergoing custodial interrogation by a law enforcement 
officer.
37
  This rights claim, properly parsed, means that the right holder is a privilege and 
immunity holder, i.e. the right against self-incrimination is a combination of the privilege and 
immunity relations.  Each individual lacks a duty to answer a law enforcement officer during 
custodial interrogation (the privilege) and no individual or institution can create such a duty on 
the individual (the immunity  a judge, and any law enforcement officer all 
lack a power to create a duty on the individual to respond.  So, they are disability bearers as to 
the (usually) arrested individual with respect to his Hohfeldian privilege not to speak while 
undergoing custodial interrogation.   
 -order relations from 
exercises of power by others (or himself) just like the privilege shields certain of the privilege 
tion/requirement (via duties) to others.  In the case of the right not 
to respond to custodial interrogation, an accused may respond to law enforcement questioning, as 
the underlying relation protected by the immunity is the privilege relation, which permits action.  
                                                 
35
 Hohfeld (1913, 55). 
36
 I suspect that concerns regarding the ontological status of the disability as the no-power could be made similar to 
those made regarding the ontological status of the no-claim-right.  See Kramer (2019); Hurd and Moore (2019). 
37
 This is commonly known as one of the Miranda rights, which is typically interpreted to be a set of rights claims 
under the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Miranda v. Arizona. 
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However, even an accused does not have the power to create a duty to continue to respond to law 
enforcement questioning.  At any time that an accused is responding to police questions, he may 
stop, entirely at his discretion, and no authority can compel him to continue.  So, that an accused 
may talk to police officers after being Mirandized in no way reflects the accused exercising a 
power to alter his underlying privilege.  This is an example of a reflexive immunity relation, 
where the immunity holder is the same as the disability bearer.
38
  So, reflexivity is a structural 
feature of all four of the Hohfeldian relations.  Whether a particular relation is reflexive as a 
-order Hohfeldian rel , over which 
the statuses scope. 
 E.  SUMMARY OF HOHFELD S SYSTEM 
Table 1: The Hohfeldian statuses 
 
First-Order Relations 
(Statuses scope over actions) 
Second-Order Relations 
(Statuses scope over first-order 
relations) 
Beneficial Statuses 
(Incidents, 
Entitlements) 
Claim-Right Privilege Power Immunity 
Detrimental Statuses 
(Correlatives) 
Duty 
No-Claim-
Right 
Liability Disability 
 
 Now that I have worked through the four relations individually, I can visually represent 
them as a system.  All the beneficial statuses are listed in the second row.  The detrimental 
statuses, their correlatives, are listed in the bottom row.  So, correlativity can be seen vertically 
                                                 
38
 See Thomson (1990, 59) for a discussion of inalienable rights as immunities we possess as against ourselves. 
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between rows two and three.  Opposition can be seen within the first-order and second-order 
relation groups diagonally. 
 There have been many attempts over the years to disprove the universality of correlativity 
between the beneficial and detrimental statuses.
39
  The primary focus of attack has been on the 
correlativity between claim-rights and duties.  The proposed counterexamples attempt to find 
duties that appear to lack correlative claim-rights or claim-rights that appear to lack correlative 
duties.
40
  For example, everyone has a duty to pay taxes.  Yet, it is argued, there is no claim-right 
correlative to this duty as there is no individual to whom the paying of taxes is owed.  A rights-
based -right to an education.
41
  Whose duty is it to provide 
that child with an education?  Certainly not my duty; I am not personally obligated to provide an 
education for each and every child. 
 A solution to both of these examples that has not been widely explored in the Hohfeldian 
literature is to acknowledge that collectivities, as distinct entities from their constituent 
individuals, are capable of possessing claim-rights and duties (and other statuses) 
s duty to pay taxes, it is the state, a collectivity, that 
possesses the correlative claim-right.  With regard to 
state that is obligated to provide an education for each child.
42
  The obvious cost of such a 
solution is that collectivities are metaphysically troublesome entities.  It is not obvious whether a 
collectivity is just the aggregation of its individuals or something itself unique and apart from the 
                                                 
39
 See, e.g., MacCormick (1976, 309 10); Feinberg (1966, 140 43); Hart (1984, 80 83); Waldron (1984, 12). 
40
 See, e.g., Feinberg (1966, 140 43); Raz (1984b); Raz (1984c, 195 97).  For more recent discussions regarding 
Hohfeldian correlativity between claim-rights and duties, see Halpin (2019), Hurd and Moore (2018, 318 23), and 
Kramer (2000, 22 23). 
41
 MacCormick (1976, 309 10); Feinberg (1966, 143).  More modern versions of this example might include the 
individual right to health care or the individual right to the internet.  It is fairly clear that such rights claims have a 
similar structure, i.e. the individual claiming s/he is owed something from the collective (i.e. society). 
42
 e of claim-
  This is in part why we have governments.   
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aggregation of its individuals.  To admit of collectivities as Hohfeldian status holders would 
require treatment of the collectivity qua collectivity, not as an aggregation of its individuals.
43
  
The issue of collectivities as Hohfeldian status bearers is not very germane to the issue of animal 
rights, as animal rights theorists adhere to individualistic notions of animal rights.  However, I do 
believe some concerns over rights (both here and in Chapter Three) can be solved by adopting a 
view that collectivities qua collectivities can be Hohfeldian status holders.  
A more theorized issue attempting to drive a wedge between claim-rights and duties 
comes from the somewhat older debate between rights-based duties and duty-based rights.  This 
debate focuses on the question of justification of one status and showing that such justification 
does not ground the correlative status.  For example, Mackie argues that because rights are 
something we would like to have (rather than be burdened 
advantage in grounding our duties and our morality.
44
  Kant is the quintessential example of a 
duty-based morality, where claim-rights add nothing more to the moral system which is 
grounded in duties.  Indeed, most of our deontological moralities are duty-based, where the aim 
is to ground moral obligation from which claim-rights arise.  The problem that this question of 
priority or grounding causes for correlativity comes from the fact that correlativity seems to 
contain some kind of notion of identity.
45
  As Halpin has recently pointed out, however, sneaking 
notions of identity into the notion of correlativity is a mistake and one which has been at least 
partly responsible for these debates and apparent rejections of Hohfeldian correlativity.
46
  If the 
                                                 
43
 form 
 
44
 Mackie (1984, 171). 
45
 The notion of identity clearly comes from the fact that the act- es, 
implicit understanding of the relationship between identity and correlativity is what drives Kramer (2019) and 
-claim-  
46
 Halpin (2019, 229 31); see also Hurd and Moore (2018, 321 23). 
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correlative statuses are identical, then what justifies one status ought to justify the other.  So, 
what justifies a claim-right ought to justify the duty, but this is often not the case.  Once the 
separation between logical, mutual entailment and identity is made, one can see that 
justifications for either side of the relation may differ while the logical, mutual entailment 
between the statuses still holds.  This logical, mutual entailment shallow 
correlativity  and is what I rely on in this project.   
III. HOHFELD S RELATIONS AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 Having laid a basic groundwork for the Hohfeldian system of the structure of rights 
claims, I now want to turn to animal rights and explore what animal rights might look like under 
lations as they 
apply to claims of animal rights, I need to discuss a general matter regarding the language 
employed in animal rights theory.  Generally, animal rights views almost always speak of 
animals having a right to such and such.  Such a formulation appears to grant a single right to 
animals as a collectivity; however, I do not interpret animal rights views as making claims 
regarding collectivities of animals.  I interpret this way of speaking as simply a shorthand way of 
saying that each individual animal possesses the right to such and such.  This is a common 
 generally do not mean that humans as a collectivity 
possess a single right not to be enslaved.  What we mean is that each individual human has a 
right not to be enslaved.   
This distinction is important for different reasons in the context of human versus animal 
rights.  In the context of human rights more generally, recognizing that collectivities can be 
Hohfeldian status holders/bearers (and therefore the holders of rights claims) is one mechanism 
22 
 
for responding to certain (alleged) counterexamples to correlativity.  In the animal context, there 
are distinct concerns regarding the moral considerability
47
 of collectivities such as species and 
ecosystems.
48
  For example, ecology recognizes such collectivities are valuable and worth 
preeminent value on biotic systems rather than on individuals within the system.
49
  If such 
collectivities are morally considerable, there are questions whether that considerability takes the 
form of being a Hohfeldian claim-right holder (i.e. could we have duties to such collectivities?).   
 On the whole, I understand animal rights theory as focusing on individual animals, not on 
s have the right 
not to be experimented on,
rights claims, rather than a single right held by the species as a whole.  This interpretation 
implies that animal rights theory is focused on individual animals rather than on collectivities of 
animals (including species).  That animal rights theory usually rejects arguments for the 
culling/elimination of individual animals for the benefit the species or ecosystem supports such 
an interpretation.
50
   
 A. THE CLAIM-RIGHT RELATION AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 
animal rights claims should be understood as containing the claim-right relation.  Let us 
consider, for example, the rights  
articulated earlier, what this really means in the context of animal rights theory is that each dog 
                                                 
47
 , who or 
what can be considered a moral patient, i.e. deserving of moral respect, in a given moral theory.  See Goodpastor 
(1978).  ly 
Chapter Four. 
48
 See Callicott (1989, Ch. 8); Russow (1981). 
49
 Leopold (1970). 
50
 Regan (1983, 354 56); Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 158 59); Francione (2000, 185).  
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s dog, B, has a right not to be experimented on
 
 Generally, all of the recent animal advocacy movements, whether they be rights-based
51
 
or welfare-based,
52
 have had as their aim changing the way that humans treat animals.  The heart 
of animal advocacy is about human behavior.
53
  ship with other 
animals?  The most generic answer, which applies broadly across animal rights theory, is that 
touch 
upon in Chapter Four, but the general notion is that animals are owed some kind of behavioral 
change, most often, some kind of abstention from action by humans.  For example, an extensive 
amount of animal rights theory is focused on the question of humans raising, killing, and eating 
animals, whether through hunting or more recent animal husbandry practices.
54
  Another major 
What is at issue 
in these debates is how humans -order Hohfeldian relations, towards 
animals.  The claim-right is correlative to the duty, and it is the duty that imposes obligations on 
an entity to affirmatively act or abstain from acting in certain ways.  Of the four Hohfeldian 
relations, the claim-right relation, because it contains the duty, is the best equipped to establish 
boundaries on human behavior that are owed directly to animals.
55
  A right that does not compel 
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 See, e.g., Regan (1983). 
52
 See, e.g., Singer (2002). 
53
 See Regan (1983, 357); Singer (2002, 226); Beauchamp (2011, 205). 
54
 See, e.g., Korsgaard (2018, 220 25); Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 76); Rowlands (2009, 162 75); Francione 
(2000, 16 17); Regan (1983, 330 53); Singer (2002, Ch. 4) (while not a rights theorist proper, Singer is 
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 See Beauchamp (2011). 
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a change in human behavior would seem to have little effectiveness for changing the current 
interactions between humans and animals.   
 -
 
ANIMAL CLAIM-RIGHT RELATION: This dog, A, has a claim-right that B not experiment 
on it (referring to A) if and only if B has a duty to A not to experiment on A. 
is that A and B only scope over humans, and minimally competent humans (e.g. moral persons 
or moral agents) at that.  However, moving away from an entirely anthropocentric notion of 
rights as exemplified in the animal rights views, there becomes a legitimate question as to what 
B can refer.  In the context of animal rights theory, the concern is not whether (human) morality 
governs animal behavior,
56
 so we have no strong reason to think that B refers to an animal or 
other entity in the context of animal rights claims.  Additionally, B does not r -as-
particular, those who are capable of being subject to duties (because not every human is capable 
of being subject to a duty). 
 The next question to ask is whether A can really scope over individual animals.  Steven 
rights and refuses to take the position that animals possess claim-rights because there are 
(probably) no animals smart enough to assert such claim-rights.
57
  Such an approach assumes 
that to be a claim-right holder, an entity must be able to assert its claim-right.  However, in the 
case of the claim- scheme that requires that A (the claim-right 
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 Animal rights theory does not aim to govern the behavior of animals among themselves.  It is intended to guide 
the behavior of humans (and those other entities) capable of being guided by reasons.   
57
 Wise (2004, 27); Wise (2000, 57). 
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is not a condition precedent to possessing such rights.  If intelligence sufficient enough to claim 
were necessary for possessing the claim-right, then no marginal human cases would 
possess claim-rights.  This would mean that no human has a duty to such individuals (since any 
such directed duties are correlative to a claim-right).  Surely, that is incorrect, and surely, Wise 
would not want to endorse such an outcome since his, just 
depends heavily on the argument from marginal human cases.
58
     
The act of claiming (what it is, who does it, and how it is done) is certainly crucial to a 
-right relation to only those who can 
actively claim their rights.  It does lim -
right to only those who can be subject to a duty.  Allowing an entity that cannot be subject to a 
that does not make any sense.  For example, if we allowed infants to be in the scope of B, we 
would end up with some very bizarre relational claims, e.g. this dog, A, has a claim-right that B, 
this infant, not experiment on it and B, this infant, has a correlative duty to A not to experiment 
on A.  It is hard to see the sense in such a statement since infants are not capable of being subject 
to any duties in the first place (although they usually develop into being subject to duties later in 
life).   
 It may seem like I have done something unfair in making this move: I have read a 
restriction into the scope of possible Bs in the claim-right relation
similar restriction on the scope of possible As.  I believe this move is defensible based on the 
                                                 
58
 (s) for being a right holder under the will theory of rights (see 
Chapter Three), in particular as espoused by Hart, with the condition(s) necessary for being a Hohfeldian status 
holder.  Additionally, I touch on the argument from marginal human cases in Chapter Four. 
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structural features 
right into smaller, more precise relations of distinct statuses, some of which are more familiar 
than others.  In particular, the duty is a very familiar moral concept.  It performs all of the heavy 
lifting in traditional moral theorizing where we talk about what we owe, what our obligations 
are, and so forth.  Arguably, we learn something new about the nature of rights when the 
conceptual analysis reveals the claim-right relation which relates a less familiar (though certainly 
not unknown) concept, the claim-right, to the more familiar concept, the duty, through the 
relation of correlativity.  Perhaps the familiarity of the duty, and the work it does in establishing 
moral maxims, is one reason we are inclined to think it prior to the claim-right.  Indeed, the 
claim-right is truly a passive status, whereas the duty is an active status. 
 In sum, it is too quick to conclude at this stage that animal rights do not contain the 
claim-right relation on the basis that animals cannot claim and claiming is necessary for being a 
claim-
for being a rights holder (or indeed a holder/bearer of any of the eight Hohfeldian statuses), and 
we should not read such conditions into his system of relations absent good reason.  In addition, 
the
effectuate such a change because it is the only concept which requires an affirmative action or an 
abstention from action.  Animal rights theory needs the claim-right relation because it needs the 
power to change human behavior.  That power is contained uniquely within the duty. 
 B. THE PRIVILEGE RELATION AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 Whether animal rights claims can contain the privilege relation depends on a couple of 
things.  First, some animal rights claims simply do not appear to contain the privilege relation 
27 
 
based on the nature of the 
experimented on by a scientist just does not contain the privilege relation.  That right does not 
say anything substantive about what the chimpanzee may do.  It is silent about permissible 
actions.  At its heart, the privilege relation is about permissible actions.  In this example, the 
being under a duty to abstain from specific actions, 
something that falls squarely within the scope of the claim-right relation, but not within the scope 
of the privilege relation.  So, I need another animal rights example, one that plausibly suggests 
the existence of a privilege relation within the rights claim. 
 If I consider some other common examples of animal rights, the right not to be 
enslaved/owned, the right not to be hunted or trapped, the right not to be killed, these do not 
seem to contain a privilege relation either.  Such rights claims are concerned with how humans 
treat animals, and therefore what behavior animals are entitled to from humans.  They do not 
touch on what animals may or may not do.  Because the essence of the privilege relation is 
articulating permissible behavior for the privilege holder, it does not appear that animal rights 
theory is aimed at making such statements.
59
  But let us assume that we are aiming to attribute 
privileges to animals, such as the right to go wherever one pleases or the right to fly wherever 
one pleases, could we make sense of this? 
 Assuming that we can at least make sense of the claim that animals can possibly be 
privilege holders, I would argue that it is only meaningful if we also assume that animals are 
capable of being under a duty to affirmatively act or abstain from acting.  That animals are 
capable of being under a duty is a tenuous assumption that relies heavily on scientific 
investigation into animal behavior, but it is not outside of the realm of possibility.  The 
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 But see Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 102) where they frame the animal rights issue as one in which we do not 
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interesting theoretical question is why does the ability to be under a duty matter to whether an 
entity can be a privilege holder? 
Recall that the privilege stands in opposition to the duty (i.e. the privilege is the no duty-
a meaningful status to ascribe to an entity, as opposed to 
vacuous and trivial, there must be some possibility that that entity could be a duty ( ) bearer 
but is in fact not one.  If it is impossible for an entity to bear the status of duty bearer, then 
bearing the status of privilege holder is ultimately trivial for that entity.
60
  For example, consider 
, etc.) to 
travel f , etc. have no-claim-right 
, etc. have no-claim-right that I not 
travel faster than the speed of light, I have no duty not to travel faster than the speed of light.  
However, in the reality we live in with the constraints of the laws of nature, I simply cannot 
travel faster than the speed of light.  So, have I really stated anything meaningful by claiming 
that I have no duty not to travel faster than the speed of light?  To put me under a duty to not 
travel faster than the speed of light is meaningless since I could not do it if I tried.  So, if I assert 
clude at least the 
privilege relation, I have not articulated a meaningful rights claim.  I do not have a privilege to 
do that which the laws of nature forbid. 
                                                 
60
 See Thomson  
-living items, such as 
shoes, can be privilege holders.  As I argue in this section, such an interpretation makes the privilege relation 
unnecessarily trivial.  The privilege relation is much better understood (and indeed, resumes some strength without 
relying on the claim-right relation) as existing only when the potential privilege holder is capable of being under the 
relevant duty, but is in fact not.   
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 Let me consider another example.  I have the privilege to walk on the sidewalk at 
midnight.  The correlative to this is that the city has a no-claim-right that I do not walk on the 
sidewalk at midnight.  Part of what makes this privilege meaningful is that the city could possess 
a claim-right that I not walk on the sidewalk at midnight.  And so, I could have a duty to the city 
to not walk on the sidewalk at midnight.  This in fact occurs when cities set curfews requiring 
their inhabitants to remain indoors during certain hours of the evening.  Humans possess an 
exceptionally large quantity of these kinds of privileges.
61
  For example, I have a privilege to 
raise my right hand, to lower my right hand, to turn my head left, etc.  In principle, however, 
since humans are generally capable of being placed under duties, none of these inordinate 
number of privileges runs the risk of being trivial in the same way that the privilege becomes 
trivial when ascribed to an entity that is incapable of being placed under a duty.  I may have the 
privilege to raise my right hand, but I am capable of being placed under a duty not to do so, e.g. 
if I were taking part in an experiment requiring me not to raise my right hand.  It is this 
capability of being placed under a duty that makes the privilege meaningful. 
 This issue of being capable of being placed under a duty is distinct from the issue of 
being entitled to the non-
that privilege.  Without more, privileges as such are generally considered unprotected from 
outside interference.
62
  The more important privileges are sometimes considered protected from 
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 Thomson (1990, 45 46). 
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 Because we live in societies that generally prohibit (unjust) assaults, batteries, murders, etc., technically, all 
, they are protecte
here.  Privileges can be much more narrowly protected, and that is the sense of protectedness I intend in this 
discussion.   
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exercise of the privilege, and sometimes this protectedness is claimed to be that in virtue of 
which a privilege is meaningful.
63
  So, for example, my privilege to walk down the sidewalk 
exactly where I please is generally unprotected from interference.  No one is required to allow 
me to walk on the sidewalk exactly where I please; sometimes, I must adjust my course because 
others occupy the desired location before I arrive there.
64
  On the other hand, my privilege to 
move about freely in my house is protected from interference.  Others have a duty not to interfere 
with my movements in my own house, and I have a claim-right against others that they not 
interfere with me moving in my own house as I please.  This privilege to move about freely in 
my house, because it is specifically protected, is meaningful whereas the former is not. 
 
slightly misleading because the notion of protectedness is not contained within the privilege 
itself.  When a privilege is protected, others are under a duty not to interfere with the privilege 
claim-right that others not interfere with his exercise of his privilege in certain ways.  So, the 
protected privilege is really a complex rights claim that contains (at least) two Hohfeldian 
relations.  The unprotected privilege is a rights claim that contains only the privilege relation and 
no claim-right to non-
notion of protectedness (and the way in which it makes the privilege meaningful) is quite distinct 
aced under a duty (rather 
than possessing no duty-not).  Indeed, the issue of protectedness does not even arise if we cannot 
overcome the triviality I suggested earlier (i.e. being incapable of being placed under a duty). 
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move about towards that spot on the sidewalk.  But I have no claim-right against someone who is already in a spot 
on the sidewalk to demand he move from that spot or not occupy that spot before I get there. 
31 
 
 So, how does all this relate to animals and privileges?  There is little evidence that any 
animals are capable of being under a duty to affirmatively act or abstain from acting.  While it is 
true that certain animal species (e.g. dolphins, elephants, great apes, even dogs) demonstrate 
highly social forms of life constrained sometimes by what appear to be some kinds of normative 
boundaries within their social groups, I do not take this as particularly compelling evidence for 
concluding that animals are capable of being under a duty.  If animals are not capable of being 
under a duty to act or refrain from acting, then ascribing to them privileges (of any kind) is 
essentially vacuous and trivial and the issue of protectedness is not relevant.  To say that a bird 
has the privilege to fly wherever it pleases when it can never be placed under a duty not to fly 
wherever it pleases does not amount to much.  Because the bird can never be under a duty not to 
fly wherever it pleases, no one can ever have a claim-right as to the bird not to fly here or there.  
If there can never be a claim-
pleases is trivial.  The bird will just fly wherever it pleases.  The overwhelming majority of the 
animal kingdom is not capable of being placed under a duty to act in a certain way.  Humans are 
the only animals who can act from reason;
65
 they are the only animals that can be considered full 
moral agents.
66
  To meaningfully be said to be under a duty, there has to be a sense in which the 
  Duties count as reasons for action or abstention from 
action; they are not external stimuli that produce an instinctive response.  To proclaim that 
migratory animals have the privilege to migrate along a particular path, e.g., does not say 
anything meaningful because they could not be obligated, or convinced by any other reason, to 
do otherwise. 
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 Let me next consider the possibility t
my first sense) to ascribe to some animal rights claims.  If we assume that some marginal, high-
functioning animals are capable of being under duties, there are two distinct issues to consider.  
The first issue concerns the mechanism by which such animals are placed under or removed 
from a duty to affirmatively act or abstain from acting in a particular way.  It is widely assumed 
that animals, even high functioning ones, cannot provide consent.  I cannot recall ever seeing a 
claim that animals can promise.  Can animals perceive moral facts (assuming a realist 
metaethics)?  I do not believe there have been attempts to demonstrate that animals have 
sufficient reason to apprehend their moral obligations, like moral philosophers.  So, there is a 
real question of how animals would end up recognizing they are under a duty to us in the first 
place.   
 A possible explanation for this concern (that also provides a view that animals are under 
duties in certain cases) could be what Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest in their citizenship 
account of domesticated animal rights.
67
  For Donaldson and Kymlicka, the mere presence of 
68
  
project of social life, they must engage in various forms of self-res
domesticated animals, have responsibilities.
69
  For example, the pet dog sacrifices certain 
freedoms, e.g. to eat anything it comes across, and has certain responsibilities, e.g. to not pee in 
the house, in return for certain goods from its humans, e.g. a warm bed at night, regular feeding, 
veterinary care when necessary.   
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 As an initial matter, I find it hard to say that dogs are under a duty not to pee in the house 
in such cases as it is hardly clear that the dog does not pee inside based on any kind of reason.  
Donaldson and Kymlicka adopt an extreme non-cognitive view of what can constitute moral 
action to defend their citizenship theory of domesticated animals.
70
  They extend moral action 
Donaldson and Kymlicka miss here is that even if the passions play a role in moral action, it is 
not the case that reason plays no role in moral action.  Even Hume did not go so far as to say that 
reason played no role in moral action.
71
 For Hume, the moral maxims alone could never generate 
moral action; in this way, the passions are fundamental for moral action for Hume.  But, reason 
animals do at all. 
 But let us assume that line of reasoning is unsuccessful, and the dog is under a duty not to 
pee in the house.  In virtue of what is it under such a duty?  From habitual commands from its 
human?  From regular behavior training teaching it to pee outside?  From some natural fact of 
house?  Dogs are 
not under a duty because they have chosen to give up peeing in the house in return for regular 
feeding and a human family or reasoned that that is what they ought to do to best satisfy their 
passions (i.e. their basic desires for food and shelter).  No study has yet demonstrated that 
animals make such conceptually-rich bargains, or reason to or intuit directly moral facts.  It is an 
extremely complex concept to not pee in the house in return for regular feedings and a safe and 
warm home.  Dogs do not have the requisite sense of temporality to understand it.  It is simply 
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depends fundamentally on humans possessing moral sentiments, not just reason. 
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habitual behavior that housebroken dogs do not pee in the house.  Indeed, I find it entirely 
strange to call behaviors imposed on animals by human conditioning behaviors that an animal is 
responsible or duty-bound to perform.  Animals usually behave the way they do with us because 
we mold their behavior through conditioning that we consciously (or unconsciously) impose.  
That is hardly a duty in the sense that we mean in moral theory.  And furthermore, even if it were 
a duty in some exceptionally expansive sense, it would be humans who determine the precise 
scope of the duties for animals through such conditioning.
72
  Not a very comfortable result for 
animal rights views I would wager.   
 Contained in this discussion I have defended the claims (1) that an individual has to be 
capable of bearing duties to have a meaningful privilege and (2) that animals are not capable of 
bearing duties and so animals are not capable of being privilege holders.  Even if my defense of 
these claims fails, there is still the concern of the protectedness of the privilege.  If animals only 
have unprotected privileges, then there is hardly a point to having privileges for them.  The 
privilege becomes trivial in a different sense than I discussed above, namely that human beings 
my previous example, if a bird has a privilege to migrate along this particular route, where, e.g., 
there is nothing in the unprotected privilege that protects the bird from the harms of human 
interference.  Only if that privilege is coupled with a claim-right to non-interference by the city 
would such a privilege be meaningful for the bird.  Unprotected privileges do nothing to rectify 
human-inflicted harms and abuses on animals. 
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scope of the just relationship between humans and domesticated animals.  Yet, many a dog and many a cat would 
very much love to lie on their owners
determine what the dog and cat may do.  Domesticated animals express their subjective good all the time; what they 
are permitted to do (in a non-Hohfeldian sense) is decided by their human owners.   
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 In sum, I am quite skeptical that animals are capable of being duty bearers, and for this 
reason, I conclude that it is trivial to claim that animal rights claims contain privilege relations.  
To so claim provides little to no insight into the place of animals in our rights theory.  However, 
for someone less skeptical that animals are capable of being duty bearers, there are still two 
issues regarding the value that the privilege relation would bring to animal rights claims.  First, it 
would be humans who set and define the scope of the duties for animals, resulting in a less than 
desirable hierarchy in our moral theory.  Second, such privileges would carry little meaning in 
the animal-human context absent accompanying claim-rights to non-interference.  But such 
claim-rights to non-interference are correlative t
privileges.  So, to the extent that animals even have privileges, they would have to be protected 
privileges and would therefore only be meaningful in reference to human duties to not interfere 
with animals in certain ways.   
 C. THE POWER RELATION AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 
,
mean create, eliminate, and alter first-order Hohfeldian relations.  Hohfeld considered powers to 
73
  Thus, the power is explicitly 
tied to the right- hat animals cannot be 
power holders and leave the discussion at that is somewhat question-begging.  The main inquiry 
is whether animals possess the kind of volition that Hohfeld thought was at play in cases where 
humans are exercising powers.  The answer to this would determine whether animal rights 
claims contain power relations. 
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through their actions. The mere alteration of a Hohfeldian relation, however, is not necessarily a 
power in the sense that Hohfeld intended.  For example, let me assume that some migratory 
species of birds migrates along a particular route and that human beings have a duty not to 
 scenario, the birds have claim-
rights against us that we not interfere with (damage or block through, e.g., construction) their 
migration route.  Now, it is possible that those birds alter their migration route based on, e.g., 
changes in winter weather patterns.  And so, the next year they migrate along a slightly different 
route, with which we are duty- -rights have been altered, 
but not through any exercise of a power on the part of any of the birds.   
 Another example is the very common claim of animal rights theory that animals each 
have a claim-right against us (each and collectively) not to be killed.  There are many 
circumstances where we may think that this claim-right no longer exists due to certain behavior 
loses his claim-right not to be killed.
74
  This elimination of the claim-right relation is certainly 
through no exercise of a power as Hohfeld envisioned it.  And even though a notion of self-
defense may seem to underlie this intuition, the claim-right relation is not eliminated because the 
dog attacked the child culpably.  It is eliminated because it is generally accepted that humans 
have a(n) (absolute) privilege to protect themselves against life-threatening aggressors, culpable 
-right when the dog becomes a life-
threatening aggressor, and it is the claim-right relation that must bow out of existence.  
                                                 
74
 See, e.g., Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 41). 
37 
 
Individuals are not generally thought to be morally required to allow themselves to be physically 
harmed or killed by innocent or culpable aggressors.
75
 
 If animals can act to alter first-order Hohfeldian relations but not necessarily by 
exercising powers, we should be tempted to ask: what does it look like for an entity to exercise a 
Hohfeldian power?  Common examples of exercises of the Hohfeldian power include promising 
and consenting.
76
  In the case of promising, power holders create duties for themselves owed to 
others.  For example, promising to meet a friend for dinner at a specific time creates a duty for 
me and simultaneously creates the correlative claim-right (for my friend).  In the case of 
consenting, the power holder is often eliminating a duty another has towards him. For example, 
you.  This effectively creates a privilege in another (and a no-claim-right on oneself) where 
before there was a duty (and a claim-right).   
 Even the most adamant animal rights theorists do not appear to ascribe these kinds of 
interpreted to ascribe powers to animals.  What would be troubling about adopting such a view?  
volitional control of a human being, i.e. they are in essence a particular kind of (human) mental 
state.  As Hurd argues, this kind of mental state has special moral force because it is essential to 
the autonomous will of the power holder to be a legislator of moral rights and duties.
77
  To will 
an alteration of first-order Hohfeldian relations (which can be effectuated simply by willing an 
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statuses.  Perhaps the content of the claim-
posing a threat to the li
no claim-right not to be killed in self-defense cases, contrary to the typical handling of self-defense cases as 
examples of conflicts of rights.  I generally skirt the content of rights problem throughout this project. 
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alteration of duties) is to be a self-legislator of moral claim-rights and duties.  This, animals 
cannot and do not do based on the evidence that we now have. 
 I do not dispute that the actions of animals can indirectly alter the first-order Hohfeldian 
relations, but this is something that Hohfeld considered and rejected as sufficient for the exercise 
mens 
rea, behind the actions which alter Hohfeldian relations.
78
  Though the content of this volition is 
79
 animals do not appear close to exercising powers because 
they lack the requisite intentionality regardless of concerns over content.  So do many marginal 
human cases.  Therefore, I conclude that animal rights claims do not contain power relations.    
 D. THE IMMUNITY RELATION AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 At its core, the immunity relation creates a sphere of protection for the immunity holder 
against others exercising their Hohfeldian powers to create, alter, and eliminate the immunity 
-order Hohfeldian relations.  In simpler terms, the immunity relation prevents 
changes to certain first-order relations between entities by certain entities.  For example, all 
humans have the right not to be enslaved.  This rights claim is really a conjunction of privileges 
that are each protected by an immunity relation.  Each person has a no-claim-right that I act as 
his/her slave, and nobody can eliminate the no-claim-right and create a claim-right that I act as 
his/her slave.  This is not achievable by conquest or even by my consent.  That privilege relation 
is protected from alteration by any (attempted) exercise of a power.   
 This kind of protection for certain first-order Hohfeldian relations is significant, and it is 
not surprising that Wise finds it to be the most compelling of the Hohfeldian relations to ascribe 
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to animal rights claims.
80
  However, as I have discussed in the case of human slavery, the right 
not to be enslaved contains not just the immunity relation.  This is because the immunity relation, 
like the power relation, is necessarily referential to some first-order Hohfeldian relation.  Put 
81
  Immunities 
protect first-order Hohfeldian relations from alteration by power holders.  They do not stand 
alone.  Again using the case of slavery, there has to be an underlying Hohfeldian relation that the 
immunity protects from alteration by the exercise of a power by a (potential) power holder.  To 
simply say 
framework of the immunity relation that Hohfeld articulated.  At an intuitive level, it is appealing 
to say this and mean something like: you can never make me your slave.  But this is very far 
in the case of animal rights claims. 
 If animal rights claims contain immunity relations, they must also contain at least one 
first-order Hohfeldian relation which the immunity relation protects.  Animal rights claims will 
not contain the right not to be enslaved as I parsed it above into a privilege relation and an 
immunity relation because I have argued that animal rights claims do not contain the privilege 
relation.  However, animal rights claims could be parsed into a different right not to be enslaved, 
one that is based on the claim-right rather than the privilege.  For example, when I say I have the 
right not to be enslaved, I may mean that all other humans have duties not to treat me like 
property.
82
  We could ascribe a similar claim-right to animals: each animal has a claim-right 
against every human being that each human not treat that animal as property.
83
  This would mean 
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that we are all under a duty not to treat animals as property.  These claim-right relations could be 
protected by immunity relations where the animals are the immunity holders and each human is a 
disability bearer.  This would mean that we have no power to alter our duties to each animal not 
to treat him/her/it as property.   
 The claim-right and immunity relations are considered passive rights.  The claim-right 
and immunity are passive statuses.  An entity that is a claim-right and immunity holder does not 
have to actively assert those entitlements to in fact possess them.  If we have duties to animals, 
then they have the correlative claim-rights against us.  If we are disabled from altering those 
duties (i.e. we lack the power to alter those duties), then they have immunities protecting their 
claim-rights against us.  Our duties and disabilities do not depend on animals possessing any 
particular capabilities.   
 As will become clear in Chapter Four, animal rights theory has largely been focused on 
arguing that humans have duties to animals.  It has not been explored whether we, as entities 
capable of being power holders, in fact lack a power to alter those duties.  The inquiry into 
whether animal rights claims contain immunities has two distinct facets: one conceptual and one 
-order relation,
84
 it must be 
combined with either a power relation or an immunity relation.  This is because the first-order 
relations are either alterable or not alterable.  If they are alterable, they are combined with a 
power relation.  If they are not alterable, they are combined with an immunity relation.  So, 
whenever a rights claim is parsed into the claim-right relation and/or the privilege relation, there 
must be some power relation or immunity relation operating on that first-order relation contained 
within the rights claim as well. 
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 The pragmatic concern has a couple of components unique to animal rights claims.  My 
conceptual argument assumes that the claim-right holder can be either a power holder or an 
immunity holder.  However, in the case of animals, it is not possible for them to be power 
holders (as in the case of human claim-right holders), so it would seem, based on my argument, 
that the only option would be that animals hold immunities for each and every one of their claim-
rights. But this does not follow.  It is possible that animals hold claim-rights, do not hold powers, 
and do not hold immunities because human beings have powers to -
rights.  Indeed, it is perhaps tempting to think that we do in fact possess powers to alter any such 
duties that we owe to animals and that their claim-rights are not combined with immunities.
85
  If 
that were the case, animal rights -right relations, alterable at 
human discretion.  Interestingly, in such a case, human beings would then have rights claims that 
ies to animals.
86
    
 Perhaps this pragmatic concern is why Wise focused on the immunity relation with 
respect to animal rights claims.  There is a sense in which the immunity relation appears to make 
the first-order relation (i.e. those human duties to animals) absolute, in that it can never be 
immunity relation.  The immunity relation does not provide that kind of absoluteness of the first-
order relation because the facts of the world may change that alter the first-order relation.  The 
immunity relation is better understood as a sphere of protection against the alteration of the first-
order relation by other agents.
87
  Even though humans are generally free to structure the relations 
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among themselves as they see fit through exercises of our Hohfeldian powers, certain relations 
cannot be altered by us through the mere exercise of our agency.  That is the value of the 
immunity relation: it protects a particular first-order relation from alteration by agents.   
 Animal rights theory would do best to appreciate  insight with respect to the 
immunity relation and combine those immunity relations with the underlying claim-right 
relations that they protect.  As I have sketched in the alternative, to deny that animal rights 
claims contain immunity relations, would remove an important component of protection from the 
agency of persons that makes animal rights claims meaningful against those same persons.  
-rights that other agents can freely alter eviscerates the value of having the 
claim-right.
88
  -rights do not come up in considering the rights claims of 
persons because in that situation, persons will at least themselves have powers to alter those 
claim-rights as well as (possibly) other agents.  But, even so, it still may be concerning in the 
case of persons to think that one has a claim-right that is not protected by an immunity relation 
and is, therefore, freely alterable by other agents at will.   
 In sum, the immunity relation clearly plays an important role in setting proper and 
meaningful boundaries in the relations between humans and animals through rights claims.  
Because animal rights claims are really claim-rights (and therefore human duties), it is the 
immunity relation scoping over these claim-rights that provides a genuine entitlement for animal 
claim-right holders.  This is because the immunity relation defines a sphere of protection for a 
 first-order relations from interference by other agents at will.   
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genuine entitlement or legal position  
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IV. BRIEF REFLECTION 
 I want to briefly pause on the larger picture regarding the implications of my arguments 
in this c
parsed out from our ordin
just how complex the relations are between individuals who stand in some rights relationship.  It 
demonstrates a kind of richness in the possibility of human-to-human relations.  I have 
essentially argued that this richness is made possible to its fullest extent only when the two 
entities have normal, full-functioning human mental capabilities (perhaps agency, perhaps the 
faculties of personhood).   
 This comes from the fact that there is more to Hohfeldian correlativity than shallow 
correlativity.  Consider other kinds of correlativity relations, such as spatial correlativity.  I am 
right/left o  of the individuals 
so related because spatial relations generally do not require any mental capabilities.  All that 
matters is that certain spatial facts about objects hold.  Other kinds of correlativity that do not 
require certain mental capabilities may require certain other properties (besides spatial 
properties), like being (or having been) alive.  For example, X is the biological mother of Y, and 
Y is the biological daughter of X.  One of these statements cannot be true without the other being 
true, and neither X nor Y need to have certain mental capabilities to stand in their reciprocal, 
biological relationship of parent to offspring.  Rocks could not participate in a parent-offspring 
89
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 The relations captured by rights claims are more complex than relations of spacial 
location or biological lineage because they are normatively correlative (not merely factually 
correlative).
90
  If my arguments above are successful, the privilege and power (as beneficial 
statuses of the active relations) presume that the individuals holding those statuses are capable of 
tive-bearer in particular 
ways that require certain mental capabilities.  This might mean that there is a further typology of 
kinds that distinguishes the active relations (i.e. the 
privilege and power relations) from the passive relations (i.e. the claim-right and immunity 
relations).
91
  Indeed, this is arguably what I have attempted to show in my discussion of which 
Hohfeldian relations are properly considered to be contained in animal rights claims. Such a 
possibility is perfectly compatible with the claim that animals possess rights.  But, it also 
emphasizes an often-lost perspective on the nature of rights in uniquely human forms of 
normative life.  Some of our rights relations, as expressed in Hohfeldian terms, require that the 
entities in the relation possess certain normative capabilities (as expressed by possessing certain 
mental capacities).  It should come as no surprise that animals (and marginal human cases) will 
not participate in certain of those relations.  Just as it is nonsensical to say that a rock is the 
parent of another rock (because rocks do not participate in biological relations), so too it is 
nonsensical to say that animals (and marginal human cases) possess privileges and powers.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have explored the form of animal rights through the lens of Hohfeldian 
analysis.  I have argued that animal rights claims do not contain privilege or power relations.  
ly in normative human relations.  They 
are not capable of being under a duty to act or refrain from acting.  Furthermore, they are not 
capable of exercising powers, such as promising and consenting.  I also argued that the claim-
right is the primary relation that we mean when we talk about animal rights.  Saying that animals 
possess rights is a way to say that we, humans, have duties to them to act (or refrain from acting) 
in particular ways.  Finally, I argued that we must conclude that animal rights claims, conceived 
of as claim-right relations, ought to be considered to be combined with immunity relations where 
animals possess immunities against humans from freely altering our duties to them.  Lacking 
immunity relations in animal rights claims will leave such claim-
ultimately impotent to require that there be any change in human behavior towards animals. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE FUNCTION OF RIGHTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In Chapter Two, I explored the first component of the nature of animal rights claims, 
wh  of rights.  In this chapter, I take up the second component of 
the nature of rights discussion , and explore 
what we might learn about the nature of animal rights from it.  The debate regarding the function 
of rights has traditionally been split into two camps: the will theory and the interest theory.  I will 
argue that animal rights theory must be committed to the interest theory of the function of rights.  
To show this, I will start by examining the debate on the function of rights, independent of 
animal rights.  This will include an unavoidably windy exploration of the will and interest 
theories as well as attempts to overcome the will/interest theory divide.  Following that 
discussion, I will argue that animal rights are not possible under any theory of the function of 
rights except the interest theory.  So, animal rights theory must be committed to an interest 
theory of rights.   
 The debate over the function of rights is part of the debate on the nature of rights.  Like 
Hohfeldian analysis, this debate occurs outside of the realm of any particular set of normative 
commitments, so it continues the discussion about the metaphysical nature of rights as such.  But 
concept of a right into its constituent relations, the function of rights debate centers on the issue 
of what rights do for the rights holder.  
of rights is facially neutral with regards to who is a rights holder.  However, certain entities may 
fail to qualify as rights holders if they are not capable of having the relevant property claimed to 
be furthered by possessing rights.  For example, entities that lack autonomy and sovereignty will 
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fail to be rights holders according to the will theory (generally speaking), and entities lacking 
interests will fail to be rights holders according to the interest theory (generally speaking).  What 
this means will become clearer as the chapter progresses.   
In order to explore the specific function of rights theories, I must first address what 
appears to me to be a metadebate regarding the proper scope of a theory of the function of rights.  
The metadebate distinction between capacious and narrow theories of the functions of rights will 
impact my categorization and analyses of the will and interest theories as well as the other 
function of rights theories that attempt to overcome the will/interest theory divide.  I maintain 
that capacious views are valuable for a general inquiry into the nature of rights.  However, when 
it comes to animal rights, taking the capacious or narrow view will not make much of a 
difference as to what function of rights theory animal rights theory must take.  Animal rights 
theory must adopt an interest theory (capacious or narrow) of rights.  In this chapter, I take no 
general stance on the function of rights debate.   
II. A METADEBATE IN THE FUNCTION OF RIGHTS DEBATE 
 There appears to be a metadebate in the function of rights debate regarding the scope that 
contend that the function of rights debate is best understood as limited only to the claim-right 
(accompanied by immunities).
1
  
the function of rights debate as not confined to the claim-right.
2
  I will call this th
view.  The result of having two such divergent goals in providing a theory of the function of 
rights is that there are essentially two different conversations in the function of the rights debate.  
The narrow view is concerned only with explaining the relationship between duties and claim-
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 Kramer and Steiner (2007, 294 98); Sreenivasan (2005); Wenar (2013); MacCormick (1976, 306 07). 
2
 Hart (1982, 188 89); Simmonds (2000, 211 25); Cruft (2004); Wenar (2005). 
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rights through a function of rights theory.  The capacious view treats the Hohfeldian relations as 
atomistic units and focuses on what those units, individually or combined with other relations, do 
for the right holder.
3
   
 To focus a theory of the function of rights on the claim-right (accompanied by 
immunities) seems to place improper importance on claim-rights over the privilege and the 
power.  One may argue that to the extent we talk about privileges and powers as being rights, 
they are only rights in virtue of the claim-rights that attach to their non-interference.
4
  For 
example, I have a privilege to walk down the street.  Kramer and Steiner (and Raz) argue that 
calling this a right comes not from anything the privilege represents or brings to the table, but 
from the claim-rights that protect the privilege from interference, such as the claim-right not to 
be assaulted or murdered or obstructed while walking down the street.   
There are a couple of things to think about with respect to this problem.  First, I cannot 
think of a privilege that is not protected by the claim-right not to be assaulted (unjustly) or 
murdered.  The claim-right not to be assaulted (unjustly) or murdered (generally) is the sine qua 
non of exiting a Hobbesian state of nature and making human civilization possible.
5
  All 
6
  So, I do 
not see how claim- my privilege to walk down the 
street, let alone the fundamental element that makes the privilege into a right, as Kramer and 
Steiner seem to suggest.  In other words, the privilege itself is meaningful in understanding why I 
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 Hart (1982, 171 73).  Such a perimeter of general obligation would not exist in the state of nature, and any such 
Thomson (1990, 50).  Bentham and Hobbes would consider 
such naked privileges to constitute rights.  A concept that makes sense of this is the idea of natural rights.  Natural 
rights are those rights that each man possesses prior to society in virtue of his nature as man.  See MacDonald 
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can claim that I have a right to walk down the street, and it is meaningful without reference to the 
claim-rights I also have against being assaulted (unjustly) and murdered.   
Second, we have to think about whether other claim-rights to non-interference (i.e. not 
claim-rights of perimeter of general obligation) are the fundamental element which makes a 
privilege into a right.  Generally, privileges to go and be physically located somewhere at some 
point in time are not protected from interference from others through obstruction.  We may call 
this acceptable interference with a privilege, and acceptable interference with a privilege means 
that there is no claim-right to non-interference in that way.  So, I have the privilege to walk down 
the street (actually, it would be on the sidewalk next to the street).  So does every other free 
person in society, but we cannot all simultaneously exercise our privilege in the same location at 
the same time.  None of us have a claim-right to be free of such obstruction from others equally 
exercising their privileges to walk down the street.  When pushing through crowded city 
sidewalks, I certainly have a privilege to move in the direction I please, but I do not have any 
claim-rights against anyone in the crowd that they move out of the public space they currently 
occupy and I wish to occupy.  It is on me to go around them if they are in my way (even though 
courtesy or the supererogatory may dictate people move to the extent they can to let me pass).  In 
this case of acceptable interference, others are passively interfering with my privilege to walk 
down the street.   
Alternatively, obstruction could be taken to mean something more like some kind of 
unjustified, active restraint or interference.  We may call this unacceptable interference with a 
privilege, and unacceptable interference with a privilege means that there is a claim-right to non-
interference in that way.  The actions contained in the perimeter of general obligation would 
undoubtedly constitute unacceptable interferences.  However, it is possible that not all 
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unacceptable interferences would be actions contained in the perimeter of general obligation.  
For example, while I am walking down the sidewalk, a preacher purposefully steps out into my 
path and begins preaching how I am a sinner for wearing shorts.  As I try to avoid the preacher 
and continue on my way, as is my privilege, he continually walks backward, matching my step, 
calling me a sinner, and not allowing me to move past him.  The preacher does this for ten, 
twenty, thirty seconds, and brings me to halt in my journey down the sidewalk.  I eventually have 
to demand that he let me pass, after which I am finally able to walk around and past the preacher.  
 rose to the level of 
being unjustified, and I have a claim-right that he not so interfere.  I even asserted my claim-right 
to non-interference with my privilege to end the interference itself.  I would not say that such 
interference is part of the perimeter of general obligation.  It was unacceptable, yes, but the sine 
qua non of society as such?  Not so much.   
The query is now more precise: Are privileges rights only when and because they are 
protected (via claim-rights) from unacceptable interference?  Claim-rights against unacceptable 
interference provide the circumstances surrounding and the conditions for the possibility of 
exercising a privilege.  They do not have anything to do with the decision to exercise a privilege 
(other than making it possible).  Continuing with the earlier example, my claim-rights against 
unacceptable interference do not have anything to do with my decision to walk (or not walk) 
down this street on this day at this time.  Those claim-rights set the baseline conditions under 
which I actually have a meaningful choice and opportunity to walk down the street (or refrain 
from doing so).  Such baseline conditions are required for a meaningful choice and opportunity 
to exercise most (if not all) privileges.  They have little to do with what the privilege itself should 
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mean for the privilege holder, namely that he has a kind of discretion over his actions.
7
  Those 
claim-rights only set the ground rules for the possibility of the privilege holder having such 
meaningful discretion.  But it does not follow that a theory of the function of rights should only 
focus on the relations that govern the circumstances under which such discretion is meaningfully 
possible.  The discretion itself is distinctly important beyond (or at least in addition to and 
independently of) the claim-rights that make its exercise meaningfully possible.   
A similar point can be made with respect to the power.  When powers elicit the 
designation of a rights claim, it is not because they are protected from unacceptable interference 
by claim-rights.  It is because powers are related to the autonomy of the power holder (similar to 
omous discretion over the structure of first-
in that land.  As part of my property rights, I have a claim-right that X stay off my land.  I also 
have the power -right.  I 
may also have claim-rights against others that they not interfere with my exercise of this power, 
but this is hardly an important reason why my power is considered a (or part of my bundle of) 
property right(s).  Such claim-rights are only protecting the conditions for the meaningful 
possibility of me exercising my power.  However, the power, like the privilege, is meaningful 
beyond (or at least in addition to and independently of) merely protecting the conditions upon 
which its exercise is possible.  
                                                 
7
 Recall that I argued in Chapter Two that animal privileges (to the extent animals possess them) are only 
meaningful if they are protected by claim-rights against humans from unacceptable interference.  This kind of 
discretion over action, this kind of self-determination contained within the privilege (conceived of as bilateral, as an 
option) is unique to humans. 
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 Limiting the scope of a theory of the function of rights only to claim-rights seems not to 
 
to demonstrate that if a genuine right is parsed far enough, claim-rights and immunities will 
always show up, this is itself an interesting conclusion regarding the nature of rights, and it opens 
up a significant question about the proper parsing of rights claims into their constituent 
Hohfeldian relations (e.g. is it proper to parse my right to walk down the street to include my 
claim-right not to be murdered?).
8
  Acknowledging this implication without addressing the 
parsing problem, however, I am led to believe that the interesting question that a theory of the 
function of rights might be able to answer is when and why powers and privileges are considered 
genuine rights claims or part of genuine rights claims.  If claim-rights and immunities are always 
part of genuine rights, then perhaps a theory of a function of rights should aim to explain when 
and why privileges and powers are part of genuine rights claims. 
 In sum, I am suspicious that the proper scope of a theory of the function of rights is 
limited only to the claim-right relation.  The alternative approach that understands the 
Hohfeldian relations as atomistic units that combine to create what we typically consider rights 
in ordinary discourse provides rich insights into the nature of rights that is otherwise unavailable 
if we take the narrow view of the scope of the function of rights debate.  As will hopefully 
become clear, this debate over the scope of a theory of the function of rights does not affect 
where animal rights ultimately must fall among the competing theories. 
III. CAPACIOUS VIEWS 
 Because I am inclined to believe rights claims are in fact complex combinations of 
Hohfeldian relations (rather than just or even primarily claim-right relations (accompanied by 
                                                 
8
 See Wellman (1985); Thomson (1990, 55). 
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immunities)), I will begin my substantive discussion of the function of rights with the capacious 
views.  I will discuss the capacious will theory, the capacious interest theory, and two capacious 
alternatives, after which I will discuss the narrow views.  As I work my way through this 
labyrinth, I advise the reader to note where trouble arises for marginal human cases in these 
different views.  Where there is trouble for the rights of marginal human cases, there is often 
trouble for the rights of animals.   
A. THE CAPACIOUS WILL THEORY 
 The basic tenet of the will theory is that rights function to provide rights holders certain 
kinds of choices.  This can be said with a little more precision: rights function to provide rights 
holders certain kinds of choices regarding their rights relations with others.  For example, to own 
property, and therefore have property rights as the owner, means that, e.g., you can permit or 
forbid another from entering your land (i.e. choose whether another is allowed on your land).  To 
see what this means in Hohfeldian terms: first, your property right means that others are 
(generally) under a duty to you to stay off of your land, and you have a claim-right against those 
others that s/he stay off your land.  However, by itself, your claim-right does not constitute a 
right under the capacious will theory because there is nothing contained within the claim-right 
that pertains to your choice over this relation.  However, combine your claim-right with a power 
to alter or remove this duty from the other (which we generally have with respect to our 
property), and you properly have a right under the capacious will theory.  So, the kind of choice 
that rights function to promote in a capacious will theory is the claim-
over the first-order relations of others.
9
  In Hohfeldian terms, this means that rights are only 
                                                 
9
 This version of the capacious will theory focuses on the question of which combinations of Hohfeldian relations 
make a right.  As I discussed in Chapter Two -order 
the will theory, such as the ability to choose to enforce a claim-right and the ability to demand or waive 
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those combinations of Hohfeldian relations which contain a power.
10
  So, combinations of 
Hohfeldian relations that fail to contain a power will fail to be a right under the capacious will 
theory.   
 The will theory views rights as the mechanism through which a certain kind of individual 
freedom and autonomy are realized.  Rights carve out a space within which the rights holder is a  
11
  In the capacious will theory, this sovereignty is captured by the claim-
right holder also being a power holder over that claim-right relation.  To have a right is to stand 
in a relation to another with the ability to legislate his/her Hohfeldian relations and statuses 
(often their duties).  So, property rights are genuine rights claims under the capacious will theory 
because the property owner can freely legislate the duties of others with respect to, e.g., entering 
his land.  Such a conception of rights builds into its structure a relationship between rights and 
individual autonomy.  However, it also poses a theory of rights that may be too narrow in two 
distinct ways.  First, it will restrict the class of rights holders to only fully functional competent 
human beings, excluding marginal human cases from being rights holders.  Second, it will have 
to reject that there are nonwaivable rights, which will pose a problem in the context of 
fundamental/inalienable rights claims.  I will discuss these two concerns for the capacious will 
theory one at a time. 
To see how a capacious will theory may be too narrow because it restricts the class of 
possible rights holders, recall that the capacious will theory does not recognize a combination of 
Hohfeldian relations as a right if that combination lacks the power relation.  One way for a 
                                                                                                                                                             
compensation for the violation of a claim-right.  See Hart (1982).  Such choice and control will come up later during 
my discussion of the narrow will theory. 
10
 Wenar (2005, 239); Kramer (2000, 64).   
11
 Hart (1982, 183). 
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incapable of being a power holder.  If an individual cannot function as a small scale sovereign, 
able to legislate the Hohfeldian relations of others, then that individual is not capable of 
exercising any powers and does not appear capable of being a power holder (in any meaningful 
sense).
12
  Such an individual will not be a rights holder under the capacious will theory.  So, this 
means that marginal human cases, such as babies, the cognitively deficient, the vegetative, the 
comatose, i.e. individuals who do not appear capable of exercising powers, will not be rights 
holders under the capacious will theory.  
 A possible response for the capacious will theorist to this concern might appeal to a 
similar strategy suggested by Korsgaard in her defense of the claim that marginal human cases 
are rational beings.
13
  For Korsgaard, rationality (a.k.a. possessing reason) is not something to be 
comes and goes based on life stages.  So, it is not the case that human beings are born irrational, 
and then, assuming they develop into normal human adults, become rational at some point in 
their g that is rational, has 
reason, and at different life stages, reasons better or worse.  Infants are not irrational, but they 
reason poorly.  Those who suffer traumatic brain injuries do not lack reason but reason very 
poorly.  They fail to exemplify their kind, but they do not fail to be of the kind they are, namely a 
rational kind.
14
   
In essence, the view treats the possession of reason as a dichotomous property grounded 
 and the exercise of reason as a scalar property.  The advantage of 
treating the exercise of reason as a scalar property is that it does seem true that humans exercise 
                                                 
12
 See Chapter Two, Section III.C.; Steiner (2000, 248).   
13
 Korsgaard (2018, 83 85). 
14
 mal rights and McMahan (2005) for a summary of and 
 moral considerability. 
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their rationality better and worse at different times in their lives.  Most children are not as good 
at reasoning as most adults.  Normal adults can experience periods of injury and even stress 
which can negatively affect their otherwise full ability to reason well in a particular instance.  
accuracy that they had when they were younger.  Certain diseases of the mind can erode reason 
even faster and further.  Might such individuals be rightly considered to possess reason in some 
sense to indicate that they are still deserving of being treated as autonomous ends-in-themselves?   
 Applying this kind of strategy to address the concern that the capacious will theory 
excludes marginal human cases from the class of possible rights holders, it could be argued that 
marginal human cases do not exercise their powers very well, but they possess those powers 
nonetheless.  Exercise of powers is scalar, whereas the possession of powers is dichotomous, 
based perhaps on whether it is the 
15
 to possess powers.  For Nussbaum, the 
species norm is not a matter of just natural facts regarding a species.  It is also a matter of 
political fact: what life is worthy of the dignity of a human (or other species)?  Regardless of the 
16
  
Nussbaum uses the idea of species norm to develop a political account of what is just behavior in 
our relationships with others (marginal human cases and other animals) who fail to live up to the 
capabilities typical of their species.  Under her view, justice would require that we help marginal 
human cases realize their ability to exercise powers to the highest extent they can (individually 
or through guardianship).
17
     
Under such approaches, marginal human cases would not be excluded as possible rights 
holders by a capacious will theory.  These responses have a certain appeal when we recall why 
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 Nussbaum (2006, 179 80, 347).     
16
 Ibid, 347. 
17
 Ibid. 
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the capacious will theory considers as rights only those combinations of Hohfeldian relations that 
contain a power.  The will theory requires that a right contain a power because powers are the 
way in which the right holder effectuates or realizes his/her small sphere of sovereignty.  But it is 
not necessary that the right holder actually exercise that sovereignty for the right to be 
considered a right under the will theory.  It is only necessary that the rights holder be able to 
exercise her power for the right to be properly a right under the will theory.  One can be able to 
do something even if one is not very good at it.  I, for example, am able to write a novel, but I am 
not very good at writing novels.  Perhaps marginal human cases are able to exercise their powers 
in that same way, and therefore remain possible rights holders under the will theory.  For 
  The will theory requires that for the infant to 
have property rights, the infant must have powers over the Hohfeldian relations of others with 
respect to her land and be able to exercise those powers.  A Korsgaardian approach might 
maintain that the infant does possess those powers: she does in fact have the ability to alter the 
Hohfeldian relations of others with respect to her land, but she is not very good at exercising her 
powers due to her infancy.  A Nussbaumian approach might maintain that the infant possesses 
those powers and has them exercised on her behalf by a guardian. 
 Such attempts at rehabilitating the will theory depend on to what extent one has to be 
 approach 
with respect to reason requires no proficiency at using reason to be considered to be able to 
reason.  An individual possesses reason in virtue of being of a particular kind of functional unity 
(i.e. human).  Reason does not come and go in an ind
a Korsgaardian approach to reason is not so much within the scalar human cases, but in the 
human cases where there is nothing that looks like reason at all, e.g. newborn infants, severe 
58 
 
cognitive disability, a human with total brain death, the comatose.  It does not sit well to say that 
 to see how such a 
view ultimately amounts to anything but speciesism in disguise: Human beings are normally of 
the reasoning kind, and for that reason, all human beings ought to be thought of as possessing 
reason, regardless of their ability to exercise it.  A similar challenge can be made against 
  It is certainly part of the human species norm to reason and to exercise 
Hohfeldian powers.  The Hohfeldian relations capture unique normative relations among humans 
based on the capabilities that are typical of our species and conducive to our individual 
flourishing.
18
  But the same marginal cases that challenge Korsgaard also challenge Nussbaum.  I 
do not see how, even if justice requires that we expend extensive limited resources to address 
deficiencies in the most deficient (e.g. the vegetative, the brain dead) to facilitate their exercise 
of capabilities they clearly do not possess, results in them possessing such capabilities.  Many 
incapabilities cannot be rectified no matter what we do. 
I conclude that while possessing an ability does not require an individual exemplify a 
high level of proficiency of that ability, it requires more than just being of a kind or species 
whose instantiations normally possess and exercise that ability to varying degrees of proficiency.  
Human beings normally can walk on two legs and can see in color.  This does not mean that a 
paraplegic has the ability to walk on two legs and just walks poorly on two legs.  Nor does not 
mean that a color blind person can see in color and just sees in color poorly.  A human being 
who does not recognize any letters on a piece of paper does not simply read poorly; that human 
being lacks the ability to read at all.  The newborn infant and comatose human being do not 
                                                 
18
 There is nothing in our history of the natural world comparable to the level of cooperation that humans have 
achieved, primarily through extensively being able to hold each other to act or refrain from acting in certain ways. 
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reason poorly; they lack the ability to reason at all.  Someone who has had parts of their brain 
destroyed, causing physical and mental limitations, cannot get those back.
19
  This is the case with 
all abilities: part of having an ability is being able to use it to some minimal degree.  So, it is not 
that marginal human cases exercise powers poorly; they lack the ability to exercise powers at all 
and therefore do not possess powers at all.  This results in marginal human cases being unable to 
be rights holders under a capacious will theory.   
If we reject something like a Korsgaardian/Nussbaumian
20
 view of what it means to 
possess powers, powers, and therefore rights under the capacious will theory, will come in and 
out of exi
accident that leaves a formerly normal and competent human being in a state of severely 
decreased mental capacity (to the point where, say, guardianship is required) would operate to 
eliminate any rights that individual formerly had because he is no longer capable of altering any 
first-order Hohfeldian relations.
21
  Infants would never be considered to have rights, but upon 
some line of maturation towards a normally functioning adult, the capacious will theory would 
imply that all of a sudden that individual possesses rights.
22
  Because the capacious will theory 
makes rights depend entirely on the right holder being a power holder, the content of the right, 
play a role in whether an entity is a right holder.  All that matters is whether the 
                                                 
19
 A great example of this kind of real-life tragedy is the story of professional snowboarder, Kevin Pearce, who 
suffered a traumatic brain injury training for the 2010 Winter Olympics and has permanent physical, emotional, and 
mental deficits due to permanent scarring in certain areas of his brain.  He was very lucky to even survive, but he 
will never be who he was before the injury.  See The Crash Reel (2013). 
20
 I have rightly treated the two views separately for the purposes of my discussion, but they are actually closely 
related with respect to how they view animals.  See Nussbaum (2011, 237
with Aristotelian elements, whi -Aristotelian with Kantian elements.  Ibid, 230.  
 a complete moral which is only a 
ts in Chapter Four.   
21
 Arguably, the guardian could possess this power on behalf of the now-disabled individual.  See MacCormick 
will theory.  
22
 This could occur along the lines that the law currently draws, such as the ages that the law considers legally 
relevant, but it could also be drawn along other non-legal lines such as the development of certain mental capacities. 
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entity possesses the power over the relevant first-order rel -order 
relation has no bearing on whether the entity possesses the power over the first-order relation.  
While the coming in and out of existence concern seems less problematic for rights like property 
rights (e.g. the power to transfer ownership), it goes against intuitions we might have with 
respect to the preeminent and most important rights, such as the rights to life and liberty.  Those 
are not rights that seem to come in and out of existence except as we ourselves come in and out 
of existence. 
 Consideration of such preeminent rights leads to the second concern over the narrowness 
of the capacious will theory.  Many of our fundamental rights, being inalienable and 
nonwaivable, do not contain powers.
23
  Those rights are usually (if not always) combinations of 
immunity relations with first-order relations, and immunities are the lack of powers.  Of course, 
that does not settle the issue because the lack of power is not necessarily ascribed to the 
immunity holder, but rather to others who would seek to al -order 
relation (whichever one happens to be combined with the immunity relations to make the rights 
claim), and the capacious will theory is about the holder of the first-order beneficial status also 
possessing a power to alter that status (and therefore, its correlative detrimental status).  
However, in at least some fundamental rights, the immunity holder is also the disability bearer, 
i.e. the immunity is reflexive and therefore the rights holder lacks a power over the first-order 
relation.
24
  For example, the right to liberty means at least that you have a right not to be 
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 See MacCormick (1977, 195 99). 
24
 The important distinction here is that the immunity can provide two kinds of protection for the first-order relation.  
Recall, that all first-order relations have two (not necessarily, but usually) distinct entities to which they refer: (1) A, 
the beneficial status holder and (2) B, the detrimental status bearer.  The immunity relation usually is understood as 
providing protection of the first-order relation from alteration by others (i.e. everyone capable of holding and 
exercising a power who is not identical to A).  But the immunity relation can also protect the first-order relation 
bearer are identical to each other and identical to the beneficial status holder of the first-order relation being scoped 
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enslaved.  This rights claim will contain a claim-right, i.e. you have a claim-right that I (and 
everyone else) not enslave you.  That means I (and everyone else) have a duty to not enslave 
you.  This rights claim will also contain an immunity relation, and interestingly, it is the 
immunity relation that signals the importance of the underlying first-order relation.  Others have 
a disability with respect to your claim-right not to be enslaved; we cannot alter our duties not to 
enslave you.  So far, this is not problematic for the capacious will theory.  However, this 
fundamental right also contains a reflexive immunity, meaning you have an immunity with 
respect to your claim-right not to be enslaved as to yourself.  This means that you, yourself, are a 
disability bearer with respect to your claim-right not to be enslaved.  You lack the power to alter 
your claim-right not to be enslaved (and therefore our duties not to enslave you).   
In essence, this is a way to conceptualize the structure of a nonwaivable right.  Because 
we generally do not believe that individuals can consent to be enslaved, we do not think that 
individuals are able to waive their claim-right not to be enslaved by others.
25
  In Hohfeldian 
terms, we do not think that indivi
them and we do not think that individuals have the power to put themselves under a duty to be 
enslaved to others.  So, here we have an example of what is generally considered a fundamental 
rights claim that lacks a power relation.  Under the capacious will theory, it would not be 
considered to be a right at all.   
This result will follow for any rights claim that contains a reflexive immunity.  Consider 
your right to life.  You have a claim-right that you not be killed (unjustly), which means others 
                                                                                                                                                             
very well be better conceived of as a paternalistic disability.  See Hurd (2016, 728).  Such labels convey an 
 
25
 Mill did not believe that freedom allowed men to choose to eliminate their freedom by consenting to be enslaved.  
Mill (2015, 99 100).  See also Barnett (1998, 77 82) who discusses inalienability and its relationship to lack of 
consent and notes that not all rights theorists agree that we cannot consent to be enslaved.  In particular, Nozick 
(1974, 331) believes that we can sell ourselves into slavery. 
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have a duty not to kill you (unjustly).
26
  You also have an immunity against others which protects 
your claim-right, i.e. others are disabled from altering your claim-right/their duty not to kill you 
(unjustly).  We do not think that, regardless of how free and knowing your consent is, you can 
27
  I think this reflects 
generally what we take the right to life to be: a claim-right not to be killed (unjustly) coupled 
with an immunity that protects the claim-right relation from alteration by others and the claim-
right holder himself. 
Another way to approach the concept of reflexive immunities is to ask: which actions are 
we unable to consent to?  Certain actions are prohibited (i.e. others are under a duty not to do 
them) and protected (i.e. others are disabled from altering their duties not to do them).  The 
question the capacious will theory forces us to confront is whether the individual who holds the 
benefit of the prohibition and protection can remove the prohibition and protection through an 
exercise of their agency.  Consider the right not to be tortured.  Can I (the one who is benefited 
by the duty on others not to torture me and protected by the immunity against them altering their 
duty) nonetheless consent to be tortured?
28
  Perhaps we have fundamental rights of dignity, such 
as the right not to be in a dwarf throwing contest or the right not to be publically humiliated in 
unimaginably degrading ways.  Can I consent to these actions and remove the duty on another 
not to inflict such actions on me?  These examples create a dilemma for the capacious will 
theory.  If consent is effective to alter the underlying first-order relation, then the rights claims 
                                                 
26
 Borrowing from the criminal law, unjustly means without justification or excuse. 
27
 A nice, if gruesome, real-life example of this principle is seen in the case of the German cannibal, Armin Meiwes.  
responded to the solicitation and offered himself to Meiwes to be eaten alive and killed.  Meiwes acquiesced to 
 was determined to have committed the killing for sexual pleasure, found 
 to kill him, Meiwes
claim-right, so it would not have been possible to hold Meiwes guilty of any crime for what he did to Brandes.   
28
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are not nonwaivable and therefore, not fundamental.  If consent is not effective to alter the 
underlying first-order relation (i.e. there is no power to alter the underlying first-order relation), 
 
To preserve as much of our  as possible, the capacious 
will theory may accept the former prong of the dilemma I just sketched and commit to the claim 
Recall that one of the strengths of the will theory is that 
because all rights contain powers, the relationship between rights and freedom and autonomy is 
built in by definition.  Under the capacious will theory, rights capture the sphere in which an 
individual is sovereign because they always contain a power, and powers are the capacity by 
which individuals legislate the Hohfeldian relations of themselves and others.  Rights, therefore 
are the vehicle by which freedom and autonomy are realized.  However, the problem of 
fundamental, nonwaivable rights indicates that sovereignty (as being a legislator/chooser) may 
not be the only thing that rights function to advance.  The rights to life and liberty are widely 
considered fundamental rights, yet they do not appear to contain powers and do not appear to be 
capturing a sphere of sovereignty, understood as legislation through Hohfeldian powers, for the 
right holder.   
In sum, the capacious will theory is too narrow in two respects.  First, it will have to 
commit to an implausibly narrow class of possible rights holders.  No human that is incapable of 
exercising a power will be capable of possessing a power.  This means that many types of 
marginal human cases, such as the infant, the comatose, the vegetative, will not be power 
holders.  Under the capacious will theory, they will not be rights holders.  Second, the capacious 
will theory will have to deny that there are any rights that are fundamental or deny that any 
troublingly narrow view of our common 
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conception of what rights there are and what rights we have.  Its inability to accommodate rights 
for marginal human cases also makes the view quite unpromising for animal rights.  The 
contending view which traditionally has opposed the will theory, by addressing these objections, 
is the interest theory, which I will consider in its capacious version next. 
B. THE CAPACIOUS INTEREST THEORY 
 According to the interest theory, the func
interests.  This means that rights promote the well-being of the rights holder.
29
  So, to be a rights 
holder under the interest theory only requires that an individual have interests or a well-being.  
This is substantially broader than the requirement under the capacious will theory that the 
individual be able to exercise powers.  Many powerless individuals can rightly be considered to 
have a well-being, in particular marginal human cases.  This is one of the strengths of the interest 
theory: it expands the class of possible rights holders to include many human individuals that we 
generally consider to have rights.  The interest theory also avoids the dilemma of fundamental 
rights because it can easily accommodate fundamental rights as functioning to promote the right 
theory will be faced with other concerns that it is both too broad and too narrow.  I will begin 
with the concern over the capacious interest theory being too narrow by undergenerating
30
 rights 
claims.   
 This concern takes on a unique form in the context of the capacious view.  The capacious 
interest theory is better equipped to make sense of many of our common rights claims than the 
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 Kramer (2000); Raz (1984b, 210 11) 
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 For a theory of the function of rights to undergenerate rights means that the view entails that there are fewer rights 
claims than we typically understand there to be in our common understanding of what rights claims there are. 
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narrow interest theory (i.e. the narrow interest theory is more vulnerable to undergenerating 
rights claims).  For the narrow interest theory, which focuses only on the relationship between 
the claim-right and the duty, there is a substantial concern that there are many interests that are 
not promoted and/or protected by a claim-right relation.  For example, suppose my favorite 
pastime is attending the opera, so I have an interest in being able to attend the opera.  I do not 
have a claim-right that promotes my interest in attending the opera (outside the claim-right 
relations that constitute the perimeter of general obligation).  No one has a duty to let me attend 
the opera or affirmatively assist me in attending the opera, even though attending the opera 
would promote my interests.  So, how does the narrow interest theory avoid having to be 
committed to saying that I have a claim-right to attend the opera in order to conclude I have a 
right to attend the opera s later in the 
chapter. 
My main point here is that this kind of undergeneration of rights concern does not occur 
for a capacious interest theory.  In the capacious interest theory, I do have a right to attend the 
opera, namely the privilege to attend the opera (protected only by the perimeter of general 
obligation).  And in fact, we make a lot of these kinds of rights claims: I have the right to attend 
the opera; I have the right to go out with friends; I have the right to Netflix and chill.  All of 
these rights claims are really privilege relations promoting our interests in doing particular 
activities (i.e. not having duties not to do these activities).  So, the capacious interest theory 
makes sense of rights claims that the narrow interest theory does not, and it acknowledges that 
many of our interests are in fact promoted by rights through privilege relations.   
Where the capacious interest theory will struggle is with a problem of overgeneration of 
rights claims in cases where an individual has a personal desire to do something which he has an 
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obligation not to do.  For example, A has a claim-right against B that B not murder A.  A has this 
claim-
life encompassing desire to murder A.  We might be tempted to say that B has an interest in 
murdering A, and the capacious interest theory appears like it has to accept that B has such a 
right, namely a privilege to murder A based on my discussion above.  Only once we get to a 
conflict of interests is the capacious interest theory forced to take a stance on what interests are 
worthy of being promoted by a rights claim.  The tools available for the capacious interest theory 
will be the same for the narrow 
interest theory, and I will discuss them in detail in Section IV.B.  The take away here is that, 
without such a conflict of interests, the capacious interest theory can avoid many worries about 
undergeneration of rights claims and make sense of many of our commonly understood rights 
claims better than a narrow interest theory. 
 Moving to concerns that the capacious interest theory may undergenerate rights claims in 
a certain set of circumstances (discussed here), the view must reject the implausible thesis that 
rights always 
31
  If the interest theory were committed to 
such a thesis, many commonly understood rights claims would fail to be rights claims.  For 
example, I could own some parcel of real property and have property rights in virtue of that 
ownership.  However, owning that property could be more trouble than it is worth to me.  
Perhaps the property is often frequented by trespassers and vandals, and I have to expend 
significant effort and expense to enforce my claim-rights against such trespassers and vandals 
and keep the property up.  If rights claims always 
would seem I do not have any property rights regarding this land.  Consider another example: my 
historically flaky friend prom
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have a claim-right against my friend that she meet for dinner at 7 p.m., but her history of not 
following through on her promises may make that claim-right more of a nuisance to me than a 
promoter of my well-being.  After all, once she makes her promise, I also have to be prepared to 
meet my friend for dinner at 7 p.m., thereby forgoing other activities at that time, and my friend 
may not show up or may cancel last minute, thereby wasting my time and preventing me from 
engaging in other plans for the evening.  If rights must always promote the right 
interests, I would not seem to have a right against my friend that she meet me for dinner at 7 p.m.  
To accommodate the concern that rights claims may not always 
s 
in the general or usual case.
32
  Defining the general or usual case will allow the capacious 
interest theory to generate rights even though some rights claims do not seem to promote the 
 
However, there is yet another issue that raises the concern that the capacious interest 
theory may be too narrow a theory of rights.  That issue arises in the context of individuals who 
occupy specific social/occupational roles and have the power to alter the Hohfeldian statuses and 
relations of two other entities.
33
  
of the objection is that there are cases where an individual, functioning in some 
social/occupational role, appears to be exercising a right (usually a Hohfeldian power) in a way 
that has nothing to do with 
seem to be too narrow because it fails to generate a right where we typically think there is a right.  
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T is to presuppose that T is, in all normal circumstances, a good for every member of C 
t that a 
right is normally beneficial, however, we should not conclude that it is invariably einer 
(2007, 290).   
33
 Wenar (2005, 241 42). 
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Wenar provides a couple of examples of the role bearer objection,
34
 and I will start with the 
judge who has the right (in virtue of possessing the power) to sentence a convicted criminal.  
Critics of the interest theory will argue that such a right does nothing to promote the 
interests/well-being of the judge, so it cannot be considered a right under the capacious interest 
theory.
35
  Defenders of the interest theory may accept this conclusion that the judge does not 
conclude that the right 
theory understands it.
36
  I want to posit a third solution to this concern for the capacious interest 
theorist that highlights the role that collectivities may play in finding a theory of rights that 
matches our common understanding of rights more closely.
37
 
I will start by precisely parsing out what exactly is going on in these kinds of 
ju
because when a judge sentences a criminal, he is altering certain underlying normative relations.  
                                                 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Notably, this would not be considered a right under the narrow interest theory simply because the Hohfeldian 
relation at issue is a power, not a claim-right.  The judge will have claim-rights to non-inference in exercising his 
power in this situation.  But, those claim-rights are not that in virtue of which the judge has a right to sentence the 
criminal. 
36
 Raz (1994, 274 enough to 
 
37
 There seems to be some tension among rights theorists about how much the philosophical discussion on the nature 
243 n. 36); 
Kramer (2000, 9-13, 93); Kramer and Steiner (2007, 296).  I acknowledge Kramer and position that 
philosophy has a role in devising a precise vocabulary of rights within which philosophical discourse can occur.  
However, the length to which they take such a position is both disingenuous and ignorant of the broader scope and 
implications of rights claims in human existence.  It is disingenuous because even the philosophical literature on 
rights often fails to carefully parse rights claims into their relevant Hohfeldian relations, which failures obscure 
interesting metaphysical observations about the nature of rights claims.  It is ignorant because the philosophy of 
rights should aim to elucidate what actually goes on in practice, to some degree.  Rights are an extremely important 
political tool for effecting political and social change.  The philosophy of rights can and should assist us in analyzing 
these claims.  We should be looking to the consistencies and inconsistencies between the competing metaphysics 
and the common usage, as each has the ability to illuminate the other.  Sometimes the metaphysics may demonstrate 
that common usage is wrong and imprecise.  Sometimes common usage may indicate that the metaphysics is too 
broad or too narrow or missing something that we know is important about rights, but obscured by imprecision. 
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The question becomes: what underlying normative relations, in Hohfeldian terms, does the 
first-order relations.  There cannot be a power without some first-order relation upon which the 
power operates.
38
  must be combined with a first-order relation.  
Furthermore, first-order relations define a relation between two (usually, but not necessarily) 
different entities.  So, what first-
the individuals 
will turn out, the judge has multiple distinct powers within the power to sentence a criminal, each 
of which operates on a distinct first-order relation. 
First, we have to ask whether the judge is altering any of his own first-order relations 
when he exercises his sentencing power or if he is actually just altering the first-order relations as 
between two other entities.  If the judge is doing the latter, this looks like a slightly different kind 
of power relation than I have examined before.  In earlier examples of the power relation, the 
power holder is altering a first-order relation between the power holder and the liability bearer.  
However, the power relation does not require this by definition.  While the power relation is 
-order relation, it is silent as to who is subject to the first-
-order status.  So, a power holder can, 
co -order relation in which the power 
holder himself does not participate.
39
 
                                                 
38
 
When it comes to actions, i.e. the first-orde to 
neither.  That is it.  You either must act/refrain from acting, or you may act/refrain from acting.  There is nothing left 
in the space of action.  So, the privilege and the claim-right carve up a complete space of action into two different 
possibilities.  Similarly, every first-order relation is either alterable (subject to a power) or not alterable (subject to 
an immunity).  So, the second-order relations carve up the entire possible space of what we can do with respect to 
the first-order relations. 
39
 Possessing a power to alter first-order relations in which one does not participate is not uncommon.  For example, 
anyone who possesses a power of appointment will be altering the first-order relations between the appointee and 
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 To make this clearer in my example, it is helpful to consider what a criminal sentence 
actually looks like.  In the federal system, a criminal sentence contains up to four distinct parts: 
, in lieu of 
incarceration and supervised release, a criminal may be sentenced to a period of probation.  
However, I will assume for the sake of this example that the criminal has is being sentenced to a 
period of incarceration.   
When thinking about the incarceration part of a criminal sentence, it is helpful for my 
purposes to consider the less common, but not rare, case where a criminal defendant is permitted 
to self-report to prison to serve his sentence.
40
  Prior to the judge announcing the sentence, the 
criminal has no duty to report to prison to serve his sentence.  After the sentence is imposed to 
contain a period of incarceration, the criminal does have a duty to report to prison to serve his 
t creates a duty on the criminal to 
report to prison to serve the sentence, where before there was no such duty on the criminal.  In 
-right, so who might hold the 
correlative claim-right 
41
   
It seems to me that there are three possibilities: the judge, the state,
42
 or the victim 
(assuming the crime for which the criminal is sentenced is a crime against a particular individual 
theory is that it does not seem true that the criminal has a duty to the judge, personally, to serve 
                                                                                                                                                             
the entity to whom the appointee owes a duty (e.g. the appointment of a guardian over a child creates duties in the 
guardian and claim-rights in the child). 
40
 I add this factual detail simply because it is hard to elicit intuitions about what duties or privileges an individual 
has when s/he is involuntarily in police custody. 
41
 Some theorists may claim that this duty is undirected, and therefore, there is no correlative claim-right.  To 
conclude that, such a theorist would have to reject that the judge is exercising a Hohfeldian power, and then the 
example should cause no concern for the interest theory because the judge is not exercising a right, as understood in 
 
42
 Understood as the metaphysically mysterious collectivity that is not reducible to the mere aggregation of its 
individual constituents.  See Chapter Two. 
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 criminal satisfying his duty to 
report to serve his sentence, so I rule out the judge.  While it may be tempting to think that the 
victim plays only a secondary role in a conviction and sentence.  The criminal case is brought in 
provide coercive penalties for certain violations of the claim-right and duty as among the victim 
and criminal).  Additionally, the state enforces the incarceration part of the criminal judgment, 
not the victim.  For example, if the criminal does not report to serve his sentence, an arrest 
warrant may be issued and the criminal may be subject to additional criminal penalties.  This 
judge at sentencing, is really owed to the state.
43
  So, it is the state that holds the correlative 
claim-right.  This means that the judge is altering the underlying normative relations between the 
criminal and the state when he exercises his power to sentence the criminal. 
Fines are clearly monetary penalties that are owed to the state, so it is reasonable to 
conclude that if a judge sentences a criminal to include a fine, the judge has exercised his power 
to create a duty in the criminal to pay the fine and claim-right in the state to have the fine paid by 
the criminal.  Fines are like incarceration in that they are part of the purely punitive portions of a 
criminal sentence.  In determining to whom a criminal owes his punishment, it seems correct that 
punishment is owed to the state.  A criminal conviction is secured as the result of violating the 
s laws place the criminal under duties to act or refrain from acting in a 
certain way.  And, while a victim crime will be a case where the criminal has violated his duty to 
                                                 
43
 A further option I do not explore here is that the criminal has a duty to himself to suffer his punishment.  Hegel, 
for one, thought that we have a right to be punished when we act immorally.  See Hegel (1991, § 99 100); 
McTaggart (1896, 483); see also Stillman (1976, 174 n. 11) (concluding that hment is a duty to 
punishment  
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the victim herself,
44
 the victim has no authority or power to claim punishment for the violation of 
her claim-right unless the state agrees to prosecute the violation.  So, the punishment for 
  owed directly to the 
state.   
Unlike incarceration and fines, which are punitive parts of a sentence, restitution is not 
punitive, but restorative.  Restitution is supposed to make a victim whole.  If the criminal were 
subject to restitution as part of his criminal sentence, to whom that duty is owed will depend on 
who can enforce it.  To the extent that the state is exclusively able to compel the criminal to pay, 
the duty is really owed to the state and the victim ends up being a third-party beneficiary.  To the 
extent that the victim can compel the criminal to pay, that creates a stronger argument that the 
victim holds the correlative claim-
sentence that contains restitution, the judge uses his power to alter the underlying normative 
relation between the criminal and the state (and/or his victim).
45
   
Finally, the supervised release is the rehabilitative part of a criminal sentence, and it is 
not meant to be punitive.  It is meant to be a period of supervision during which the criminal is 
provided strict rules to assist him in reintegrating into society as a productive member of society.  
Of the four parts of the criminal sentence, it seems least intuitive to whom the criminal owes his 
duty to comply with his supervised release terms.  Because the victim is not involved in the 
rehabilitation of the criminal and there seems to be no reason to think the criminal owes this duty 
to the judge, I conclude that this too is owed to the state.  It may sound strange to claim that there 
is ever a duty of rehabilitation (it sounds almost like a duty to improve oneself), but in supervised 
                                                 
44
 I see no reason to reject the possibility that a single action can violate multiple duties.  See Hurd and Moore 
(2018, 317). 
45
 Judges can order community restitution for victimless crimes (mostly drug offenses).  In that case, restitution 
operates more like a fine, and the duty to pay owed by the criminal is owed to the state, and there is no possibility it 
is owed to a specific victim. 
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release, the state sets out a set of rules which the criminal is duty-bound to follow (under threat 
of further punitive sanction) which rules ought to function to help the criminal readjust to being a 
productive member of society.  So, supervised release is not quite a duty to improve oneself but 
more of a duty to the state to follow certain rules which should result in the criminal not 
returning to crime. 
Clearly, this attempt to rescue the capacious interest theory from the role bearer objection 
requires that the somewhat mysterious collective entity, the state, be capable of possessing or 
bearing Hohfeldian statuses 
suffering his criminal punishment.  For that cost, i
correlativity thesis from at least some alleged counterexamples of duties without claim-rights.
46
 I 
have not yet explained, however, the relation between the judge and the state and how that is 
generalizable to other role bearer cases.  Collectivities exercise their Hohfeldian powers and 
claim/enforce their claim-rights through individual representatives who are authorized to act on 
udge is doing when he sentences a criminal.  The 
-right that the 
a duty on the criminal and claim-rights in the state, on behalf of the state.  The state cannot do 
that (or anything else really) without acting through an individual representative. This means that 
ed  power in the same 
necessarily is exercised through authorized, individual representatives of the state because 
collectivities can only act through authorized agents.  When we say the judge has the right to 
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 See Hurd and Moore (2018, 318). 
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sentence the criminal, we do not mean that it is his personal right, but rather that it is his right in 
an official capacity as an authorized agent of the state that has the right to sentence to the 
criminal.  
 This analysis is generalizable to save the interest theory from the role bearer objection 
more generally.  That objection could be leveled at all kinds of collectivities or organizations, 
such as corporations, LLCs, trusts, franchises, teams, branches of the military, etc.  The rights 
exercised by authorized individuals of these organizations will, most of the time, not be in the 
well-being, except maybe in some attenuated way, such as job security (if 
rights of the individual, personally.  They are rights of the collectivity.  And collectivities 
themselves are unable to exercise any of their rights.  Collectivities can only act through 
authorized individuals and therefore, they can only exercise their rights through authorized 
individuals.  That is what is going on in these role bearer cases: the authorized individual has a 
right in his/her official capacity and is exercising the right of a collectivity on behalf of the 
collectivity.  As long as that right, in the general case, promotes the welfare/interests of the 
collectivity, it is a right under the interest theory.  It is no objection that the right does not 
personal right to begin with.   
 A concern with this solution is that collectivities do not have interests or do not have 
interests of the kind relevant for possessing rights under the interest theory.  I will not delve into 
the depths of the issues that such an objection presents here.  However, I do think that our 
common understanding is that collectivities, especially entities like business organizations, have 
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interests.
47
  Their substantive interests may be narrower in scope than those of a human 
individual.  For example, a human individual has an interest in bodily integrity and the 
continuance of her life, whereas a corporation has no body to worry about and has no natural end 
to its life.  But corporations certainly have financial interests that affect their long-term well-
s also have reputational interests (so 
do human individuals), e.g. maintaining a brand name or maintaining the integrity of the 
organization.  For example, human sports leagues often exercise their powers to sanction their 
players who perform acts unbecoming to the league (through the appropriate authorized 
individual, usually the commissioner of the league, exercising a right in his official capacity).  
Such exercises of rights are generally done to protect a reputational interest of the sports league.   
 A slightly trickier case may be the example of the military, as an organization, and a 
military captain who has the authorized power to order troops to do certain actions.  In that case, 
it is less obvious what the organization is and what its interests are.  Is it the entire military, or 
one branch of the military (e.g. land troops or sea troops), or even just the individual company or 
regiment that the captain is in charge of?  Regardless of the answer to that question, it seems that 
the captain, in exercising his authorized power, is creating duties for the soldiers under his 
command, and it would not seem appropriate to say that those duties are owed to the captain 
ted via 
company or the regiment or the branch of the military or the military as a whole, all of which the 
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 See Raz (1984, 20) (conceding that corporations have interests); see also French (1979) (arguing that corporations 
are moral persons).  Winkler (2018) provides a fascinating history of the legal rights of corporations.  Throughout 
the history of corporate legal rights in America, there has been a long debate on whether corporations are nothing 
more than their individual members (and therefore, deserving of those rights possessed by their individual members) 
or whether corporations are distinct legal persons not reducible to their members (and therefore, not deserving of 
certain rights possessed by their individual members). 
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soldier is a member.  Furthermore, such duties are in the interest of the collectivity: military 
branches function better if their soldiers follow orders pursuant to the chain of command.  In 
fact, following orders is so important to the well-functioning of a military that failure to obey 
orders is often heavily sanctioned. 
In sum, the capacious interest theory will have strengths where the capacious will theory 
has weaknesses.  It will accommodate the rights of marginal human cases and nonwaivable 
rights quite easily, as both can be understood as promoting interests of the rights holders.  
However, the capacious interest theory will come up against some other difficulties.  It will have 
lve conflicts of 
nterests 
in depth in Section IV.B.  Additionally, the capacious interest theory can avoid being too narrow 
by acknowledging that rights promote interests in the general case (something the narrow interest 
theory will also adopt), and by allowing collectivities to possess or bear Hohfeldian statuses 
which they exercise through authorized individuals exercising rights in their official capacity.  
This solution to the role bearer objection also rehabilitates the correlativity of claim-rights and 
duties from some alleged counterexamples at the cost of a mysterious metaphysical entity: the 
collectivity. 
 C. ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME CAPACIOUS WILL/INTEREST THEORY DIVIDE 
 Having sketched the capacious will and interest theories, I will now explore two attempts 
to overcome the capacious will/interest theory divide.  This exploration is necessary because it 
would be too quick to saddle the animal rights theorist with an interest theory of the function of 
animal rights without examining options beyond the will/interest theory divide.  As between the 
capacious will and interest theories, it seems clear that animal rights must function to promote 
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interests (in the general case) because animals, like marginal human cases, fail to be 
power holders as required by the capacious will theory.  However, such reasoning assumes that 
the will and interest theory are the only two options for a rights theorist regarding the function of 
rights.  This is simply not the case, but especially not the case in the narrow function of rights 
debate where the hybrid and role theories are substantive alternatives to the will and interest 
theories.  Before moving to the narrow theories of the function of rights, however, there are 
additional unique insights that capacious attempts to overcome the will/interest theory divide 
bring to a theory of rights.  While these insights are not specific to the issue of the rights of 
marginal human cases and animals, they are quite relevant to my more general theory of rights 
claims as combinations of Hohfeldian relations that operates in the background throughout this 
project.  
  1. THE ANY-RELATION THEORY 
 Recall that the capacious views of the function of rights aim to delineate which 
Hohfeldian relations, or more importantly, which combinations thereof, are properly considered 
rights claims in our common understanding of what rights there are.  To see why we might be 
interested in identifying which combination of Hohfeldian relations make rights, we can consider 
the any-relation theory of the function of rights.
48
  The any-relation theory holds that any 
Hohfeldian relation, or combination thereof, constitutes a rights claim.  So, as opposed to the 
capacious will and interest theories, there is no restriction on what relation, or combination of 
relations, constitutes a rights claim.  It does not take much to produce examples of Hohfeldian 
relations, or combinations thereof, which we do not take to be rights in our ordinary 
understanding of what rights claims there are.  For example, whenever a power relation is 
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 Wenar (2005, 243
Hohfeldian relations.  I will stick to my terminology that distinguishes between the relation and the statuses within 
the relation. 
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lacking, there is an immunity relation, but we do not consider every immunity relation to be a 
right.  So, the any-relation theory would appear to be too broad.   
example that demonstrates this problem: I have an immunity 
against my city council granting me a pension.
49
  This does not appear to be a right in our 
common understanding of rights; however, parsing it 
help us understand why it is not a right.  First, recall that immunity relations, like power 
relations, do not stand alone but are necessarily referential to a particular first-order relation.  So, 
to say that I have an immunity against the city council is to say that the city council lacks the 
power (i.e. bears a disability) to alter some first-order relation of mine.  Which first-order 
relation?  I take it that it would be my no-claim-right against the city council that it provide me a 
t wholly convinced that the city 
council is without the power to put itself under a duty to provide me a pension, and thereby alter 
my no-claim-right into a claim-right.  But, if we grant that the city council does lack such a 
power, I can more fully explain why we do not ordinarily consider this a rights claim by looking 
to the structure of the first- and second-order relations at play here.   
To do so, I will rely on the concepts of the beneficial statuses and detrimental statuses of 
the Hohfeldian relations.  Recall from Chapter Two that I listed the beneficial statuses as the 
claim-right, the privilege, the power, and the immunity, and the detrimental statuses as the duty, 
the no-claim-right, the liability, and the disability.  With this in mind, we can see why my 
immunity against my city council granting me a pension is not part of our common 
understanding of what rights claims there are and what they do.  Such an immunity relation 
protects a detrimental status holder (me) and her detrimental status (my no-claim-right) from 
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 Ibid, 245. 
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alteration by making the detrimental status holder of the first-order relation the beneficial status 
holder of the second-order relation.  This inverts the structure required for a combination of 
Hohfeldian relations to constitute a rights claim.  A rights claim has an identified right holder, A.  
The relations contained within the rights claim must be relations where A, and only A, is the 
beneficial status holder.  Because the second-order relations are relative to a first-order relation, 
this means that the first-order relation contained within the second-order relation must have the 
same entity, namely A, as the beneficial status holder for both the first- and second-order 
relations.  My immunity against my city council granting me a pension fails to make me the 
beneficial status holder in the first-order relation, so it fails to be part of a proper rights claim.   
This exposition does not demonstrate a sufficient condition for what it takes for certain 
Hohfeldian relations to constitute a right.  Rather, it provides a necessary condition for what it 
takes for Hohfeldian relations to constitute a right as commonly understood, namely the right 
holder must be the beneficial status holder in all the relations.  Consider a right holder, C, who 
has a claim-
claim-
- ill, then C does not really have a right.  
If C really does have a right, namely the claim-
-right at will.
50
  Something has to give.  B and C 
do not both have rights as we commonly understand the term. 
This necessary condition provides 
privilege not to assault someone are not really part of rights claims as we commonly understand 
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 -right against his parent, and the parent 
lacks the power to alter that claim-right.  MacCormick (1976, 307). 
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them.
51
  If I have the privilege to not assault X, that means I have no duty to assault X.  
However, I do not have the freedom to assault X because I am (generally) under a duty to X not 
to assault X.  I am a detrimental status holder with respect to X and assaulting X, i.e. a duty 
bearer.  That I am technically also a beneficial status holder with respect to X and assaulting X, 
i.e. a privilege holder, does not transform that relation into a right.  What is needed for me to 
have a right is for me to be the only beneficial, first-order s
This means that if my right properly contains me as a claim-
I cannot simultaneously be the detrimental status bearer in the privilege relation with respect to 
not also be the no-claim-right bearer.  If my right properly contains me as a 
bearer in the claim- e duty bearer.  
This means that rights that contain privilege relations contain bilateral privilege relations only.  
Rights will never be made up of unilateral privilege relations (although unilateral privilege 
heme).   
This conclusion says something about the nature of rights and the privilege relation, 
namely that having discretion for action (i.e. bilateralness of the privilege relation), not merely 
permission for action, is fundamental to something being a rights claim.  A bilateral privilege 
holder possesses discretion to act or not act in a certain way with respect to the no-claim-right 
holder.  Whenever one is under a duty to act or refrain from acting with respect to X, necessarily 
one does not have discretion with respect to that action and X.  One will always have a unilateral 
52
 but that is not enough to produce a rights 
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 Also suggested by Wenar (2005, 246) as a counterexample to the any-relation theory.   
52
 Chapter Two clearly defines the privilege as unilateral, i.e. as a 
deontic permission.  See Hurd and Moore (2018).   
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claim.
53
  This is not so much a shortcoming of the any-relation theory, but an interesting result 
from the exploration that the any-relation theory prompted.  While the any-relation theory clearly 
comes up short in providing a workable theory of the function of rights because it is simply too 
broad, the exploration of the any-relation theory revealed one important structural necessity of 
rights claims: the right holder, A, must be the beneficial status holder of all the Hohfeldian 
relations that make up the right.   
Recall my discussion of Wise relation in the context of 
animal rights from Chapter Two.  I argued there that if animal rights did not contain the 
-
powers to alter them.  Such a situation would be troubling because we would have powers to 
freely alter our duties to animals.  My arguments here provide another, and stronger, position 
regarding such a situation: namely, -rights would not be properly considered 
rights claims if animals possess neither the power nor the immunity within their rights claims.  
Just because we can combine Hohfeldian relations in a variety of ways does not imply that every 
such combination is properly considered a rights claim, as I have discussed here.  So, while the 
possibility space for the second-order statuses over an animal -right (indexed to an action 
and person) is: animals possess a power, animals possess an immunity, the person possesses a 
power, the person possesses an immunity, the only options that would plausibly combine with 
the claim-right relation, where the animal is the beneficial status holder, are the animal as power 
holder and animal as immunity holder.  Rights claims parse into Hohfeldian relations where the 
rights claim holder is the beneficial status holder across the first- and second-order relations. 
The any-relation theory ends up blurring the lines between the form of rights and function 
of rights debate because it invites this kind of analysis into the structure of combinations of 
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 See Hart (1982, 166 67); Kramer and Steiner (2007, 282 83). 
82 
 
Hohfeldian relations contained in proper rights claims.  Funnily, the view does not even 
nominally suggest that rights do anything for the right holder, leaving the function of rights 
question largely unaddressed.  However, it provides a launching point for the several functions 
theory, which is an attempt to answer the question of what do rights do for the right holder 
without simply taking a side in the will/interest theory debate and which I now move to discuss. 
  2. THE SEVERAL FUNCTIONS THEORY 
 -relation theory, and without 
simply concatenating the will and interest theories together, Wenar proposes what he calls a 
several functions theory.
54
  According to the several functions theory, any-relation, or 
combination thereof, constitutes a rights claim if and only if it performs at least one of the 
following six functions: marking exemption, discretion, or authorization of the right holder, or 
entitling its holder to protection, provision, or performance.  The individual Hohfeldian relations 
can be considered to be performing one or more of these functions individually.  The privilege 
relation functions as exemption and discretion.
55
  Powers function as discretion and 
authorization.  Claim-rights function as protection, provision, and performance.  Immunities 
function as protection.   
 As an initial matter, the several functions theory is not a version of the capacious or 
narrow will theory.  The will theory requires that powers (or some kind of sovereignty) exist in 
any relation, or combination of relations, that purport to be a rights claim.  The several functions 
theory rejects this possibility as both the claim-right and immunity relations do not perform such 
a function (not surprisingly, as they are considered the passive relations).  So, the inquiry with 
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 Wenar (2005, 233, 246). 
55
 I suspect Wenar needs these two functions for the privilege because he does not see that we need not rescue some 
examples, such as the privilege not to assault someone, as rights claims.  Once we recognize that unilateral 
privileges run afoul of the necessary condition for constituting a proper rights claim that I discussed in the prior 
section, we need not concern ourselves with whether or how they constitute rights.  They do not.   
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respect to the several functions theory is whether it proposes a solution to the will/interest theory 
divide that is not some version of the interest theory.   
 I am inclined to agree with Kramer and Steiner that the several functions theory is just a 
more fine-grained restatement of the interest theory.
56
  Wenar c 
ways in which an entity may have its interests advanced.  When it comes to protection, we 
usually think of protection as protection from harm or detriment, which is a concept that 
implicitly contains a notion of good for and bad for an entity.  Provision is similar to protection, 
although it is normatively opposite.  Rather than protecting an entity from harm, we typically 
think of provision as providing to an entity some good or benefit, which also contains an implicit 
understanding of what is good for and bad for an entity.  Performance can be both protection 
and/or provision except that it refers to actions that lack tangible goods/benefits and harms.  
 While I think it is fairly intuitive that protection, provision, and performance promote the 
interests of the rights holder in the general case, the other three functions of the several functions 
theory are not so clearly more fine-grained restatements of 
will start with discretion.  Is a rights claim that provides the rights holder discretion generally in 
the right holder  interest?  I would wager the answer to such a question is yes.  Discretion is a 
particular kind of freedom and autonomy in that the agent ultimately has a choice over 
something, to do or not do something.  We typically think that freedom and autonomy are in an 
 the exercise 
of his/her/its discretion).
57
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 Kramer and Steiner (2007, 294). 
57
 See, e.g., Rawls (1982, 162, 165 66) (treating freedom of thought, association, and movement as primary goods 
in developing an account of justice); Rawls (1971, 54) (defining primary goods as things that every rational man is 
presumed to want). 
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There may be concerns that an entity that can exercise discretion may be pressured into 
exercising its discretion in a way that goes (or seems to go) against its interests,
58
 and so a right 
functioning to provide its holder discretion is distinct from a right functioning to promote its 
holder
such and exercising discretion to produce/result in some outcome.  Possessing discretion as such 
is a channel through which entities capable of being free are free.  So, possessing discretion is in 
possess discretion).  Exercising discretion is wholly different than possessing discretion as 
discretion can only be exercised in a particular set of factual circumstances, some of which may 
make an actu
one
inancial interest (if the investment 
some sense) free that he has the discretion to choose the investment.  
The next question is whether exemption is 
statement of what rights do for the rights holder.  Exemption for Wenar is the way in which he 
handles the concern over what the function is of the unpaired (i.e. unilateral) privilege relation.
59
  
I have previously argued above that the unpaired privilege relation will not generate a rights 
claim as we commonly understand them.  So, rather than advocate for exemption being a 
function of rights contained within the interest theory, I stand by my earlier analysis and 
conclude that unpaired/unilateral privileges are not rights at all, and a theory of the function of 
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 Kramer and Steiner (2007, 293) provide an example of family pressuring a terminally ill family member to end 
his/her life where physician-assisted suicide is legal.     
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 Wenar (2005, 248). 
85 
 
rights does not need to account for them.  The cases of rights claims that seem to reject this 
conclusion are not being carefully parsed into their appropriate Hohfeldian relations.   
 
statement of what rights do for the rights holder.  Wenar adds authorization to the set of 
functions that rights perform for their holders to handle concerns that arise in rights claims that 
contain unpaired power relations.  An example of an unpaired power relation occurs when a 
judge sentences a criminal to a mandatory sentence.  In such a case, the judge does not appear to 
possess the discretion that is seen in the case of a paired power relation.
60
  Often, a judge has 
substantial discretion in fashioning a sentence to a particular criminal
the nature and circumstances of the offense combined with the criminal s personal and criminal 
history).  In the case of a mandatory sentence, the judge does not have discretion to fashion the 
61
  Wenar introduces the notion of authorization to 
account for examples of rights of these kinds: the judge
mandatory sentence functions as an authorization.  As I discussed earlier, I characterized the 
right held by the state by its authorized agent which further
theory is capable of accommodating this case.   
 There is, however, a more general concern with the notion of a mandatory power being a 
right beyond this case, namely: if it is required that an agent exercise a power (or exercise a 
power in a particular way), is it appropriate to conclude that such a right functions to further the 
                                                 
60
 I will note, all cases of sentencing are actually mandatory in one sense: namely, the judge must pass a sentence.  
The discretion is usually contained in the nature, length, and terms of the sentence. 
61
 In practice, mandatory sentences usually contain a minimum term of imprisonment, beyond which the judge has 
discretion to sentence the defendant for a longer or shorter term.  It is possible, however, that the judge is required to 
sentence the defendant to a fixed term of imprisonment and has literally no discretion at all, such as in binding plea 
agreements. 
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to say that he is under a duty to exercise his power.
62
  Notably, this is a new kind of right 
compared to what I have discussed up to this point.  The claim-right and duty are indexed to an 
action, and in this kind of case, the action  of the claim-right and duty is another Hohfeldian 
relation, namely the power.  However, the power itself is supposed to be indexed to first-order 
relations.  So, it appears there is the possibility of some kind of circularity between the first- and 
second-order relations, or perhaps there are higher-order relations than the second-order 
relations.  This structure also appears in the role bearer context where the authorized agent is 
exercising a mandatory power on behalf of the collective entity.  In such cases, it is possible that 
the authorized agent actually owes a duty to the collective entity to exercise the power in some 
fashion (e.g. fiduciary agents may have such duties).  So, in the mandatory sentencing example, 
the state really has two Hohfeldian relations, the first being the power to sentence the criminal 
(carried out by the judge, in his official capacity) and the second being the claim-right against the 
 
 In sum, the several functions of the several functions are either contained in the interest 
theory (protection, provision, performance, discretion, and authorization) or their motivating 
counterexamples to the interest theory can be accommodated by the interest theory using the 
novel approaches I have argued for here (exemption).  So, the several functions theory does not 
produce much of an alternative to the capacious will and interest theories. 
IV. NARROW VIEWS 
 In order to move to the narrow function of rights theories, I must limit the scope of the 
function of rights debate to only the claim-right and its correlative, the duty.  The narrow theories 
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 Perhaps such a duty would be undirected, tout court, and therefore, there would be no correlative claim-right.    
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are focused on 
63
 rather than on the broader question 
of which Hohfeldian relations, individually or in combination, make rights claims.  I interpret the 
narrow theories of the function of rights to be engaged in an effort to identify the claim-right 
holder given a duty and explain why that entity (and not some other entity) is properly 
considered to be the claim-right holder given the duty.
64
  Because animal rights contain the 
claim-right relation, an exploration of the narrow function of rights theories bears directly on the 
nature of animal rights.  I will discuss the narrow will theory and the narrow interest theory 
before turning to two alternatives that claim to transcend the will/interest theory divide (in the 
narrow sense of the debate). 
 A. THE NARROW WILL THEORY 
 owed 
to X (and, accordingly, X possesses a claim-
65
 over Y
means is that to determine to which entity the duty is owed, Y has to determine what entity has 
-
X, and not Z, who holds the 
claim-
narrow will theory can also identify the duty bearer given the claim-right on the same grounds.  
Suppose X has a claim-right that some enti
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 Kramer and Steiner (2007, 298). 
64
 The narrow theories rely on an implicit assumption about the relationship between the function of rights and the 
directedness of duties, namely that a theory about the function of rights explains or grounds the directedness of 
duties.  I do not address this idea in depth in this project, but I do suggest in Chapter Four that in the case of moral 
duties, it is the ground of the duty itself that produces the directedness of the duty, and therefore the moral claim-
right.   
65
 See Hart (1982, 183 84).   
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this case, Y.  In a sense, this version of the will theory provides guidance as to the identification 
of claim-right holders and duty bearers given the identification of the other based on who has 
66
  
  from the notion of 
that I discuss
(given it has been breached), and the power to waive compensation (consequent to the original 
standardly contends that all powers pertaining to a duty must lie with the claim-right holder, if he 
or she is to be a right-
67
 So, the narrow will theory is only focused on who holds powers 
over certain duties of Y (or Z, or A, or B, etc.) in an effort to identify the claim-right holder and 
explain why he, and no one else, is the claim-right holder.   The narrow will theory uses powers 
over a duty as a way to explain the directionality of the duty and its correlative claim-right.  The 
capacious will theory looks at powers on their own as necessary components of a rights claim.  
Powers are not necessarily relative to a duty; they can also be relative to a no duty-not (i.e. the 
privilege relation).  These kinds of powers play a role in the capacious will theory, but they play 
no role in the narrow will theory.
68
  The narrow will theory is focused solely on the claim-right 
relation, so any powers relevant to the narrow will theory will be indexed to a claim-right 
relation. 
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 To the extent there is no measure of control by anyone over the duty, I suppose the duty would be undirected and 
there would be no Hohfeldian claim-right relation. 
67
 Steiner (2000, 245). 
68
 It is not clear whether Hart is best conceived of as a capacious will theorist or a narrow will theorist.  Kramer and 
Steiner categorize Hart as a capacious will theorist.  Kramer and Steiner (2007, 295 n. 20).  Sreenivasan, on the 
other hand, clearly treats Hart as a narrow will theorist.  Sreenivasan (2005, 259).  Regardless of this issue, Hart was 
a staunch defender of the will theory of the function of rights. 
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 Despite this difference between the capacious and narrow versions of the will theory, 
they will face similar challenges.  For example, the narrow will theory is vulnerable to the 
marginal human cases challenge I discussed above because marginal human cases 
 and therefore, will not 
be claim-right holders.
69
  The narrow will theory will also face a challenge when there appear to 
be nonwaivable duties in the context of fundamental rights.
70
  In such a case, the narrow will 
theory will be unable to conclude that there is a (claim-)right holder for such duties. 
 B. THE NARROW INTEREST THEORY 
I turn now to the narrow version of the interest theory.  There are several variations of the 
having a claim-right is just to say that some interest of the claim-r
71
  A more recent version of the narrow 
interest theory, adapted from Bentham (via Hart), has been defended by Kramer.
72
  Kramer
interest theory contains two distinct conditions, one of necessity and one of sufficiency.  His 
necessary condition states that claim-
73
  So, while all claim-
interests generally, it is not necessarily the case that all interests are promoted by the existence of 
a claim-right.  To conclude otherwise would result in an overgeneration of claim-rights by the 
narrow interest theory.  The only entities entirely precluded from being claim-right holders under 
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 Steiner (2000, 248). 
70
 See 
duty not to kill X). 
71
 Raz (1984, 5). 
72
 Kramer (2000, 81 82); Kramer and Steiner (2007, 304 05). 
73
 Ibid, 303.  This is something that the capacious interest theory must also accept to avoid overgenerating rights 
claims. 
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such a view would be entities with no interests (e.g. rocks).
74
  So, this condition eliminates the 
concern that marginal human cases, and animals, are conceptually precluded from being rights 
holders.  But it does not entail that animals (or marginal human cases) have interests that 
generate claim-rights.  I will say more on this in Section V. 
 the sufficiency condition is actually a two-
layered sufficiency condition.  First, we must ask whether there has been some detriment to an 
breached a duty.  If so, that is sufficient for finding that the entity is a claim-right holder.  The 
latter sufficiency is what we typically understand with respect to necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  The former sufficiency is a normative/political constraint: what detriments can one 
inflict on another entity without being held to have violated a duty?  While this is somewhat 
way that we typically take to be detrimental for that entity, is that enough to conclude that 
someone had breached a duty?  If so, there is a claim-right.   
commitments to drive what claim-rights there are because it is the underlying normative 
framework that must answer the first sufficiency question.  What interests generate duties and 
claim-rights, ultimately, is reserved for a full moral theory and/or political theory of the 
distribution of entitlements.  So, that first sufficiency condition is what will define the scope of 
what claim-rights and duties there actually are.  What is important from the metaphysics of rights 
standpoint is a narrow version of the interest theory is that the duty is for the claim-right holder
benefit.
75
  That is why, when X has a claim-  is to X 
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 See Feinberg (1974, 57). 
75
 Sreenivasan (2005, 261). 
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for 
76
  Y could do many  that are to X not 
all of those will generate a duty on Y to 
-rights there actually 
are.  
An important challenge for the narrow interest theory is the third-party beneficiary 
problem.  That problem is as follows: Suppose Y has a claim-right that X pay $100 to Z.
77
  
duty is to Y, but the detriment of non-performance of the duty by X is borne very differently as 
is duty, not Y.  
an example where the duty advances the interests not of the claim-right holder, Y, but of a third-
party beneficiary, Z.  Yet, we are reluctant to say that Z has a claim-right, as at the beginning of 
the example it was Y who was specifically identified as the claim-right holder.  On that same 
ground, we should be equally reluctant to conclude that Y does not have a claim-right against X 
either.  Y
of the breach of duty by X would appear to produce the exact opposite result.  The third party-
eory,
78
 as I will discuss 
in the next section. 
C. ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME NARROW WILL/INTEREST THEORY DIVIDE 
At the end of the narrow will/interest theory debate, animal rights theorists are in 
approximately the same spot in the function of rights debate they were at the end of the 
capacious will/interest theory debate.  Clearly, the narrow interest theory conceptually allows 
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violated her duty to X. 
77
 Sreenivasan (2005, 263 64). 
78
 -party beneficiary problem inadvertently.  
Ibid, 265.   
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marginal human cases and animals to be possible right holders, whereas the narrow will theory 
conceptually precludes them from being right holders.  However, in keeping with my earlier 
position that I cannot saddle the animal rights theorist with a narrow interest theory of animal 
rights solely based on the rejection of a narrow will theory of animal rights, I will explore two 
recent attempts that propose alternatives to the narrow will and interest theories: 
theories of the function of rights and are concerned only with the puzzle of the directionality of 
duties.  To conclude that animal rights theorists are best off adopting a narrow interest theory of 
rights, I must show that in addition to rejecting the narrow will theory, they should also reject the 
hybrid and role theories. 
 1. THE HYBRID THEORY 
Sreenivasan works through several variations of the hybrid theory before proposing what 
he calls the complex hybrid theory.  In those variations, it is clear that Sreenivasan is starting 
from a version of the narrow will theory and increasing the complexity of the hybrid theory to 
expand the theory to include certain rights claims that the will theory struggles to accommodate 
(e.g. fundamental rights).  As a result of this iterative process, Sreenivasan ends up with his 
complex hybrid theory of the function of rights stated thus: 
Suppose X is duty- -  
 
79
  
 
                                                 
79
 
- thing that is 
-right holders.  
difference between th  
93 
 
As an initial matter, the complex hybrid theory clearly admits of the possibility that Y has 
80
  So, it overcomes the objection to the will theory that 
marginal human cases (and animals) cannot be claim-rights holders.  The complex hybrid theory 
will also allow the possibility of claim-right holders who are disabled from altering their own 
claim-rights (i.e. who have reflexive immunities protecting their claim-rights).  Recall, in the 
case of reflexive immunities, Y is disabled from altering her own claim-
fore has no measure of control 
hybrid theor
being able to alter this relation.  So far, the complex hybrid theory accommodates two of the 
primary objections to the will theory while maintaining at least one desirable feature of the will 
theory, i.e. as an expression of 
freedom and autonomy.   
-
party beneficiary problem.  So how is the complex hybrid theory supposed to resolve the third-
 
must be kept entirely separate from the justification of correlation of that duty with a claim-
right.
81
  The complex hybrid theory tracks the latter and is silent as to the former.  So, recalling 
our earlier example: Assume Y has a claim-right that X pay Z $100.  Here, while Z certainly has 
interests that are benefited if X performs his duty, Z has no measure of control over that duty 
because Z cannot waive the duty, enforce the duty, or waive compensation in the event X 
                                                 
80
 See Kramer and Steiner (2007, 308). 
81
 Recall my discussion and notes on this issue from Chapter Two, as expounded upon by Halpin (2019), Halpin 
(2019b). 
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breaches his duty.  So, the complex hybrid theory does not produce Z as a claim-right holder to 
y 
 
  2. THE ROLE THEORY 
 Moving beyond his capacious several functions theory, Wenar proposes a narrow 
function of rights view, which he calls the role theory, in another attempt to overcome the 
will/interest theory divide.
82
  The role theory is also focused exclusively on the problem of the 
directedness of duties to specific claim-right holders, and is, therefore, only concerned with the 
claim-right relation.  One puzzle the role theory is supposed to solve is the duties without 
rights  cases, which resemble the role bearer objection that I discussed earlier in my discussion 
of the capacious interest theory.
83
   
To avoid objections regarding the notion of the term role, especially as applied to human 
out in 
-rights states: 
Formalization: Consider a system of norms S that refers to entities under 
descriptions that are kinds, D and R. If and only if, in circumstances C, a norm of 
S supports statements of the form: 
 
1.  
 
2.  Rs (qua Rs) want such duties to be fulfilled; and 
3.  Enforcement of this duty is appropriate, ceteris paribus; 
 
then: the R has a claim-right in S that the D fulfill this duty in circumstances C. 
 
                                                 
82
 Wenar (2013). 
83
 Section III.B. 
95 
 
First, because the role theory is indexed to a system of norms, S, upon which there is no 
restriction other than that it be a system of norms, the role theory provides a comprehensive view 
for identifying claim-right holders for all kinds of duties, e.g. legal, moral, even duties within the 
structure of a game.     
to be fulfil
84
  This allows the role theory to accommodate (at least conceptually) marginal 
human cases and animals as claim-right holders.  How the role theory handles animals depends 
entirely on what kind those animals are seen as.  For example, farmers may have a duty not to 
abuse their animals under two different conceptions: animals as commodities for generating 
profit and animals as live creatures capable of feeling pain and suffering.  On the one hand, if the 
animals are seen as commodities, livestock raised for commercial profit, resources being put to 
the most efficient use for human desire satisfaction, such a classification would result in no 
ascription of claim-
On the other hand, if animals are seen as sensate individuals, capable of feeling pain and 
, e.g., to not abuse them to be 
fulfilled, and therefore are claim- se the animals. 
draws on the notion of the Aristotelian categorical, which depends on knowing what the 
85
  In games, the boundaries of kinds are quite sharply drawn 
because games consist of specialized roles that individuals assume by playing the game.  For 
example, in basketball, an offensive player has a claim-right not to be physically impeded 
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 Wenar (2013, 219). 
85
 Ibid, 221 22. 
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through physical contact in attempting to place the ball in the hoop because the defensive player 
both has a duty not to so physically impede the offensive player and the offensive player has 
role of scoring points either much more difficult or even impossible).  However, we run into 
different concerns with natural kinds because there are no such sharp boundaries of what the 
ideal of that kind ought to be.  We can posit a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, and 
fight over what is missing and what should not be included, but this is very much unlike sports 
and other games where the rules are exhaustively codified.   
both human and animal rights.  Let us think about this in a simple example:  Let D and R be 
humans -right 
pursuant to the role theory, R (qua human beings) must want that duty to be fulfilled.  Therefore, 
the corresponding Aristotelian categorical that must be true in order to conclude that R has a 
claim-right against D is: Human beings want to exclude non-owners from their real property 
In lieu of ascribing to the Aristotelian categorical, 
one may instead take the approach that the content of the want follows necessarily from (take 
your pick) action, reason, personhood, agency, etc.
86
  Given the problems of conceptually 
analyzing action, personhood, agency, etc., I am more inclined to work within the natural 
kinds/Aristotelian categorical view.  Under that view, even though the boundaries of natural 
kinds may not be sharp and we may debate over the edge cases, there are vast spheres away from 
the boundaries that are quite clear.  Humans want not to be killed.  Humans want to be largely 
free to exercise their powers of self-determination.  Humans do not want to be insecure in their 
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nts, threats of human beings, or 
otherwise). 
The role theory highlights an important feature of the claim-right relation.  Wenar thinks 
of this relation as a role-based (or the more expansive kind-based) relation.  Entities stand in 
relation as individuals, and those individuals occupy particular social, normative roles and 
natural kinds.  If it is in the nature of that role and/or kind to desire that the duty be fulfilled, then 
there is a claim-right.  The role/kind-based desire is the critical element that appears to 
distinguish the role theory from the interest theory.  The interest theory typically takes some 
objective concept of well-
view of interests will produce an inferior interest theory of claim-rights than the role theory of 
claim-
interests to reject desire satisfaction (such as when one politely declines a second or third slice of 
 
The role theory appears to contain three discrete normative spheres: games (e.g. sports or 
board games, cooperative activities among humans that have explicit, finite, and sharp rules and 
roles for each player), social roles (e.g. employment or citizen, cooperative activities among 
humans that have rules and roles, but many times the rules and roles are not as sharp and definite 
as in games), and natural kinds (e.g. humans or lions or dogs).  However, the first two cases are 
in many ways expressions of human self-determination, which we may be inclined to think of as 
part of the natural kind of being a human being.  So, it is not so clear to me that the role theory is 
not just a version of the interest theory with a natural kinds understanding of what constitutes 
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interests and natural kind desires selecting the relevant interests to be protected by claim-rights 
and duties.   
V. THE FUNCTION OF RIGHTS AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 I started this chapter with a goal of discussing what a theory of the function of rights 
should look like for animal rights theorists to move one step closer to a complete view of the 
nature of animal rights.  From the nature of rights perspective, animal rights will be a subset of 
human rights.  Recall from Chapter Two, I argued that the form of animal rights claims are 
restricted to claim-right and immunity relations, i.e. passive rights.  I argued that because animals 
cannot be said to be under duties, the privilege is essentially a vacuous Hohfeldian status to 
ascribe to them and any animal rights claims that (purport or appear to) contain an animal as a 
privilege holder are similarly vacuous.  Such rights claims, such as the right to walk down the 
animal rights 
theory.  Further, I argued that animal rights claims do not contain powers simply because 
animals do not possess powers: they do not have the ability to alter first-order Hohfeldian 
relations.  Any alteration of first-
action is accidental and not the exercise of a power.   
 With this recap of the form of animal rights in mind, I will now turn to my argument that 
animal claims are best understood as functioning to protect and/or further the interests of the 
right holder.  Regardless of whether we commit to the capacious or narrow view on the 
metadebate regarding the scope of a function of rights theory, the interest theory will be the best 
view for understanding the function of animal rights claims.  I will start with the capacious views 
of the theories of functions of rights before discussing the narrow views. 
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 Recall, the four capacious theories of the function of rights are the will theory, the 
interest theory, the any-relation theory, and the several functions theory.  The capacious theory 
of the function of rights is primarily focused on understanding what combinations of Hohfeldian 
relations are possible in a rights claim and why.  I will start with the capacious will theory and 
then turn to the any-relation theory, before discussing the several functions and capacious 
interest theories in tandem. 
 In the case of animal rights claims, a capacious will theory is wholly inadequate to 
understand what the function of animal rights claims are.  This is simply because a capacious 
will theory requires that the power be contained in the combination of Hohfeldian relations that 
constitute the rights claim.  The power relation produces a sphere of freedom and autonomy over 
the first-order relation that the rights claim holder has in virtue of possessing the rights claim.  
For animal rights claims, as a matter of form, as I argued in Chapter Two, and as a matter of 
function, as I argued here, those rights claims will never contain a power and will never represent 
the function of rights under the capacious will theory.  So, with little surprise, because the 
capacious will theory simply cannot accommodate animal rights claims as a conceptual matter, it 
should be rejected by animal rights theorists.  
 The any-relation theory seems like it could be an option for a capacious theory of the 
functions of animal rights.  Conceivably, animal rights theorists could adhere to the any-relation 
theory as claim-right relations combined with immunity relations are a combination of 
Hohfeldian relations, which the any-relation theory would accept as a right.  Additionally, I 
made two arguments to resuscitate the any-relation 
argued that the primary refinement needed for the any-relation theory is to restrict combinations 
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of relations such that the rights claims holder is the beneficial Hohfeldian status holder in each 
relation constituting the rights claim.  This would mean that there is no such thing as a unilateral 
privilege relation which constitutes a right under the any-relation theory (making it more like a 
.   
 However, I did not discuss the fact that the any-relation theory, even so resuscitated, 
provides no real metric for judging what combinations of Hohfeldian relations properly 
constitute rights claims.  Therein lies the ultimate weakness of an any-relation theory as a 
capacious theory of the function of rights: even resuscitated with a very minimal restriction, the 
any-relation theory does not provide any hint of an answer as to what the function of rights 
claims actually are.  So, the any-relation theory fails to explain (1) why some claim-right 
relations are combined with power relations and not immunity relations (such as property rights) 
and why others are combined with immunity relations and not power relations (such as animal 
rights) and (2) what the function of rights is even supposed to be.  As such, it is a wholly 
inadequate theory of the function of rights, even though it provides previously unseen insight 
into the structure of rights claims. 
 The discussion of animal rights in the context of the capacious interest and several 
functions theories can go hand in hand simply because, as I argued above, the several functions 
theory is a version of the interest theory.  Additionally, to the extent that argument fails, the 
several functions theory does not add anything distinctive or additional to the interest theory in 
the context of animal rights.  Any debate between the capacious interest and several functions 
theories would depend on distinctively human rights claims and therefore, distinctively human 
capabilities and relations.  For example, the first three functions (protection, provision, and 
performance) of the several functions theory are simply refinements of ways in which a rights 
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claim may protect and/or advance the right -being/interests.  The second three 
functions (exemption, discretion, and authorization) relate to capacities that are held only by 
humans, which the interest theory will claim are in the interest of the human rights holder.  
Animals are not exempt from obligations because they are never subject to obligations.  Animals 
do not authorize; authorization is a normative activity that animals do not participate in.  Animals 
do not exercise discretion, understood in the several functions theory (as I have argued) as the 
bilateral privilege.  An animal may make a choice, to eat the left-hand treat before the right-hand 
treat, but such choices are not exercises of discretion like we see from humans who possess 
bilateral privileges.   
 Moving to the narrow theories of the function of rights, the interest theory will still be the 
best view for understanding the function of animal rights claims.  A narrow will theory does no 
better than the capacious will theory in providing a viable theory for the function of animal rights 
claims.  The narrow will theory, which is solely focused on identifying the claim-right holder 
given a duty, uses as the criterion for identifying that claim-right holder who or what holds 
-right holder will be that 
entity which has the ability to alter the duty (and, according to Hart, the power to seek 
compensation or waive compensation, given that the duty has been breached).  Animals have no 
measure of control over any duties that we would potentially have to them because they do not 
possess powers, so the narrow interest theory cannot conceptually accommodate animal rights 
claims.   
 While the hybrid theory clearly allows the possibility of animal claim-rights, it is going to 
struggle to provide a full theory of claim-rights in the context of animals.  The primary feature of 
the hybrid theory is that it strictly separates (1) the justification of the duty from (2) the 
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justification of the correlation of the duty to a claim-right.  The hybrid theory is only concerned 
with the latter enterprise (as perhaps all narrow function of rights theories should be) and within 
that task, the hybrid theory tries to weld the idea of measure of control  to the interests of the 
claim-right holder.  We identify the claim-right holder, given a duty, by looking at who has a 
measure of control over that duty and asking whether that measure 
a theory because they will never have any measure of control over the duty owed to them 
because the measure of control for the hybrid theory is still conceived of as powers.  When there 
is no measure of control, all that is left under the hybrid theory is to ask whether the possession 
of no measure of control matches (by design) the (purported) claim-right holder s (on 
balance).  To consider an example of this in the human context, recall that the hybrid theory 
accommodates those cases where a claim-right is combined with a reflexive immunity (i.e. cases 
where the claim-right holder has no measure of control over the duty because s/he is disabled 
from altering the duty).  In those cases, the reflexive immunity disables the claim-right holder 
from altering the duty because the interest advanced by the duty (e.g. not being enslaved, not 
being compelling to respond to custodial interrogation) is so important that it is appropriate that 
there be no control over altering the first-order relation.   
 However, in the case of animals, there will likewise be no measure of control over the 
first-order relation, but not because the interests being protected are so important that it is 
appropriate that there be no control over the duty.  There is no measure of control over the duty 
simply because animals are incapable of exercising control over first-order relations at all.  So, 
while I had previously mentioned that the hybrid theory at least conceivably accommodates 
animal claim-right holders because it allows for zero measure of control over the duty, it is at 
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least unclear how the hybrid theory actually works in the context of entities that never have any 
measure of control over any duties.  The hybrid theory does contain a parenthetical clause 
discussing surrogates of the claim-right holder, and this might be crucial in understanding how 
the hybrid theory handles cases where the claim-right holder has no measure of control, such as 
marginal human cases.  However, many, if not most, animals do not have designated surrogates 
whose measure of control could be used to perform the measure of control-to-interest matching 
function that the hybrid theory demands.  Even presuming that all such entities have, in theory, a 
surrogate, what is the measure of control that that surrogate would have in the case of animal 
rights?  Would it follow the measure of control that we typically take surrogates to have in 
marginal human cases?  At the very least, the hybrid theory is underdefined for animal claim-
rights.   
 Another concern that is more easily seen in the case of trying to apply the hybrid theory 
to animal rights is that the interests at stake appear to determine the measure of control that exists 
over the duty (and not the other way around).  If we were to actually try to formulate an 
chimpanzee, we would look to the importance of the interest to determine the measure of control.  
Say that there are duties, as many animal rights theorists would defend, not to kill the 
chimpanzee, not to experiment on the chimpanzee, and not to keep the chimpanzee in captivity.  
What measure of control would a surrogate have over these duties?  I think the principle behind 
animal rights as a movement is that a surrogate should have no control over any of these duties 
(except maybe seeking compensation for their violation, if the legal system recognized such 
rights).  All of these duties advance very fundamental interests of the chimpanzee that are to be 
respected.  But this dialogue reveals that the interests precede the issue of control over the duty 
104 
 
in the case of animals.  So, there is an arguable case that the hybrid theory, at least for those who 
possess no measure of control over any duties (i.e. marginal human cases and animals), collapses 
into some version of an interest theory because it will be the interests of the claim-right holder 
that are determinative of the measure of control.  There is not a robust understanding of measure 
of control independent of interests in such cases, whereas there is a robust understanding of 
interests independent of measure of control.  I take this to be a good reason to reject the hybrid 
theory as a strong candidate for understanding the function of animal claim-rights. 
 The final alternative that I have explored in this chapter to the narrow will and interest 
theories is the role theo
the function of rights to better accommodate role-based claim-rights (e.g. the claim-rights of 
athletes to certain locations on the court/field or lack of interference in certain ways during a 
game) where the interest theory would have to stretch the concept of interest to accommodate 
such claim-rights (e.g. the goalie has an interest in being unimpeded to the ball, as a goalie, but 
not as an individual per se).  The role theory recognized as well that roles are really just a 
specific type of kind and that the theory could become more generalized to accommodate 
marginal human cases and animals by such an expansion from roles to kinds.  Combined with 
the role/kind notion is also the desire normally ascribed to that role/kind which together 
appropriately select the claim-right holder, given a particular duty.  In my view, this kind-desire 
theory is not distinct from a narrow interest theory in the case of animal claim-rights. 
 What concept does the heavy lifting in the role theory?  The kind that a potential claim-
to that kind.   animal example of livestock cattle.  Those cattle could be 
categorized in kind as livestock (i.e. property to be exploited for the economic gain of the 
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property owner) or as sensate living beings.  If cattle are categorized as the former kind, they 
have no desires relevant to the claim-
87
  
-right holder under the 
role theory.  If the cattle are categorized as the latter kind, then they certainly have the desire not 
to be abused (indeed, such a desire is attributable to all sensate living creatures capable of feeling 
pain and enduring the suffering caused by abuse).  So, the duty not to abuse the cattle is a real 
duty, and the correlative claim-right holders are the cattle (each having a claim-right and the 
farmhands, owners, etc., each having a duty to each cow not to abuse it).  But all it means to say 
the cattle have a desire not to be abused is that it is in their interest not to be abused because it is 
desires that animals would appear to have on such a kind-desire analysis are desires to have their 
interests satisfied (assuming the animals a
 
 
88
  Regan 
concludes that, e.g., chimpanzees have a right not to be experimented on.  So, to apply the role 
theory, we start with the assumption there is a duty that we humans not experiment on 
chimpanzees.  Assuming we categorized chimpanzees as of a kind of living sensate creature 
(rather than petri dishes for the development of medical knowledge),
89
 we must ask whether 
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 Wenar (2013, 220). 
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 Chapter Four. 
89
 Again, why they would be categorized as one kind over another is left unsaid by the role theory.  In my discussion 
claimed that this is a 
desirable feature of the role theory.  The response goes something like this.  As a metaphysical view, the function of 
rights should not be committed to any particular normative system.  It is the normative system in which the duty and 
claim-right are being examined that will determine the desire-kind analysis.  I think the trouble with this response is 
that we simultaneously inhabit multiple normative systems at a time.  A farmhand is both a moral agent and an 
employee of a farm business that needs to make profit, at the same time.  The role theory produces claim-rights in 
the cattle against the farmhand in the former normative system, but not the latter.  Which one ought to matter as to 
how the farmhand acts towards the cattle?  The role theory does not say. 
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chimpanzees, qua chimpanzees, want such duties to be fulfilled.  The answer to this is the 
Aristotelian categorical claim that, yes, chimpanzees as living sensate creatures do not want to be 
experimented on.  Why?  The answer to the Aristotelian categorical depends solely on the 
interests of the kind chimpanzee.  They are living creatures with complex social lives that have 
interests in being free to live those lives.  Their interests are harmed by not only being caged and 
prevented from living those lives but also by having their physical bodies invaded with 
unpredictable and many times harmful substances for the sake of the advancement of human 
knowledge (usually only to better the lives of humans). 
 Now, in the case of humans, such an interest theory would still be distinct from the 
interest theory suggested by Kramer, which has been my primary model for a narrow interest 
theory of the function of rights.  This is so because the fundamental question for identifying a 
claim-right holder in the presence of a duty is truly distinct between a role-interest theory and 
-interest theory looks to the potential claim-
and desires to ascribe the claim-right to that entity in the face o
theory looks to the detriment suffered by the potential claim-right holder and asks whether that 
detriment is sufficient for concluding that another had breached a duty owed to that entity.  
Desires and interests come apart more readily in the case of human beings because we can take 
on roles that have specific goals that are distinct from our interests qua humans.
90
  But animals 
do not have desires and interests that come apart in this way.  Detriment to an entity that is 
sufficient to find a breach of duty, per Kramer, will translate into a desire to have the duty be 
fulfilled for animals, per Wenar.  Animals do not have any desires that duties be fulfilled except 
for those duties which, when fulfilled, promote their interests as the kind that they are.  So, the 
                                                 
90
 In particular, the desires of athletes in sports and of competitors in games are not really a reflection of the interests 
of humans qua humans.  Being able to create such games might be in the interests of humans qua humans because 
we are a self-determining species.  Our full telos is not given to us by our animal natures.   
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role theory is ultimately just a version of an interest theory in the context of animals as claim-
right holders. 
 So far, I have argued that the will (capacious and narrow versions), any-relation, several 
functions, hybrid, and role theories are not suitable for animal rights theory because they either 
cannot conceptually accommodate animal rights or they add nothing to a function of animal 
rights theory that is not already contained in the interest theory.  However, none of this is to say 
that an interest theory of the function of rights is itself suitable for animal rights.  Perhaps none 
of our traditional and more recent function of rights theories is suitable for animal rights.  I do 
not think we need to go that far.  It is a strength of the interest theory, as a general theory of 
rights, that it clearly conceptually accommodates hard cases such as marginal human cases and 
animals.  It is also a strength of the interest theory, for marginal human cases and animals, that it 
does not contain a normatively-laden view of what counts as an interest and what does not.  All 
that is needed for an entity to be a rights holder under the interest theory is to have a well-being 
or welfare.
91
  Animals clearly have a well-being or welfare.
92
  Things can be good for or bad for 
animals,
93
 and they experience pain and suffering.
94
   
Older versions of the interest theory have read additional normative restrictions into the 
concept of interest to exclude animals from being possible right holders.  For example, 
McCloskey -
idea that right hold
95
  Rights not only have to be conducive to the right 
have to be of concern  to the right holder 
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 See, e.g., Feinberg (1974, 49). 
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 See, e.g., Korsgaard (2018, Ch. 2). 
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 Singer (2002, 7 8); see also Regan (1983, Ch. 1 3). 
95
 McCloskey (1965, 126); see Feinberg (1974) and Regan (1976) for responses to McCloskey. 
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(the prescriptive overtone).
96
  This prescriptive (conative) condition on being a possessor of 
interests is clearly not required by the interest theory.  It is a product of sneaking normative 
constraints into the concept of interest even though the interest theory is not meant to be a moral 
or political theory.
97
   
Indeed, the weakness of the interest theory properly understood as minimally normative 
is that the concept of interest is too minimally normative and the view admits of too many 
possible right holders.  Frey makes this point when he notes that inanimate objects can have 
things happen to them that are good for or bad for them, i.e. things that make them good or 
exemplary of their kind.
98
  For example, regular oil changes are good for gasoline vehicles.  
Regular sharpening is good for a knife.  Introducing the 
does not solve the problem because gasoline cars need regular oil changes and knives need to be 
sharpened.
99
  Ultimately, Frey draws the line for interest holding at the level of possessing 
desires and denies that animals possess desires (because desires require beliefs, i.e. linguistic 
content, and animals do not have language).
100
  Such an argument sneaks language into what it 
means to have an interest, something which the interest theory should not do.   
A better so
possessing interests (and therefore possibly being right holders under the interest theory) is to 
recognize that welfare is typically understood to be related to life processes.  Gasoline cars and 
knives do not have welfares.  They can be better and worse instantiations of their ideal form, but 
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 McCloskey (1965, 126). 
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 See, e.g., Kramer (2000, 79).  The fact that Regan is involved in these debates indicates the conceptual error being 
not a substantive moral theory. 
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 See Frey (1980, 82 83). 
100
 Ibid, 83 100. 
109 
 
-
101
  -
functioning is a characteristic of living organisms, and it reveals a self-referential notion that is 
contained within the concept of welfare.  All living things strive (not to be understood as a 
mental state) to obtain that which is good for them and avoid that which is bad for them.  They 
strive to achieve their welfare.  So, if interests as welfare is too broad, it is too broad is because 
the interest theory allows for the possibility that all living things could be right holders.  
inference.  Because the interest theory is not a full moral or political theory of which interests are 
deserving of protection via rights, I see no major problem with animal rights theory adopting a 
theory of the function of rights which admits of the possibility of rights for plants, fungi, and 
other living organisms.
102
   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 In Chapter Two, I began my discussion of the nature of animal rights by arguing that the 
form of animal rights consists only of the Hohfeldian claim-right and immunity relations.  In this 
chapter, I concluded my discussion of the nature of animal rights by examining the function of 
rights debate and arguing that animal rights ought to be understood as functioning to promote the 
interests of animals.  To defend that claim in this chapter, I examined the traditional function of 
rights debate between the will and interest theories, both in their capacious and narrow forms, 
and argued that the will theory cannot conceptually accommodate animal rights.  I also examined 
attempts to transcend the traditional will/interest theory divide in the any-relation, several 
functions, hybrid, and role theories.  I concluded that these views either cannot conceptually 
accommodate animal rights or simply collapse into an interest theory of rights in the case of 
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 Korsgaard (2018, 20). 
102
 For an in-depth view differentiating between objects, plants (and non-sentient organisms), and sentient animals, 
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animal rights.  Finally, I argued that interests, as understood by the interest theory, are best 
understood as welfare, something that is shared across all living entities.  Although such a 
conception of interests is broader than what animal rights theory needs, I emphasized that the 
interest theory is not meant to provide a full normative accounting of what rights there are.  Such 
a task is the job of a full moral (or political) theory, and such is the task I take up in the next 
chapter where I will discuss the substantive moral arguments for animal rights. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANIMAL RIGHTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the preceding two chapters, I have explored the form and function of rights debates 
and what those metaphysical explorations of the nature of rights can tell us about the nature of 
animal rights.  I concluded that animal rights claims are limited in their form to the passive 
Hohfeldian relations (i.e. the claim-right and the immunity).  I also concluded that the function of 
animal rights claims is limited to an interest theory of the function of rights.  In this chapter, I 
take up the question of whether animals have moral rights.  To answer this question, I will first 
identify which of our moral theories readily admits of rights in its moral machinery.  Because the 
existence of rights claims (i.e. all of the Hohfeldian relations) ultimately depends on the 
existence of directed duties, only deontological moral theories will be able to accommodate 
rights.  Following this general discussion, I will examine four prominent arguments for the moral 
considerability of animals, three of which are specifically arguments for animal rights.  All of the 
big three moral theories can argue for the moral considerability of animals; however, this chapter 
will show the value of considering animals to be rights holders and how our deontological moral 
theories might defend that assertion. 
II. MORAL THEORY AND RIGHTS 
 Before I can turn to the moral arguments for animal rights, I must first provide a brief 
overview of the three big moral theories (i.e. consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics) 
and where rights fit (or do not fit) within those views.  In addition to capturing a special kind of 
moral relation, rights claims also convey a kind of moral reason,
1
 and they may or may not have 
a role in a particular moral theory depending on the kinds of moral relations and reasons the 
theory allows.  My discussion here will be kept at a general level compared to the depth of 
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 See, e.g., Thomson (1990, 120); Raz (1984b, 197 n. 1). 
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nuance that can and has been drawn among competing versions of the big three moral theories in 
their respective literatures.  The simple reason for this is that many of those nuances are not 
germane to my later discussion of animal rights.  The nuances that are germane to the discussion 
of animal rights will be made more specific in the context of the arguments for animal rights in 
Section III. 
 Before discussing the big three moral theories individually, at the highest level of 
generalization, they can be grouped into two categories: the deontic and the aretaic.  Deontic 
moral theories are typically described as action-guiding moral theories, where the primary moral 
concept is the notion of obligation (to act or not act) and permission (to act or not act).  Aretaic 
moral theory is typically described as a character-based moral theory, where the primary moral 
concept is virtue.  Virtue is ascribed to , which is constituted by more than 
just .  Aretaic moral theory is arguably a richer moral theory because it 
incorporates a variety of thicker ethical notions (e.g. coward, gratitude, brutality) than the 
morally thin notion of the obligatory (i.e. right and wrong) into what constitutes the moral.
2
  
Although the aretaic pre-dates the deontic in the history of philosophy, I will begin with the two 
major deontic moral theories that have dominated western moral philosophy from the 
Enlightenment through the mid-twentieth century: consequentialism and deontology.  
Dissatisfaction with these two deontic theories is what spurred a resurgence of philosophical 
interest in aretaic moral theory,
3
 and so I will conclude this section with a brief discussion of the 
aretaic, as opposed to the deontic.  Inside of each theory, I will specifically explore the role of 
rights in that moral theory and conclude that rights, conceived of as combinations of Hohfeldian 
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relations, are conceptually available only in deontological moral theories.  This discussion will 
also reveal some reasons why we find rights to be valuable in our morality. 
 A. CONSEQUENTIALISM 
I begin my discussion of the deontic moral theories with consequentialism.  The basic 
tenant of all consequentialist moral theories is that the goal of morality is to promote the best 
overall state of affairs (a.k.a. outcomes, consequences, the Good).  All consequentialist moral 
theories have three constitutive principles: (1) a theory of value, i.e. what constitutes the Good, 
(2) an egalitarian principle, and (3) an aggregation/maximization principle.  I will start here with 
a discussion of the first principle to narrow my discussion to utilitarianism.  I will address the 
remaining two principles as interpreted in a utilitarian moral theory. 
As the dominant kind of consequentialism, utilitarianism, takes some concept related to 
well-being or welfare, such as pleasure or preference satisfaction, as constituting the Good.
4
  The 
two founding fathers of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, were both hedonic 
utilitarians that took the sensation of pleasure (and the absence of the sensation of pain) as 
constituting the Good.
5
  While the feeling of pleasure and the absence of the feeling of pain seem 
to be good much of time, the sensation of pleasure and the absence of pain do not seem to 
capture all and only what is good.  For example, the sadist receives the sensation of pleasure by 
inflicting pain, harm, and/or humiliation on his victim.  It is hard to conclude that such an act 
contributes to the Good, rather than detracts from the Good.  Alternatively, many actions are 
good for us without producing sensations of pleasure.  For example, eating nutritious food of 
                                                 
4
 Some consequentialist views maintain that the Good includes non-welfare states of affairs, such as justice, fairness, 
and equality.  See Hooker (2003, Sec. 3); Griffin (1992).  Such views are non-utilitarian, and I do not consider them 
in this project.   
5
 
that matters is the quantity of pleasure.  Mill suggested that some pleasures, e.g. pleasures of the intellect and moral 
sentiments, are better than others, and therefore, the type or quality of pleasure could affect how much Good an 
action produces.  Mill (2015, 122).  This distinction is not germane to my discussion here. 
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which one does not like the taste and/or texture will produce minimal (if any) sensations of 
pleasure, but it is certainly good for our physical health to eat such food.  Furthermore, if only 
sensations of pleasure constituted the Good, we should all desire to be hooked up to an 
experience machine
6
 (much like the Matrix) that provides us a constant stimulation of pleasure-
inducing experiences, even though no such events occur in reality.  Many have moderate to 
strong reactions against being hooked up to such an experience machine, providing further 
reason to conclude that pleasure (and absence of pain) is not (entirely) constitutive of the Good. 
The common solution to these problems with hedonic utilitarianism is to equate the Good 
with something like preference (or informed desire)
7
 satisfaction, where the Good is a state of 
affairs in the world satisfied.  In this way, what happens in reality is 
fundamental to the Good.  Preferences have to be satisfied in reality, not just felt to be satisfied 
in the experience machine, to add to the Good.  One substantial problem with preference 
utilitarianism is how to compare preferences across individuals.
8
  Some individuals may have 
extremely strong preferences to, e.g., humiliate someone that are perhaps stronger than that 
humiliation is an addition to the Good just because a particular actor has a bizarrely strong 
preference to humiliate people.  Nozick calls these kinds of individuals utility  and 
9
  The excessive satisfaction that they obtain by having their preferences satisfied 
would appear to require that we all be sacrificed to that end, since no amount of satisfaction of 
our preferences exceeds the amount of Good produced by satisfying the preferences of the utility 
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 Nozick (1974, 42 45). 
7
 See Griffin (1986, Part One, I, 4 and Part One, II). 
8
 See Coakley (2016). 
9
 Nozick (1974, 41). 
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monster.
10
  I will come back to this problem of comparing preferences across individuals in more 
detail in Section III.A., where I discuss Sing
considerability of animals. For now, I must turn to the two remaining, constitutive principles of 
utilitarianism.   
The egalitarian principle requires equal consideration for equal interests.
11
  This means 
equal interests get the same amount of weight or value in determining their contribution to the 
Good.  The egalitarian principle plays a relatively inert role in hedonic utilitarianism because for 
the hedonic utilitarian, just one thing constitutes the Good: pleasure.  All pleasure is the same, 
and all that matters is the quantity of pleasure in determining what contributes more or less to the 
Good.  In preference utilitarianism, not all interests have the same weight, value, or contribution 
to the Good.  I have an interest in clean drinking water; I also have an interest in practicing yoga.  
These two interests are clearly not equal.  My interest in clean drinking water is much stronger 
than my interest in practicing yoga.  Accordingly, my interest in clean drinking water should 
receive more moral consideration in how it is considered to contribute to the Good than my 
clean 
drinking water should receive more moral consideration than my interest in practicing yoga.   
 The aggregation/maximization principle (what I will call the aggregation principle) holds 
that states of affairs are essentially aggregative, and therefore, the Good is essentially 
                                                 
10
 I often wonder if humanity (understood as the aggregate of all humans, not a collectivity distinct from individual 
humans) is not itself the quintessential example of the utility monster.  Not only do many/most think our relatively 
trivial preferences (e.g. what food we eat) outweigh the unbelievable suffering of others for us to have them (e.g. the 
agricultural animals that we torture in concentrated animal feed operations), we also constantly create new and 
unsatisfied preferences as soon as we satisfy other preferences (e.g. seasonal clothing fashion, yearly technology 
releases). 
11
 
view of the moral considerability of animals.  Singer uses the terms preference, interest, and desire with less than 
utilitarian view to a more preference utilitarian view.  See Lockwood (1979, 158).  In this chapter, I treat Singer as a 
preference utilitarian and interests as synonymous with preferences, although such synonymy is not strictly true.  
See Griffin (1986, 37) . 
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maximizable.  At first glance, the aggregation principle may appear to be inconsistent with the 
possibility of unequal interests because it is unclear how unequal interests are to be made 
commensurable to determine which contributes more or less to the Good.  Some 
consequentialists will deny that the pluralistic values captured by interests can be made 
commensurable, and therefore the Good cannot be aggregated or maximized.
12
  Maximization 
may be savable through adopting something like a lexical priority of values that produces a rank 
ordering of what contributes more and less to the Good.
13
  However, saving aggregation (and 
therefore saving maximization through aggregation rather than as a function of a lexical priority) 
needs something more like a weighting function that transforms seemingly pluralistic values into 
a monistic value (e.g. utiles) that is then summed.  The problem of the plurality of values 
considerability of animals.  But now I must turn to an important distinction inside utilitarianism 
that is relevant to the role of rights in a utilitarian moral theory: act versus rule utilitarianism. 
  1. ACT UTILITARIANISM 
 The quintessential feature of act utilitarianism is that every action must be evaluated for 
how it will contribute to the Good when the moral agent is deciding whether or not to do the 
action.  Only those actions which produce the most Good should be done.  As an initial matter, it 
would appear that this means there are no shortcuts for performing the utilitarian calculus (per 
the aggregation principle) for each and every action the moral agent makes.  Something as 
simple as coming up to a four-way stop sign where the driver can see that there are no other 
drivers approaching requires a calculation of the Good: whether (and how fast) the driver should 
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 See, e.g., Chang (2017); Finnis (1997); Wiggins (1997); Stocker (1997). 
13
 
also be a kind of rank ordering of pluralistic values. 
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save gas, wear and tear on his car, and time by blowing through the stop sign.  The act utilitarian 
burden of having to constantly perform the utilitarian calculus.
14
  However, every action should 
be an action which produces the most Good regardless of any such guides. 
 Two major problems arise for act utilitarianism, largely because its commands are agent-
neutral.
15
  First, act utilitarianism demands abhorrent individual sacrifices inside the world of 
inevitable and unavoidable tradeoffs.  For example, we live in a world where many humans need 
organ transplants all the time to survive.  There are many healthy humans whose organs could be 
harvested to save those who die waiting for an organ to become available.  Each healthy human 
is capable of having his organs harvested and saving at least five lives (heart, lungs, liver, and 
two kidneys).  Applying the egalitarian and aggregation principles in determining what action 
would produce the most Good, act utilitarianism demands that we harvest organs from healthy 
individuals, even against their will.   
Second, because the egalitarian principle is so radically egalitarian, it makes act 
utilitarianism a highly impersonal morality and quite alienating to the moral agent.  For example, 
interest in clean drinking water when I am determining how I should act.  In deciding which act I 
should do to produce the most Good, my interest gets no additional consideration just because it 
is mine.  To take a more extreme example, assume I am in rightful possession of a life-saving 
drug, and I am tasked with determining to whom I ought to give it among three people (myself 
included), all who will die without it.  Pursuant to the egalitarian principle, I cannot take into 
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 summary conception  of rules. 
15
 I leave aside for this project the third major problem for act utilitarianism: the distribution of the Good.  See 
Rawls (1971, 23). 
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determining who gets the life-saving drug.  Consider the same life-saving drug example except 
the three people are my child and two children who are strangers to me.  I cannot take into 
consideration any special obligation or sentiment I may have to my own child in determining 
who gets the life-saving drug according to the egalitarian principle. 
The solution to these challenges lies in adopting agent-relative permissions possessing 
some kind of categorical force that is not overridden simply because more Good can be produced 
otherwise.
16
  So, in the transplant case, agents have an obligation to the victim not to harvest the 
 even though less Good is produced as a result of not doing so.  In the life-saving 
drug case, I have the discretion to prefer myself (or my child) over others, regardless of the Good 
saving those others might cause (perhaps one of the others is the next Einstein).  What this means 
is that the solution to these challenges is to incorporate rights into the moral theory.  The 
transplant victim has a claim-right against other agents that his organs not be harvested 
involuntarily.
17
  I have the right (i.e. the bilateral privilege) as to each of the others, who could be 
saved, to administer the life-saving drug to myself (or my child). 
Act utilitarianism does not have these rights in its moral machinery.  While it is properly 
categorized as a deontic, or an action-
directed to anyone or anything.  The moral maxim of act utilitarianism produces an obligation to 
act, not an obligation to someone to act.  Without directed obligations, claim-rights just do not 
exist for the act utilitarian.  Additionally, it is not clear that act utilitarianism allows for any 
discretion as captured by the bilateral privilege.  This kind of discretion would depend on the 
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utilitarian calculus resulting in the same, maximum amount of Good for more than one action.
18
  
It is insufficient, however, to solve the issue of an agent preferring herself by relying on ties in 
the utilitarian calculus, not least of all because it is hard to determine how frequently they 
occur.
19
  Let me assume that in the drug case, saving any life would produce the same amount of 
Good, except if I do not prefer to save e in the 
world also gets a chocolate chip cookie.  Act utilitarianism again requires that I not prefer my life 
  In lacking the claim-right and privilege relations, act utilitarianism simply 
has no real sense of rights in its moral machinery to solve these problems.  Before turning to 
deontology, there are some theorists who have attempted to find a third way between categorical, 
directed obligations and pure act utilitarianism by adopting a two-tiered, rule utilitarian 
approach.  I will briefly discuss rule utilitarianism and the role rights play in it before turning to 
the deontological moral theories. 
  2. RULE UTILITARIANISM 
 To begin, rule utilitarianism rejects the act utilitarianism principle that each action must 
produce the most Good.  The rule utilitarian recognizes that there are some actions which 
typically produce more Good on balance and some actions which typically produce less Good on 
balance.  For example, killing innocent persons generally detracts greatly from the Good, 
whereas not killing innocent persons generally contributes to the Good.  It is an unusual situation 
where killing an innocent person would contribute to the Good on balance.  So, the rule 
utilitarian concludes that it is appropriate to adopt a rule regarding the act of killing innocent 
persons, namely, do not kill innocent persons. 
                                                 
18
 privilege relation, but I need not focus 
on that concern here. 
19
 See Hurd (2002, 399 400); Quinton (1973, 46 47). 
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 To address the transplant case, the rule utilitarian adopts a rule: do not harvest organs 
from involuntary victims.  victims: 
humans have a right not to have their organs harvested involuntarily.  This  is justified on 
the grounds that the Good is much greater if individuals, generally, did not have their organs 
involuntarily harvested to save others.  Absent such a ,  every healthy individual would at 
all times have to be concerned with whether s/he is soon be cut up and divvied out to others.  
Society would look much different (perhaps close to a Hobbesian state of nature
20
) because 
nobody could be secure in the physical safety of their person.  Everyone would be liable to be 
snatched up by organ harvesting crews.  It is possible that society would simply not function 
without the g  even though there are many 
specific violations would produce more Good in the world.
21
 
 The problem of not being able to prefer oneself is solved in a similar way.  I have a 
efer my own life (or the life of my child).  
that s
children.  Society also benefits greatly if individuals demonstrate a slight preference in their own 
reater if individuals are generally able 
to prefer themselves, especially in close cases such as the life-saving drug cases.  The Good is 
much greater if parents generally put special attention into their children.  More Good is 
  The precise 
arguments for establishing these rules that promote the greatest Good I leave to the rule 
utilitarian.
22
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 See Section II.B.2. 
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 For example, consider five dying children, all beloved by their parents, and one lone, blood-type-matching 
orphan, whom no one cares about and who could be sacrificed to save the five beloved children. 
22
  Scanlon (1977, 89). 
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 The real struggle for the rule utilitarian is in how to deal with cases where following the 
rule (or according the right ) clearly produces significantly less Good than breaking the rule (or 
violating the right ).  To see how troubling this can be for the rule utilitarian, consider the 
following example.  Suppose that property rights, in particular the right to exclude others from 
 can be justified on rule utilitarian grounds.
23
  Suppose that a family of four is 
traveling in winter when their car breaks down, through no misjudgment or fault of their own.  
Suppose further that the only place for the family to survive the winter night before they can get 
help in the morning , currently-unoccupied cabin.  Clearly, the correct thing for the 
  It would be 
right  
because it would be four lives lost instead of four trespasses to land (plus any minor property 
damage the family must inflict to gain access to the cabin).  In these kinds of cases, the point of 
the right  is lost because the decision to act in violation of the  is so clearly and strongly 
the correct thing to do because the act produces significantly more Good than according the 
.   at such an 
rule-
24
 but t  is just to be a thorough-going act utilitarian.     
 The difficulty comes from the issue surrounding the force of rights in our moral theory.  
The rule utilitarian has to determine where according rights  sits in competition with 
maximizing the Good.  For the rule utilitarian, rights  are more like defeasible or prima facie 
routes for getting to the most Good (and avoiding major, major evils).  But they lack true 
categorical force because they ultimately yield at some point if the Good is large enough (or, 
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 I think free-market economists would generally agree that privatization of resources leads to their efficient use.  
Such a rationale could justify private property rights on consequentialist grounds. 
24
 Smart (1956, 349). 
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more often, the evil to be avoided is great enough).
25
  Some may take the position that rights 
violations themselves detract enormously from the Good, so enormously so that it takes a large 
amount of Good saved to .   Under such a view, s just another 
value, one among many that may be balanced,  great evils.
26
  
rights  into the hierarchy of interests which 
represent a plurality of values that constitute the Good.  It does not affect the way that the rule 
utilitarian must conceive of rights,  namely defeasible or prima facie reasons but not categorical 
reasons, and it does not solve the problem that rule utilitarianism will require the violation of one 
27
 
 When rights are justified on utilitarian grounds, although rights may in effect protect and 
promote some amount of individualism, they do not reflect anything important about individuals 
as such.  That the transplant victim has a right  not to have his organs harvested involuntarily, 
that I have a right  to prefer to give the life-saving drug to myself (or my child), does not say 
anything about the transplant victim or me.  We have these rights  not because we are important 
but because that treatment of us produces the most Good (generally).  Our rights are instruments 
for achieving the Good.
28
  Although the rule utilitarian is obligated to accord our rights,  she is 
not obligated to us to accord our rights.   That we even have these rights  is contingent upon 
certain natural facts about the world and the Good and where we stand in relation to the  
action to produce the Good in the world.   
                                                 
25
 Deontology will face similar challenges to the force of rights in threshold cases and where rights themselves 
conflict.  For a discussion of threshold deontology, see Moore (1997, Ch. 17) and Alexander (2000).  For a 
discussion of conflicts of rights, see Hurd (1999, Ch. 11), Thomson (1990, PART I), Waldron (1989), Hurd and 
Moore (2018, Part III). 
26
 See Scanlon (1977, 89 90). 
27
 See Nozick (1974, 28 29). 
28
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irected 
duties, the rule utilitarian fares no better than the act utilitarian in truly incorporating Hohfeldian 
accord the rights  are directed to the beneficiaries of the rules/ rights.   Even if the duties 
appear directed because, e.g., the beneficiaries have control over the duties (i.e. the beneficiaries 
can enforce, waive, or waive compensation for violations), such control would also be justified 
on utilitarian grounds.  Who the beneficiary is of any particular duty to act for the rule utilitarian 
is a contingent fact.  It has nothing to do with that individual in particular.  This is because 
utilitarianism necessarily makes the individual subordinate to the Good.  Adding rules, even 
utilitarian has no space for Hohfeldian claim-right relations in her moral theory. 
Furthermore, to whatever extent rule utilitarianism provides moral agents spheres of 
discretion (bilateral privileges), the rule utilitarian runs into the same dilemma he encountered 
when faced with the question of the force of rights t 
utilitarianism.
29
  Even if a bilateral privilege for some action, such as eating an egg sandwich for 
breakfast, could be justified on utilitarian grounds as generally producing the most Good, 
whether I ought to eat an egg sandwich for breakfast today either will or will not produce the 
most Good.  
If it does produce the most Good, I could have concluded I ought to eat the egg 
sandwich just by being an act utilitarian.   
In sum, the moral machinery for the rule utilitarian does not contain appropriately 
grounded or forceful rights, either claim-rights or bilateral privileges, to solve the problems that 
arise with act utilitarianism.  The only moral machinery within act or rule utilitarianism are 
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 See Hurd (2002, 435 36). 
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undirected duties and unilateral (and undirected) privileges  (i.e. undirected permissions to do 
what the moral agent is obligated to do).  With this background on the role of rights in 
utilitarianism, I will now move to explore deontology and the role of rights in deontological 
moral theories. 
 B. DEONTOLOGY 
 In many ways, deontology is just the stark opponent of consequentialism.  For example, 
unlike consequentialism that requires a theory of the Good apart from the moral command to 
maximize the Good, deontology has no such theory of the Good apart from conforming to the 
moral law.
30
  So, unlike the consequentialist who has a single moral maxim, the deontologist has 
a variety of moral maxims which are not reducible to a single value external to the moral law 
itself.  Furthermore, for the deontologist, the moral law is not concerned with producing the best 
(or even better) states of affairs.  All that it takes for an action to be moral is for the moral agent 
to intend and act in accordance with the moral law.  Deontology is about doing what is right; 
consequentialism is about doing what is best.
31
   
 This means that deontology can solve the transplant case that plagued both the act and 
rule utilitarian with relative ease.  The obligation not to involuntarily harvest organs from victims 
is simply categorical.  Nothing justifies or permits failing in that obligation; the obligation just is 
what the agent should do to act morally.
32
  Furthermore, the agent owes her obligation to the 
victim specifically, i.e. he has a claim-right to not to have his organs harvested involuntarily 
against every moral agent.  Considering the life-saving drug example, I am permitted to prefer 
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 See Hurd (1994, 162). 
31
 Ibid, 161. 
32
 This is a strong way to characterize deontological moral theories, but it is the starting point for deontology.  From 
here, deontologists debate among themselves how to resolve conflicts of rights and threshold cases.  See supra n. 25.  
Because this project will not address how rights are to retain their categorical force in the face of conflicts and 
threshold cases, I will not go into the details of those debates here. 
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 ).  I have a 
I give the life-
saving drug, not because that rule generally produces the most Good, but because it is my (or my 
) life.
33
  
Who others are to a moral agent can affect what the moral agent owes them.  This is not so for 
the consequentialist.  Agent-neutrality is demanded by the egalitarian principle, and it just cannot 
accommodate our intuitions that individuals have a variety of relationships with others that are 
not all identical.  So, deontology solves the two challenges to act utilitarianism by adopting an 
agent-relative system of obligations and permissions rather than the agent-neutral system of 
obligation seen in consequentialism.
34
  
 Deontology also readily accepts Hohfeldian claim-right and privilege relations into its 
system of obligations.
35
  With respect to the claim-right in particular, deontologists fall into two 
camps depending on whether emphasis
36
 is placed on the claim-right holder or the duty bearer.  
These factions within deontology are called patient-centered and agent-centered deontological 
views, respectfully.  Patient-centered views emphasize the right of the right holder while agent-
centered views emphasize the agency of the moral agent herself.  For example, consider again 
the transplant case.  A patient-centered deontologist will emphasize the  right not to be 
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 See Nagel (1986, 153 54). 
34
 See ibid. 
35
 One might argue that Hohfeldian moral claim-rights and deontological moral claim-rights are logically 
independent of each other.  A Hohfeldian moral claim-right is correlative to a directed moral duty but the 
deontological moral claim-right might depend -things- an the directed moral 
duty.  See Sreenivasan (2010, 476); Thomson (1990, PART I) (regarding the -things-
issue appears to be generated from a concern about conflicts of duties, namely, one could have a Hohfeldian claim-
-things- ntologically 
speaking.  I am not convinced this is a serious problem, if it is even a problem at all.  Accordingly, I treat the 
Hohfeldian claim-right and the deontological claim-right as synonymous. 
36
 More precisely, the patient- and agent-centered factions of deontology have arisen to explain certain intuitions 
regarding hard deontological cases.  See Moore and Alexander (2007, Sec. 2.1 and 2.2); Kamm (2007, 20, 251 52, 
388).  In Sections III.B. and III.C., the patient-centered and agent-centered distinction will be helpful in 
distinguishing between two different Kantian arguments for animal rights. 
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used as a mere means to an end by having his organs harvested (and life ended), even if that end 
is substantially more Good.  The victim deserves a certain amount of respect, including not 
having his life ended merely for the benefit of others.  The patient-centered approach is focused 
on the moral worth of the victim.  An agent-centered deontologist will emphasize that the organ 
harvester soils his own agency by involuntarily harvesting the organs of the victim.  Deciding to 
violate the categorical prohibition on involuntarily harvesting organs, the agent chooses to put 
his agency towards an action that he is morally forbidden from doing.  The agent-centered 
approach is therefore , being the intentional 
causer of harms.
37
   
 Both patient- and agent-centered deontological views will face challenges.  Patient-
centered views will struggle to explain the prohibition on tradeoffs.  If rights really must be 
accorded because of the moral worth of the individual whose right it is, then why is it okay to 
allow many other such rights, and the equal moral worth of the individuals who hold them, to be 
violated so that the one is accorded?  For example, in the transplant case, the reason we do not 
harvest the organs of the victim is because his life has some absolute moral worth that must be 
respected.  Yet, all the organ recipients have each the same moral worth to their lives.  The 
rationale that is supposed to explain the right is easily adopted to justify violating the right.  In 
this way, patient-centered views lose some of the agent-relativeness of the deontological 
obligation because their emphasis is on external and agent-neutral value.
38
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 See Moore (2009, Ch. 3). 
38
 See Kamm (2007, 251 52).  One solution to this problem for the patient-centered deontologist is to understand 
that rights represent a status of inviolability that is unrelated to what happens to the victim or recipient of the organ 
harvesting.  See Nagel (1995, 89 90).   
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 Agent-centered views run the risk of reducing into some kind of egoism or moral 
narcissism,
39
 where the only moral concern is the purity of an agent
-guiding morality that has no 
concern with the state of affairs of the world that it produces runs the risk of being mere rule 
worship.  Additionally, the motivational component for the agent-centered deontologists may be 
lacking.  To the extent a moral agent takes no concern in his moral ledger, it would be difficult to 
convince him to do so.  The patient-centered deontologist can at least point outwards, beyond the 
moral agent, to try to give reasons why the right holder has the moral worth accorded by the 
right.  For the agent-centered deontologist, no such appeal is available: a moral agent either 
recognizes the importance of keeping his moral ledger clean or he does not.   
 How the patient- and agent-centered distinction affects deontological arguments for 
animal rights will be made clearer in Sections III.B. and III.C.  Before moving to those 
arguments, I must briefly discuss what the deontological moral maxims in fact are.  Because 
deontology does not have a theory of value that determines the contents of its moral maxims, 
unlike consequentialism, the moral maxims must be derived in some other way.  The two 
prominent methodologies for grounding deontological duties as such and determining the 
contents of those duties are Kantianism and contractarianism.  In what follows, I will also touch 
upon the issue of why deontological duties are directed.  I will argue that directedness comes 
from the notion of reciprocity as it is contained in Kantian and contractarian deontological 
theories.   
  1. KANTIANISM 
 Perhaps no other philosopher is more associated with deontological morality than 
Immanuel Kant.  Unlike consequentialists who must look to something external to morality for 
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its theory of the Good, Kant famously held that the Good was internal to morality itself when he 
concluded that only thing that is unconditionally good is a good will, and a good will is one that 
wills in accordance with the moral law.
40
  Indeed, Kant did not believe any further motivation for 
rational agents was required to justify acting in accordance with the moral law.  This is just to 
say that Kantian morality is a strictly deontological morality.  Furthermore, Kant argued that our 
deontological duties are grounded in pure reason.
41
  In being capable of acting from reason, 
rational agents are not only able to reflect on the means to achieve their ends, but they are also 
able to reflect on the ends themselves.  This means that when a rational agent chooses to act in a 
particular way, he not only wills the means to his ends, he also wills the end itself.  Additionally, 
when a rational agent acts on reason, he is acting upon laws that he has selected to govern his 
conduct, i.e. he is acting autonomously.
42
  Such laws are not arbitrary; they are constrained by 
the boundary of reason.  That boundary is categorical and expressed in universal terms: act only 
in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law.
43
  
 
imperative.  It not only grounds morality but also constitutes a test (of sorts) for evaluating 
                                                 
40
 Kant (G 4:393, 4:399 4:400).  Notice how a commitment to this claim immediately resolves the paradox of 
deontology (i.e. how is it sometimes morally permissible and sometimes morally required to bring about a worse 
state of affairs in the world?).  The good that morality is supposed to produce is not states of affairs of the world, but 
compliance with the moral law. 
41
 
See Korsgaard (1996); Korsgaard (2018).  The reasons for this are several.  First, Kant interpretation may be one of, 
if not the most, difficult areas in the history of philosophy, and most of those debates are not germane to my goals in 
this project.  Second, and quite germane to my goals in this project, Korsgaard is the most Kantian moral 
philosopher to argue for animal rights.  I will discuss her argument in Section III.C.  Third, I am quite drawn to 
(constructivism included).  I do not believe such a preference affects the points I am trying to make, but it will 
slightly alter the framing of the discussion at certain times.  This problem is unavoidable and would occur whichever 
metaethical position I prefer. 
42
 Korsgaard (2018, 119). 
43
 Kant (G 4:421). 
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whether a proposed action complies with the moral law.
44
  For example, suppose you are 
considering lying on a loan application about your income, your assets, or the value of the 
collateral.  To determine if such an action complies with the moral law, you must ask yourself 
whether you could will lying about income, assets, or collateral value on a loan application 
universally.  That is: Can you will that everyone lie on their loan applications?  The answer to 
this is no because if you did so will, no lenders would loan anyone money, including yourself.  
You would directly undermine and contradict the very end you seek to accomplish, obtaining a 
loan, by willing lying on the loan application as a universal law.  Therefore, lying on your loan 
application is not in accordance with the moral law and the moral maxim derived is do not lie on 
loan applications about income, assets, or collateral value.
45
   
 Consider another example: suppose you wish to kill your neighbor.  Perhaps he is more 
successful than you or mows his lawn at 6:30 a.m. on Sunday morning.  Whatever it is about 
your neighbor that bothers you, it has risen to the level where you wish to kill him.  To test 
whether such an action would be in accordance with the moral law, you must ask whether you 
can will that everyone kill their neighbors when they desire to because of jealousy or 
annoyance.
46
  If you were to so will, one of the results would be that you, as a neighbor of 
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 Th It is controversial 
what Kant means us to do with these formulas. Some think the first formula provides a general test of permissibility 
for maxims, or even a so-ca CI-procedure  for constructing the content of all morality. I think those 
interpretations are wrong, but clearly Kant does think that his three formulas taken together provide some 
substantive moral guidance and ground the system of ethical duties he presents in the Metaphysics of Morals.
Because the Kantian animal rights theorists ultimately aim to end up at substantive moral guidance regarding the 
 evaluating the 
content of proposed moral maxims. 
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 This example is adapted from Kant (G 4:422).   
46
 One criticism of the Formula of Universal Law that can be traced back at least to Fichte, see Wood (2016, 151
52, 244), is how the description of the act-type is to be fixed to test whether it can be universalized.  Even within my 
example, what constitutes jealousy?  What constitutes annoyance?  Perhaps the only act-type that constitutes an 
annoyance is mow .m. on a Sunday morning.  In that case, I should have no concern about 
annoy my neighbor.  I am not such a morally bankrupt individual to even consider mowing my lawn at 6:30 a.m. on 
a Sunday morning.  I offer no solution to this problem here. 
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 with you.  
But this is clearly not something you rationally assent to.  It is not a strict logical contradiction 
(i.e. contradiction of your will), but it reveals an inconsistency in the treatment of those who are 
neighbors of others, namely you get to kill your neighbor while being immune from being killed 
contradiction reveals that your choice to kill your neighbor because of jealousy or annoyance is 
not in accordance with the moral law. 
 This kind of universalization thought experiment puts the moral agent in the shoes of the 
moral patient and asks whether the moral agent would accept the same treatment he proposes to 
give the moral patient.  The answer is not contingent on the moral agent
regarding how he wants to be treated (e.g. some moral agents may welcome death at the hands of 
a jealous or annoyed neighbor), but determined by reason as such, independent of any actual 
desires or preferences of the moral agent.  Moral reasons must be acceptable from the point of 
view of every moral agent,
47
 which entails hypothesizing the moral agent as the moral patient of 
the proposed action.  Because universalization results in this kind of perspective-taking, 
universalization has built into it a notion of reciprocity.  I contend that this is where the 
directedness for Kantian duties comes from.
48
  When a rational agent acts autonomously, which 
occurs when he acts on reasons, he legislates laws for himself that universalize to all rational 
agents.  That means that because he owes other rational agents a duty not to kill them because of 
jealousy or annoyance, they owe to him the same duty.  And so reciprocity underlies the 
emergence of the directedness of their respective duties not to kill one another because of 
jealousy or annoyance.   
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 This point of view just is the point of view from reason.  Kant (G 4:424). 
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 Korsgaard (2018, 122 n. 11) notes that Kant cannot make sense of undirected duties.   
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 ve is the Formula of Humanity: act 
so that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.
49
  Rather than looking inwards 
towards the moral agent, like the Formula of Universal Law requires, the Formula of Humanity 
looks outward towards the moral patient.  The Formula of Universal Law represents the 
will that is demanded by reason.  The Formula of Humanity 
captures the importance of how moral patients are to be treated on the basis of their status as a 
moral patient, i.e. they are never to be used as a mere means.
50
  For example, when you are 
contemplating lying on the loan application, the Formula of Humanity would forbid such an 
action because to lie about material facts to the lender is to use the lender as a mere means to 
your end, namely obtaining the loan.  Lying prevents the lender from realizing his autonomy 
through a fully-informed decision about whether or not to lend you the money you seek.  Your 
act of lying does not treat the lender as if he is an end-in-himself.  Similarly with the individual 
who wants to kill his neighbor out of jealousy o
-in-
of jealously or annoyance uses
51
 him as a mere means to one
 
Deontologists who emphasize rights and the value of moral patients often will appeal to 
the language of the Formula of Humanity.  The Formula of Universal Law, on the other hand, is 
more agent-  and focuses on 
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Kant (G 4:440), because it is not germane to my discussions later in this chapter.  For the sake of this project, I will 
treat the variations on the categorical imperative as representative of the same constraint on the moral maxims 
grounded in reason.  The precise relationship between the three formulations of the categorical imperative is debated 
among Kant scholars.  See, e.g., Korsgaard (1986). 
50
 See Kamm (2007, 12); Alexander (2016). 
51
 The challenge for the patient- - or over-
inclusive and we get the right results in the right cases.  See ibid; Moore (2016, 399 400). 
132 
 
, regardless of anything related to the value of 
moral patients (although that value is understood implicitly through reciprocity).  This contrast in 
animal rights view in Sections III.B. and III.C.  Before moving on to the arguments for the moral 
considerability of animals, however, I must briefly examine contractarianism as a deontological 
moral theory and wrap up this section with a brief comment regarding aretaic moral theory and 
rights. 
  2. CONTRACTARIANISM 
 Contractarianism can be seen as early as Plato;
52
 however, its modern origins are usually 
attributed to Hobbes and start with the notion of the state of nature.
53
  The state of nature is best 
conceived of as a thought experiment
54
 where there are no laws or rules, legal or moral, 
governing individual action.  It is, in essence, a world in which for every action that a human 
could do, he possesses a bilateral privilege with respect to that action and every other possible 
moral patient.
55
  Nobody has any claim-rights against anyone else.  No actions are required or 
forbidden.  Within the state of nature, all rational agents will deduce that it is in each of their 
own interests to take advantage of each other as much as possible, e.g. lying, 
resources, killing others if they do not keep a watchful eye.  Agents will also deduce that they are 
each vulnerable to being taken advantage of by everyone else at any time.   The state of nature 
56
   
 Rational reflection, however, reveals that it might be desirable and achievable for moral 
agents to exit the state of nature.  Because the state of nature produces a situation where all 
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 Plato (Crito, 50c 54d; Republic, 358e 359b). 
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 Hobbes (1839). 
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 It is not best thought of as being an actual, or even potential, representation of how humans work in reality.  
55
 Thomson (1990, 49 50). 
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rational beings have to be entirely focused on self-preservation and protection against the purely 
self-inter
discretion regarding, e.g., the creation of art, one must have certain safeg
ownership of certain resources, i.e. private property.
57
  So, to exit the 
state of nature, individuals must convince others to accept boundaries on their purely self-
interested actions.  However, for each individual, there is no reason to bind yourself and restrict 
your freedom to pursue your pure self-interest against others, unless those others also bind 
themselves and restrict their freedoms to pursue their pure self-interest against you.  The idea is 
that it is not in your self-interest to give up your bilateral privileges and take on duties to others if 
you do not receive claim-rights against others in return.  So, the solution is to exchange 
reciprocal promises that give up the discretion that causes th  
and property 
directedness of the duties that arise upon leaving the state of nature and adopting the social 
contract.  Because the reciprocal promises create the directed duties, they also create the claim-
rights within the social contract.  The social contract just is the moral law, and these reciprocal 
promises and duties just are the moral maxims. 
 What I have described is a crude form of contractarianism, but it underlies the general 
principle of all contractarian moral theories: the moral law is just what we would rationally agree 
to.  This crude version of contractarianism depends on assuming the contractors possess roughly 
equal physical power to threaten each other because it is the reciprocal threats, the equality of 
vulnerability, that is supposed to motivate self-interested rational agents to cede discretion.  
                                                 
57
 Chapter 
Three. 
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Additionally, the contractors must all be rational in that they can reason for their self-interest.  
Only with reason can the contractors understand that in the state of nature, they live under 
reciprocal threat and that they can self-consciously choose to eliminate such threats through the 
exchange of reciprocal promises to not act in those ways.   
 Because of the power and rationality requirements in a crude contractarianism, no 
individual that lacks either power or rationality will be involved in the reciprocal promise-
making.  This is just to say that no individual that lacks power to threaten or rationality to 
obligate itself not to threaten will be a contractor of the social contract.  For example, infants 
lack both the power and rationality requirements that it takes to be a contractor.  They cannot 
physically threaten adult human beings and even if they could, they cannot stop so threatening 
adult human beings by making a promise to do so.  Because infants are not contractors, they are 
not engaged in the reciprocal promise-making, and so they are not owed obligations by any of 
the contractors.  Only those engaged in the reciprocal promise-making elicit obligations owed 
directly to them because those obligations are what they receive for having given up their 
discretion.   
 With so much emphasis on individual physical power to threaten others, crude 
rational agents, if I am holding the gun and you are not, I have no reason to cede any of my 
discretion to you.  You clearly have every reason, i.e. pure survival, to cede all of your discretion 
to me.  It is possible that I will not exercise my discretion to pull the trigger against you, but that 
is contingent upon my desires.  I have no obligation to you not to.  Scaling this idea to the level 
of society in general, if the majority has physical control over the minority, the majority has no 
reason to cede to the wishes of the minority.  The minority has every reason to cede to the wishes 
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of the majority, namely their physical safety.  It is possible that the majority would adopt rules 
that the minority could live under; however, whatever rules are so adopted are contingent and not 
owed to those in the minority themselves.  With such emphasis on power, crude contractarianism 
fails to incorporate ideas of justice, as some kind of fair or equal treatment in spite of certain 
differences, such as physical power, gender, race, and socioeconomic status, into the social 
contract.    
 The most prominent solution to crude contractarianism was proposed by John Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice.
58
  Rawlsian contractarianism requires the contractors making the reciprocal 
 
knows his/her physical power, race, gender, or socioeconomic status in the proposed society.  In 
this way, the original position strips the contractors of their morally arbitrary properties, such as 
race, gender, social, and economic status.  Properties that are morally arbitrary are those which 
are considered undeserved (usually unearned in some sense).
59
  Race and gender are clearly 
matters of universal happenchance.  Economic status is probably more likely a blend of luck and 
choice and action, but if we consider that where one is born in the socioeconomic ladder plays an 
important, if not quite a determinative role, in where one ends up in the socioeconomic ladder, it 
is not unfair to include such properties in the morally arbitrary category for the purposes of the 
original position.  In the original position behind the veil of ignorance, the contractors are 
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been fairly freely adopted as one of the more plausible versions of a contractarian moral theory. 
59
 See ibid, 16 17.  Removing morally arbitrary properties from the contractors is supposed to result in rules that 
everyone, regardless of their actual situation, could agree to, i.e. a just set of rules.  However, when we reflect on 
individual properties such as talent, inclination, ambition, strength, genes, it is clear that none of these properties is 
89; Nagel (1973, 226).  And it is possible that because so many 
properties have to be removed from the contractors, there is no original position from which agreement could be 
had.  Rawls addresses this concern by offering an Archimedean point from which we can reason based on the 
primary goods which Rawls claims is a weak normative assumption.  Nagel, however, thoroughly disagrees and 
argues that the Archimedean point is actually a quite strong, and controversial, normative assumption.  Nagel (1973, 
227 28). 
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rationally compelled to construct the terms of the social contract so that it does not favor morally 
arbitrary classes of human beings based on their actual social situations (such as being in a high 
socioeconomic class or being part of the racial majority).  In this way, the veil of ignorance is 
supposed to level morally arbitrary differences that result in power disparities that would 
negatively affect what the weaker individual/faction is owed in a crude contractarianism.   
So, reconsidering the gun example from above, as a contractor, I could hold the gun or I 
could be in your position of not holding the gun when I am reasoning in the original position 
behind the veil of ignorance.  Reasoning from an agnostic position about my power relation to 
you in this scenario, I conclude that it is in my interest that the gun holder (whether me or you) 
be under an obligation to the other not to shoot the gun at the other.  Similarly, in the case of the 
majority versus the minority, when each individual is reasoning in the original position from 
behind the veil of ignorance, he does not know whether he will end up in the majority or in the 
minority in reality.  So, each contractor should conclude that the majority should be obligated to 
the minority to act fairly (e.g. not prohibit the minority from practicing certain religious beliefs 
or not treat the minority worse because of the color of their skin).   
Even though Rawlsian contractarianism appears to alleviate concerns regarding 
systematic injustice towards certain classes of people by dampening the disparities of power 
across differences through the veil of ignorance, it still contains the rationality requirement on an 
maxims and only the contractors receive directed duties from the reciprocal nature of the 
maxims, those who lack rationality will be precluded from being the object of a directed duty.  
So, while contractarianism readily accommodates Hohfeldian claim-right and privilege relations, 
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it would seem that the question of whether animals (and marginal human cases) can be claim-
right holders is off the table if rationality is necessary.   
This conclusion has been a fairly standard conclusion (and critique) of contractarianism.
60
  
establish the moral rights of animals on contractarian grounds.  Before moving on to the 
arguments for animal rights, I must very briefly comment on the role of rights in virtue ethical 
views. 
C. VIRTUE ETHICS 
 Despite ancient roots in Plato and Aristotle, virtue ethics received little attention in the 
Enlightenment debates among consequentialists and deontologists.  It experienced a revival in 
the second half of the twentieth century through the work of Anscombe, MacIntyre, and Foot, to 
name a few.
61
  As opposed to the deontic moral theories just examined, virtue ethics does not 
focus solely on choice and action, but on the agent developing his character, 
cultivating his virtue.  Character is a holistic notion.  It includes an agent
intentions, judgments, and actions.  To possess a virtue is to say that one possesses a particular 
kind of good character trait, namely an appropriate set of dispositions (emotions, judgments, 
behaviors) around a particular event or situation.  For example, a person who is charitable not 
only donates value (e.g. time, money) to those less fortunate than herself but also has the 
appropriate emotions and judgments around such giving.  Her charity involves compassion and 
empathy for others.  It involves having developed desires that are not wholly self-interested but 
reflect an emotional understanding that not all who are less fortunate are so simply because they 
deserve to be.   
                                                 
60
 See, e.g., Regan (1983, Ch. 5); Carruthers (1992, Ch. 5); Rowlands (2009, 129 31). 
61
 See Anscombe (1958); MacIntyre (2007); Foot (1978); Foot (2001). 
138 
 
62
  
a single action.  It is closer to a commitment to a way of living 
appropriately (this is sometimes called flourishing) as a unified, rational animal.  Additionally, 
t  (regardless of whether they are 
unified to create Virtue), such as honesty, courage, wisdom, charity, kindness, loyalty, etc.  
These are rich, holistic notions that are not properly ascribed to individual actions.  
Comparatively, the deontic views simply ascribe right or wrong to a particular action by a moral 
agent.  In contrast, virtue ethics is intensely personal to the moral agent.  The moral is not simply 
contained within reason itself; the emotions are not second class citizens.  Virtue ethics 
recognizes humans as complex wholes who experience emotions, have desires, and can reason.  
These come together holistically to produce a way of being (i.e. feeling, desiring, intending, and 
acting) in a given situation.  Because virtue ethics is not action-focused and contains no notion of 
duty, rights (as I have been conceiving of them throughout this project) have no role in a virtue 
ethics.
63
   
In sum, rights are only found in deontic moral theories.  This is because deontic morality 
is action- s, that rights are fundamentally action-
focused.  Both the claim-right and privilege relation are indexed to particular actions, and the 
power and immunity relations only exist if there are claim-right or privilege relations over which 
the power and immunity relations can scope.  So, a morality that makes actions of the moral 
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agent central is crucial for rights having a role in that morality.  Within deontic morality, 
deontology better accommodates rights because claim-rights require directed duties.  
Consequentialism does not produce duties directed to individuals.  Another way to say this is that 
-right relation, but it cannot define the 
individual, A, to whom the duty bearer owes his action, come as no surprise in the next 
section, therefore, that animal rights are grounded in deontological moral views.    
III. MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 Having shown in the previous section that rights are best conceived of in the deontic 
moral theories, it should come as no surprise that there have not been any virtue ethical 
arguments in favor of animal rights.  This does not mean that there are no virtue ethical 
arguments in favor of the moral considerability of animals,
64
 only that such arguments will not 
be discussed further in this project.  The focus of this section is to explore the contemporary 
moral arguments for animal rights.  To understand how the question of the moral considerability 
of animals arrived at arguments for animal moral rights, it is necessary to begin with the 
consequentialist  view on the moral considerability of animals before exploring several 
deontological arguments for animal rights.   
A. ACT UTILITARIANISM AND ANIMALS: BENTHAM, SINGER, AND ANIMAL LIBERATION 
 Peter Singer -known contemporary utilitarians, and his 
work on animal liberation has played a central role in the development of animal rights theory 
and the animal rights movement.  In many respects, Singer  to the 
egalitarian principle of act utilitarianism, i.e. equal consideration for equal interests, applied to 
our contemporary (mis)treatment of animals.   
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The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may 
acquire those rights which never could have been with-holden 
from them but by the hand of tyranny.  The French have already 
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human 
being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a 
tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number 
of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum 
are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to 
the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? 
Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But 
a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as 
well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a 
week or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what 
would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they 
talk? but, Can they suffer?
65
 
 
At first glance, one can read Bentham as simply saying that the relevant property for moral 
considerability
66
 has been misidentified.  That property is not rationality; it is not the ability to 
use language.  The relevant property for moral considerability is whether one possesses the 
capacity to suffer.   
However, Singer interprets Bentham to be making a more serious objection than the 
claim that we have simply misidentified the relevant property for moral considerability.  Because 
the egalitarian principle of utilitarianism requires the equal consideration of equal interests, 
Singer interprets Bentham as making the claim that the capacity to suffer is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for possessing an interest 
67
  In other words, the capacity to suffer is 
the condition for the possibility of interests generally, whatever those interests may be, and once 
an entity is considered to have interests, the egalitarian principle of equal consideration for equal 
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interests means that the entity 
goes as follows: it is not that we have selected the incorrect interest as the relevant property for 
moral considerability; it is that having the capacity to suffer is necessary and sufficient for 
having interests, and having interests is necessary and sufficient for being morally considerable 
under a utilitarian moral theory because of the egalitarian principle.   
rom non-living 
and non-sentient entities such as rocks, is the capacity to suffer. Possessing the capacity to suffer 
means that an entity will have a welfare, a well-being that can be satisfied or not satisfied.
68
  An 
epending on the variety and complexity of interests that the 
entity possesses.  Humans have interests in not being tortured, freedom from physical restraint, 
and autonomous self-determination.
69
  Animals have interests in not being tortured and freedom 
from physical restraint, but not in autonomous self-determination because most (if not all) 
animals do not choose their ends, but are given their ends by their natures.  So, human and 
animal welfare look different; they are not actually equal because humans and animals do not 
actually have the exact same interests, but they have some equal interests, namely the interests in 
not being tortured and freedom from physical restraint, that ought to be given equal moral 
consideration when moral agents decide how to act. 
A thorough articulation of what this moral considerability demands of the moral agent 
might require that interests be more finely specified than I have just articulated.  This concern 
e egalitarian principle of 
equal consideration for equal interests.  For example, I can say that humans and animals have an 
interest in not being tortured.  I might thereby appear to articulate an identity of interests from 
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which we might conclude that an identical consideration of those identical interests is warranted 
pursuant to the egalitarian principle. However, humans and animals have more than physical 
interests in not being tortured.  They also have psychological interests in not being tortured that 
are considerably varied among humans and among animals.  For example, some animals have 
short memories and live very much in the present.  When their situations improve, they do not 
indicate any long term psychological harm from having been treated poorly in the past.  Other 
animals (e.g. orcas, dolphins, elephants) have long memories and demonstrate long-term 
changed behaviors from torturous living situations.  Because of the complexity of human 
socialization, some humans may suffer irreparable mental harm from being tortured.  Humans 
also likely suffer from being able to anticipate the torture.  While human and animal 
psychological interests in not being tortured vary greatly, even among animals psychological 
interests in not being tortured vary.   
What t
determining whether interests are equal.  To do so would leave the view vulnerable to 
emphasizing minor differences between humans and animals, framing them as interests, and 
justifying different treatment on those grounds, i.e. creating a fine-grained hierarchy of interests.  
For example, the interest in not being tortured would be broken up into (at least) the physical 
interests against torture and the psychological interests against torture.  Since humans (and some 
higher animals) have significant psychological interests in not being tortured, they would receive 
more consideration against being tortured than lower animals who do not have significant 
psychological interests in not being tortured.  The human consideration for the interest in not 
being tortured would be both the consideration of physical interests and psychological interests, 
whereas many animal considerations for the interest in not being tortured would be limited to 
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only physical interests.  This opens up the very real possibility that humans get more 
consideration in whether they can be tortured than animals.
70
 
This kind of hierarchy is certainly desirable to account for some differences in moral 
consideration.  For example, it accounts for why only humans have the right to vote and animals 
do not.  Humans have an interest in democratic participation in their societies, whereas animals 
do not.  So, it is appropriate that our moral considerations are concerned with humans being able 
to vote, but not with animals being able to vote.  For Singer, it also justifies experimenting on 
animals rather than normal adult humans, if such experiments must be done.  The richness of 
normal human mental life makes kidnapping normal adult humans, caging them, and subjecting 
them to experimentation far worse than treating animals in the same way.
71
  While such a 
hierarchy of interests seems plausible, it becomes problematic when interests become too fine-
fine-grained, then the egalitarian principle disappears and the hierarchy of interests determines 
what moral consideration is due. 
weight on the physical interests of sensate beings and does not finely specify these physical 
interests.  For example, humans and animals have very similar physical interests in not being 
locked in a cage (a form of torture).  As long as we do not further specify this interest (e.g. 
humans because they have an interest in painting or creating music, birds because they have an 
interest in flying) to create differences that could be exploited to place the human-specified 
interest higher than the animal-specified interest, the egalitarian principle requires equal 
consideration of the human and the animal with respect to locking them in a cage.  As long as we 
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give great weight to not locking humans in cages, the egalitarian principle demands that we give 
est in producing meaningful moral considerations for animals.   
animals if it places great weight on the psychological interests of sensate beings and finely 
specifies physical interests.  As I argued earlier, the fine-grained specification of interests turns 
the egalitarian principle into a hierarchy of interests, and so fine-grained physical interests 
simply will become a straight hierarchy of physical interests (e.g. painting and creating music are 
more important interests than flying).  Furthermore, if the physical interest in not being locked in 
a cage has much less weight than the psychological interest in not being locked in a cage (e.g. 
humans have a psychological interest in socialization and self-determination), the egalitarian 
principle would provide weaker moral consideration to animals being locked in a cage than it 
would to humans being locked in a cage.  This does not mean animals would receive no moral 
consideration, as humans still have physical interests in not being locked in a cage.  But it does 
mean that humans would receive (significantly) more consideration than animals (perhaps just 
the right amount of consideration to justify our current practices).   
solution is to equate the mental lives of animals and marginal human cases and 
to adopt a coarse-grained approach to physical suffering.  So, when physical suffering is equal, 
what determines whether we can treat animals a certain way is just whether we can treat 
marginal human cases in that same way.  If we would not, e.g., test dermatological substances on 
the eyes of marginal human cases, we should not test dermatological substances on the eyes of 
animals.  Generally, we need not be concerned with the question of whether humans feel more 
physical suffering than animals because what matters is that the animals  interests in not being 
145 
 
treated in these pain-inducing ways are much, much greater than the human interests that are 
satisfied by such treatment of the animals.  We do not need to decide whether a human suffers 
more than an animal in, e.g., being confined to a tiny, filthy cage for its entire life before being 
slaughtered in inhumane ways for food for others.  All that matters is that the amount of 
suffering humans would experience in being denied their preferred food to eat is nowhere near 
the amount of suffering inflicted on animals to produce that meat in our industrial agriculture 
settings.  This means killing animals for food, as such, is not the problem, but it is our 
agricultural practices around raising and killing animals for food that is the problem.  Life and 
living processes as such play no role in being morally considerable.   
The issue of life as such po
living creature only matters to the extent that the creature has the capacity to suffer, then the line 
of moral considerability is at the perimeter of sentient creatures.  This means that plants are not 
morally considerable.  Insects, fungi, and other forms of life would not be morally considerable.  
Vegetative, brain-dead human beings would not be morally considerable.  Indeed, comatose 
humans would not be morally considerable unless being in the coma was considered transient, 
i.e. the capacity to suffer still exists in the individual even if it is not operable at the moment.
72
  
account of the moral considerably of animals and that these are desirable features in an animal 
rights  view.  Perhaps we have long been mistaken to accord vegetative and brain-dead humans 
moral status and that preferring members of our species is just the result of some evolutionary 
advantage that is wired in us.  To such a defender I would remind him that to be deserving of no 
ing abused, tortured, and 
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used as a mere resource by moral agents.  This means that vegetative and brain-dead human 
beings could be subjects of abuse, torture, experimentation, etc. to satisfy the interests of others.  
In whatever way the view would attempt to proscribe such abuse, it would have to do so 
indirectly, i.e. on the grounds that such actions harm the interests of others who have an intact 
capacity to suffer, not because the actions harm the interests of the vegetative or brain-dead 
individual.  Ultimately, not many are willing and ready to concede that rapists and murderers are 
morally allowed to take out their desires to rape and kill the Terry Schiavos of the world.
73
  Not 
many are willing to allow scientists to run experiments on such individuals either.  
Second, the bigger concern with this view is articulating why the capacity to suffer 
entitles the individual to the moral consideration not to be killed.  When all interests are 
grounded in a capacity to suffer, it is unclear how life as such is an interest worthy of moral 
consideration.  Another way to frame this concern is grounding moral consideration on the 
capacity to suffer does not tell us when and why it is wrong to kill painlessly.  Interests grounded 
in suffering, when left unsatisfied, result in some kind of suffering (whether physical or 
psychological, whether significant or minor).  However, because life is a necessary condition for 
painlessly (and unknowingly for those entities that can anticipate future actions) causes 
suffering.  When a sentient creature is killed, there is no longer any life to experience any 
painlessly becomes a morally irrelevant action to the sentient creature who is killed because it 
does not create suffering in that creature.  (Indeed, one could argue that it prevents suffering in 
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that creature and therefore ought to be done on the basis of minimizing suffering!)  The action 
might create suffering in others who were attached to the sentient creature who is killed, but that 
does not make the action morally relevant to the one to be killed.  Perversely, it means that the 
one to be killed has no moral considerability against being killed, while those who care about the 
one to be killed do have moral considerability regarding the one being killed. 
The utilitarian could appeal to the aggregation principle to push back against the concern 
of painless killings.  Such a response shifts from focusing on minimizing suffering to 
maximizing the Good.  Even if a killing does not produce any suffering, it prevents more net 
positive utility from being achieved in the world and therefore, reduces the total amount of the 
Good that could be realized.  This is so because an interest bearer, whose interests could have 
been satisfied and thereby more positive utility created, no longer exists to have its interests 
satisfied if it is killed.  So, because the Good is not maximized by an act of painless killing of a 
sentient creature, the act is prohibited.   
Appealing to the aggregation principle, however, makes the view vulnerable to the 
repugnant conclusion.
74
  The repugnant conclusion is derived as follows.  To take the 
aggregation principle seriously, it is morally required to increase the population of interest-
bearing individuals to some absurd number as long as each additional individual will have a life 
worth living.  In this way, the Good is maximized.  This is so even if such an increase in 
population serves to significantly decrease the quality of life of all currently living and future 
individuals from a very high quality of life to a life just barely worth living.  The reasoning 
behind the repugnant conclusion is that even though individual quality of life may decrease 
drastically during such an increase in population numbers, the total amount of the Good will still 
increase as long as each added individual has a life worth living.  So, to solve the problem of 
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painless killing by appeal to the aggregation principle is to open up the view to the problem of 
the repugnant conclusion.
75
 
In sum, the aggregation principle will pose difficulties for all utilitarian moral theories, 
whether they are specifically concerned with the moral considerability of animals or not.  What 
the strong egalitarianism that it proposes.
76
  The view proposes a kind of moral equality across 
species that has often been underemphasized by utilitarian moral theories and outright rejected 
by many deontological moral theories.  Singer observed that the expansion of moral 
considerability through the egalitarian principle had been used to successfully expand our 
spheres of moral considerability along human racial and gender lines.  In many respects, Singer 
is simply asking that we follow the natural inference from those cases and accept that the 
egalitarian principle also expands our sphere of moral considerability along species lines.  To 
accept Sin  would drastically alter human behavior towards animals and prohibit much 
of the horrible treatment of animals that currently goes on in our current agricultural and 
scientific practices.  But, does the view get to the right results for the right reasons?  Animal 
rights theorists will certainly deny the latter, and the former is contingent on natural facts about 
the world.  Perhaps some humans really do experience more pleasure eating, e.g., bacon than the 
pig suffers in being reared in a concentrated animal feed operation.  Perhaps humans really are 
utility monsters: the satisfaction we get from dominating and subjecting the rest of the animal 
kingdom to our desires cannot be matched by any suffering they can experience.  With this in 
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concluding that it is worse to kill a being who has a desire/preference to keep living than to kill a being with no such 
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mind, I turn next to the foundational argument for animal rights in the animal rights literature to 
see if it can arrive at better results.   
B. REGAN S PATIENT-CENTERED DEONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS  
 Regan, writing at the same time that Singer was arguing for animal liberation on 
utilitarian grounds, articulated his highly influential argument that animals are bearers of rights 
and that they deserve a minimum of moral respect: not to be used as a mere means to an end by 
humans.
77
  
alternative theories of moral considerability for animals as it does into defending an affirmative 
view.  Because the reasons Regan rejects the alternative views motivate his affirmative animal 
rights view, I will briefly discuss the alternative views that Regan rejects before turning to his 
affirmative view. 
 First of the rejected contenders are the indirect duty views which deny that moral agents 
have any duties directed to animals.
78
  However, this is not to say that animals necessarily have 
no moral status.  Indirect duty views allow for the possibility that moral agents have duties 
regarding animals.  While we can do no wrong to an animal, we can still perform wrong acts 
involving animals
considerability of animals will consider this a wrong act not because I have wronged my 
cat by shooting it.  Rather the wrongness of the act is in virtue of my damaging the 
property of my neighbor.
79
  Thus, I have wronged my neighbor because I have violated his 
claim-right against me (and I have failed in my duty owed to him) not to damage his property.   
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Historically, such a cruel view could have been defended on the assertion that either (1) 
animals feel no pain or (2) that only human pain is morally relevant.
80
  A more sophisticated 
 contractarianism.  For Regan, 
the primary problem with a Rawlsian contractarianism is that it is an inadequate theory of the 
moral considerability of humans because it only allows of duties directed to those humans who 
meet the rationality condition.  Only those humans with sufficient capacities to participate in the 
legislation of the social contract are objects of the directed duties of other moral agents.  Any 
human being that lacks sufficient capacities to participate in the legislation of the social contract 
who cannot participate in the legislation of the social contract only ever have contingent moral 
considerability.  If they are granted moral considerability in the social contract, it is only by the 
mercy of the legislators of the social contract.  Whatever moral considerability may be granted, it 
is not driven by equality between the legislating and non-legislating individuals, but rather 
through compassion, empathy, love, or even blatant self-interest (e.g. to appear compassionate, 
empathetic, or loving).  Should these motivations fail (and they often do when in conflict with an 
-interest), so too then does the moral considerability for non-legislating 
individuals.  So, an indirect duty view will not suffice.   
Turning attention to direct duties views, for the sake of brevity, I will limit my discussion 
to utilitarianism.
81
  cus of 
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that an act is right that is kind, and an act is wrong that is cruel.  As an initial matter, cruelty-kindness does not seem 
to be a deontic view, but rather a virtue ethical view.  So, it is not clear to what extent Regan expects rights and 
duties to emerge from the view.  Indeed, Regan acknowledges that some versions of a cruelty-kindness view are not 
direct duty views at all.  Regan (2003, 51 52).  Considering cruelty-kindness as a virtue ethical view, it should come 
as no surprise that the view is focused on assessing the character of the actor rather than the morality of his actions.  
-kindness view misunderstands how virtue ethics 
-kindness is that one can be kind while doing the wrong 
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value.  For the utilitarian, all that is morally relevant, and therefore possess moral value, is an 
/preferences/desires, not the individual himself.  The individual merely acts 
as a receptacle for the satisfaction/frustration of his/her interests/preferences/desires.  And so, the 
utilitarian view fails to place any value on individuals as such.  This is where the problem of 
painless killings comes from.
82
  
unique experience of living his/her life.  When all that matters is the avoidance of interest 
frustration and the promotion of interest satisfaction, it does not matter who is experiencing the 
frustration or satisfaction of the interest.  However, interest frustration and satisfaction are also 
phenomenological experiences indexed to a particular subject.  It matters to that subject whether 
her interests are frustrated or satisfied.  For example, suppose I put food out for two stray cats 
that have been hanging out in my backyard.  One day, I notice that two different stray cats are 
eating the food and the two original stray cats are nowhere to be found.  It matters to the first pair 
of stray cats that they are not getting fed by me anymore in that they have to find another source 
of food, and it matters to the two new stray cats that they have found a free lunch and do not 
need to scavenge anymore.  To the utilitarian, it only matters that my actions satisfy the same 
two interests: the hunger of two stray cats.  It does not matter upon whom the frustrations or 
satisfactions of interests are laid or experienced. 
From this, Regan derives his rights-based view of the moral considerability of animals in 
four steps.  The first step is to reject all indirect duty views and maintain that humans have 
directed duties to 
83
  Recall from Chapter Two that directed duties are 
                                                                                                                                                             
thing and such kindness does not remove the wrongness of the action.  However, virtue ethical views are not 
all the virtues (of which 
kindness is one).  It is by cultivating and exemplifying all of the virtues that one leads an ethical life.  So, it should 
not be surprising that kindness alone is not enough to produce better treatment of animals.  See Foot (1988).  
82
 Section III.A. 
83
 
has been extended to include some birds.  Regan (2003, 38). 
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correlative with claim-rights, so it would seem to follow that any direct duty view would have to 
be a rights view, understood as Hohfeldian relations.  However, this observation may cause a 
pause and question as to why Regan treats utilitarianism as a direct duty view.  I think the 
Hohfeldian framework just shows that Regan misclassified utilitarianism as a direct duty view.  
Utilitarianism is properly categorized as a deontic view (i.e. an action-based view), but it does 
not generate directed duties to entities.  Utilitarianism generates duties to act, but these are not 
duties to anything in particular.  Directed duties are directed to something or someone in 
particular.  Direct duty views, as seen through the lens of Hohfeldian analysis, should always be 
rights-
egalitarian principle expresses a duty owed to animals to take their interests into consideration 
and treat them equally to similar interests.
84
  However, the egalitarian principle does not express 
a duty owed to individuals themselves whose interests are to be considered equally with other 
equal interests.  It expresses a duty to give equal consideration to equal interests, but this duty is 
not owed to anyone in particular.  It is simply a duty to abide by the egalitarian principle, i.e. 
when performing the utilitarian calculus, the moral agent is obligated to give equal consideration 
to equal interests.
85
 
 The secon
locus of value.  Our duties are directed to those individuals because they possess inherent value.  
Inherent value contrasts with the utilitarian treatment of individuals as nothing more than 
aggregates of interests.  In a sense, to possess inherent value is to be greater than the sum of 
                                                 
84
 See ibid, 57. 
85
 views are slightly misleading.  
Contractarianism is actually a direct duty view when scoping over full adult humans, but an indirect duty view when 
scoping over animals and marginal human cases.  Utilitarianism is really an indirect duty view even though it scopes 
equally over humans and animals. 
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-in-
such an appeal brings into question how (or if) inherent value is different from what is standardly 
calle
86
 
Intrinsic value is best understood by being contrasted with instrumental value.  When 
something is instrumentally valuable, it is good for some further end.  For example, a spoon is 
instrumentally valuable when one is served soup for lunch because a spoon is good for moving 
is hard to see the value in a spoon.  The value of spoons as such is instrumental; that value 
depends on there being some further end that the spoon helps fulfill.  In contrast, to be 
intrinsically valuable is to be valuable in and of oneself, without reference to or need of a further 
end that the individual helps accomplish.  The quintessential example of entities that are 
considered intrinsically valuable are humans.  Each and every human is valuable independent of 
tion of intrinsic value, although the 
two terms are sometimes used synonymously.
87
  Inherent value has an additional component 
beyond non-
interests, rather than in whole individuals.
88
  Inherent value as mere non-instrumentality can 
defend the view that the only thing that is intrinsically valuable is the satisfaction of interests (i.e. 
the Good).  So, inherent value must be an enhanced kind of intrinsic value.  It is a non-
                                                 
86
 See, e.g., Frankena (1979, 17 18); Rolston (2005, 69 77) (discussing the relationship between human virtue and 
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debate between realist and anti-realist theories of value. 
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instrumental value that is supposed to contrast starkly against the utilitarian value of interests 
alone and emphasize the value of individuals as wholes.  
 The third step is to recognize that those who possess inherent value must possess it 
equally.  If utilitarianism gets one thing right, it is its emphasis on equality.  However, unlike the 
egalitarian principle that must define the scope of what it means for intere
the equality among individuals who possess inherent value is quite dichotomous.  An entity 
either possesses inherent value, or it does not.  If it possesses inherent value, that means the same 
thing for all such entities, i.e.  the
89
  
 establishes 
the extension of rights to animals. 
The fourth, and final, step must suggest and defend a criterion for determining which 
individuals possess inherent value and which do not. Regan suggests the criterion being the 
-of-a-l  as determining that an individual possesses inherent value, and 
he defends that criterion by appealing to marginal human cases.
90
  The argument starts with the 
premise that animals lack many of the mental capacities of fully and normally developed adult 
humans such as the capacity to read, do higher mathematics, or build a bookcase.  Instead of 
focusing on such dissimilarity, we should emphasize that there are many humans, such as 
infants, children, and the mentally infirm who similarly lack such capacities.  For those humans, 
we do not typically take such deficiencies to mean that they do not possess (or possess less) 
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 Regan (2001, 44).   
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 Regan (2001, 44); see Frey (1980, Ch. III) for a general characterization of the argument from marginal human 
cases. 
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inherent value.  What is this similarity that is doing the work for marginal human cases in 
establishing their inherent value?  That they are experiencing subjects-of-a-life.
91
   
Being the subject-of-a-life will involve possessing a minimum mental life that may 
include things like beliefs, desires, perception, memory, an emotional life, feelings of pleasure 
and pain, preferences, and the ab
92
  As Regan puts it, 
subjects-of-a-life have a biography, not merely a biology; they are a somebody, not just a 
something.
93
  Each subject-of-a-life possesses an experiential welfare regardless of its usefulness 
to others.
94
  It is this criterion that picks out individuals who possess inherent value, and it is this 
inherent value which requires such individuals to never be treated as a mere means (in Kantian 
terms) by moral agents.  The subject-of-a-
performs a similar conceptual bridging between natural facts about individuals and their inherent 
value.  However, instead of limiting the scope of moral considerability to the Kantian person, the 
subject-of-a-life criterion expands moral considerability beyond the scope of the Kantian person 
to include marginal human cases, and therefore, according to Regan, animals.
95
   
 
bridging that being a subject-of-a-life does between individuals and their inherent value, being a 
subject-of-a-life must capture something fundamentally phenomenological, but not wholly 
phenomenological.  There is something important about being the particular one to experience a 
particular life through a variety of mental states, and that importance is not reducible to just the 
mental states.  If it was just the mental states that mattered morally, then there would be no moral 
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experience machine.
96
  
of animals by hooking animal brains into a simulation where they get to experience their lives 
without actually living their lives.  Accepting this irreducibility of the subject-of-a-life to mental 
states, we are left to wonder to what extent the view might be committed to some kind of 
metaphysical dualism.   
 Another related concern is a conceptual question regarding the analyzability of the 
concept subject-of-a-life.  Regan provides examples of mental capacities that are relevant to 
determining whether an individual is a subject-of-a-life, but we are left to guess whether any of 
them are necessary and which one(s) might be sufficient for concluding that an individual is a 
subject-of-a-life.  The question of which capacities are necessary creates a bit of a dilemma in 
because most (if not all) animals will lack those capacities, and therefore fail to be subjects-of-a-
they are relevant to the subject-of-a-life inquiry at all.  An additional problem is the issue of what 
set (or a variety of sets) of mental capacities are sufficient to establish that an individual is a 
subject-of-a-life.  If any of the suggested capacities are not included in the set of capacities that 
are jointly sufficient to be considered a subject-of-a-life, then those capacities should not be 
relevant to the inquiry at all.  The problem of the analyzability of the subject-of-a-life is not 
surprising because Regan views the concept as filling a lexical gap between the concepts of 
human, animal, and person.
97
  He is trying to expand the concept of person to include all humans 
but not (necessarily) all animals.  Given that there is much debate and division over the 
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necessary and sufficient conditions of what it is to be a person,
98
 it should come as no surprise 
that a concept aiming to expand on the concept of a person (without being synonymous with 
human or animal) will run into similar challenges. 
 Furthermore, for Regan, the concept of subject-of-a-life is determinative of the precise 
boundary of all those individuals that possess moral rights.
99
  
to determine the precise boundary of moral rights holders.
100
  His goal was to expand the 
boundary of moral rights holders beyond the boundary of persons, so we might be tempted to 
forgive the lack of precision in the analysis of the concept of subject-of-a-life.  Indeed, to really 
the boundary ends (i.e. the precise definition of subject-of-a-life), but to put pressure on moving 
the boundary of moral considerability beyond of the concept of person at all.  The clear place 
dies by the success of the argument from marginal human cases.  To the extent there are good 
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 One might wonder whether the possession of inherent value is truly dichotomous.  Perhaps moral patients possess 
less inherent value than moral agents.  This is an option that Regan explicitly considers and rejects.  Regan (1983, 
240). Such a view confuses the inherent value of individuals with (1) the comparative value of their experiences, (2) 
their possession of favored virtues, (3) their utility relative 
interest.  Ibid.  It would also be vulnerable to being committed to a double standard where the reduction of inherent 
value for moral patients because of the deficits contained in (1)-(4) is not applied to reduce the inherent value of 
moral agents for the same deficits.  Ibid.   
-er) animal 
rights, namely that humans are capable of acting from reasons.  Warren (2001, 48).  Because rationality makes 
humans more dangerous and unpredictable than animals, morality is a necessary tool to structure human interaction 
  Ibid. greater possibilities for 
  Ibid.  Furthermore, Warren advocates scalarizing the 
strength of weak animal rights along the continuum of mental sophistication.  Warren (1986, 166 67).  So, it is 
worse to kill a cow than to kill a fish than to kill a spider, though the killing of all sentient creatures should not be 
done unless there is good reason to do so.  Ibid. 
The concern over whether rights are possessed dichotomously or along a continuum of more and less important 
rights is a concern that is more properly restricted to a discussion of the conflicts of rights and the force of rights.  It 
Warr 68.  Just to conclude that mammals have rights equal to humans 
immediately implicates some impact on (e.g. a curtailing or complete elimination of) human rights.  Because this 
project will only just briefly touch on the conflict and force of rights concern, I do not take a stance here on how we 
should resolve the challenge of scalarizing rights to accommodate animals.   
100
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for animal rights is grounded before it even takes off.
101
   
The biggest wea
is a subject-of-a-life, then X is inherently valuable.  The whole view relies on inherent value 
arising from, being grounded in, or supervening on some natural property possessed by 
in articulating his view, his animal rights view is not particularly true to Kant in how the scope of 
the Formula of Humanity is derived.
102
  Furthermore, this reliance on a natural property to 
-centered 
deontology, where it is the nature of the rights holder that explains the deontological obligation.  
If the deontological obligation depends on a natural property, then there is no obvious reason 
why we should not sacrifice one individual for the sake of many other individuals with that same 
natural property.  In other words, it is unclear, based on the nature of the deontology that Regan 
adopts, why his view would prohibit practices like culling the herd.
103
  If all members of, e.g., 
the deer herd have inherent value because they are subjects-of-a-life, it is not clear why we 
cannot cull a few individuals so that the remaining members of the herd thrive.   
value means that one cannot be used as a mere means to promote the good of others.  But given 
that inherent value is wholly based on the natural property possessed by each individual deer, 
why would we not want to promote more of that natural property (it is after all important enough 
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 Regan dubs practices like culling the herd 
hunting is justified on the grounds that the prey species lacks natural predators and many individuals of the species 
rmit humans to 
hunt those animals.  Regan (1983, 354 56). 
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to ground inherent value) by sacrificing just a few for the sake of the many?  It is difficult to 
prevent the view from collapsing into some kind of utilitarianism.  The problem is that there is 
implicit appeal to consistency in how the agent treats humans of similar natural properties to 
animals.  But the derivation from that value for marginal human cases and animals to the 
obligation is left open by Regan.  A traditional Kantian approach would have to rederive the 
to conclude that marginal human cases have moral status.  In fact, in traditional interpretations of 
Kant, marginal human cases do not have moral status.  This problem may be solved by taking an 
agent-centered approach, which I will argue in the next section is how best to understand 
 
C. KORSGAARD S AGENT-CENTERED DEONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS  
 
continuation of her overall moral philosophy which has its roots in Kant and is well-known for 
al theory.  I do not aim to 
evaluate the constructivist components of the view here.  The goal of this section is to explore 
grounds the moral considerability of animals on the 
commands of reason alone rather than on the recognition of the inherent value of natural 
human cases, maintaining that marginal human beings are rational and therefore categorically 
160 
 
distinct from animals.
104
  So, in more traditional Kantian fashion, there is in fact a natural 
property that categorically separates humans from animals . 
 However, where Korsgaard first departs from more traditional Kantian interpretation is in 
denying that the possession of rationality is a necessary and sufficient property for being owed 
moral obligations.  Rationality does not track some inherently valuable property in the world that 
demands moral respect.  Rather, for Korsgaard, what matters is whether or not an individual 
possesses the 
property for possessing moral considerability is possessing the capacity to obligate, and so the 
view is simply substituting one natural property for another natural property to ground moral 
considerability.  For example, one could argue that animals do not have moral considerability, 
not because they lack rationality, but because they do not participate in the collective and 
universal legislative willing that creates morality, and therefore they lack the capacity to 
obligate.   
To avoid this, Korsgaard equates the capacity to obligate, not with rationality and active 
-in-
105
  Korsgaard 
distinguishes between -in-one
106
  In the first sense, an end-in-oneself is 
n the second sense, an end-in-one
 i.e. through 
the exercise of his legislative will.  Animals are not ends-in-themselves in the latter sense 
because lacking rationality, they do not participate in moral legislation.  However, this does not 
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105
 I think it is fair to interpret capacity to obligate  as equivalent with end-in-oneself here.  In fact, what 
-in-oneself show are the two ways in which an individual can obligate an 
agent. 
106
 Korsgaard (2018, 125); Korsgaard (2004, 21). 
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preclude the possibility that animals can be ends-in-themselves in the former sense, in that they 
are the sources of obligation.
107
   
for something to be an end-
in-oneself as a source of obligation, without participating in moral legislation.  To answer this, 
Korsgaard relies on her constructivist theory of value.  In valuing ourselves as ends-in-
ourselves,
108
 we do not merely confer value on being a chooser (i.e. possessing rational 
autonomy), but we also confer value on the content of those choices.
109
  It is not simply the 
choice to drink or play or have sex that we value, it is also the natural incentive to drink, play, 
have sex that underlies the choice which we value.  So, the source of our obligations is not just 
our rationally autonomous nature, i.e. our autonomous will, but also our animal nature because 
when we value ourselves, as an ends-in-ourselves, we value both our animal and autonomous 
natures.  For example, to the extent we value things like eating, drinking, sex, playing, we are 
valuing our animal nature.  It then follows that, in so valuing our animal nature, we are rationally 
required to value the natural goods which matter to others who similarly experience and pursue 
their own good, whether or not we take those natural goods to have any value for us in particular.  
be ends-in-ourselves we legislate that the natural good of a creature who matters to itself is the 
source of normative cla
110
  And therefore, we have moral obligations to animals (and they 
have moral claim-rights against us). 
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who do not participate in the legislation of society yet to whom legislating members have obligations).  The passive 
citizen is meant to show that Kant left open the possibility that an entity that cannot participate in the moral 
legislation may yet obligate those who do so participate.  Korsgaard (2018, 126); Korsgaard (2004, 21 22). 
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does not require grounds independent of the moral agent.  Ko
: subject-of-a-life grounds inherent value because we take marginal 
human cases to be inherently valuable, but we may reject that marginal human cases are 
inherently valuable.  The closing of the gap  comes from a kind of 
reciprocity that is compelled by the universalization constraint on reason.  So, the obligation the 
moral agent has towards animals is an obligation she legislates for herself on account of her 
being a rational animal.  This view is not agent-centered in the way I had discussed earlier, i.e. in 
-centered 
in that the nature of the agent compels the content of the moral maxims to contain obligations to 
regarding their treatment.  It is solidly patient-
nature of the agent compelling the moral maxims regarding animals. 
 Additionally, the argument from marginal human cases relies entirely on an appeal to 
consistency, but appeals to consistency can backfire.  Someone could just accept that marginal 
human cases are not moral patients (even though they might be subjects-of-a-life) and are not 
owed obligations by us.  The treatment they in fact receive is a phenomenon related to emotional 
and sympathetic responses we have to seeing members of our species.
111
   
Instead of relying on an appeal to external consistency
reciprocity and consistency .  
patient-centered view about sacrificing one inherently valuable individual to save many more 
inherently valuable individuals in this way.  
view, the moral agent is not looking at the situation as one unit of inherent value on the sacrifice 
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side and multiple units of inherent value on the saved side.  The agent is looking at the situation 
internally and reciprocally.  The agent is looking at the situation as a product of her rational will: 
to sacrifice or not.  
perish is not.  Because the agent takes herself as an end-in-herself, not to be sacrificed as a mere 
means to save others, she binds herself to treat all other ends-in-themselves that way 
(universalization).  In the sacrifice case, to let the many perish is not to fail to treat them as ends-
in-themselves.  Being an end-in-oneself does not entitle one to have  achieved and 
realized no matter what the cost is.  What matters for the moral agent is to act always on those 
principles that can she can will as universal law.  The moral agent cannot will as universal law 
that she act so that all ends-in-themselves have their ends realized.  She can only will that she not 
act so as to be the one who makes an end-in-oneself into a mere means. 
 obligations internally to the moral agent makes it 
fairly clear why the moral agent is permitted, and sometimes obligated, to produce what would 
be a worse state of affairs for the utilitarian.  States of affairs just are not involved in grounding 
Korsgaardian obligations (to humans and animals).  I take this to be a great strength of 
animal rights view.  It captures the idea that [w]e can impose the form of law on 
112
  I think a commitment to 
something like this is necessary for solving the myriad of rights conflicts that will arise with 
animal rights while maintaining a real force to animal rights (as opposed to adopting something 
have just the briefest of comments on this in the 
Conclusion.  To round out the deontological arguments for animal rights, I will now conclude 
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D. ROWLANDS  CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 
  animal rights view aims to rehabilitate contractarianism as a moral theory that 
can establish directed duties to animals (and marginal human cases), and therefore the moral 
guishing 
between two forms of contractarianism: Hobbesian contractarianism and Kantian 
contractarianism.
113
  The Hobbesian form of contractarianism takes the social contract to be 
constitutive of the moral right and wrong.  The agreement between the contractors, who must be 
rational agents, is what makes certain actions right and wrong.  Hobbesian contractarianism, 
then, is the traditional view of contractarianism that I called crude contractarianism in Section 
II.B.2.  Because the contract is the thing in virtue of which things are right or wrong, there is 
nothing that is right or wrong to non-rational actors because they do not participate in making the 
contract.  
 Adopting a Kantian contractarianism (i.e. a Rawlsian contractarianism), Rowlands 
suggests that we deny that the social contract is constitutive of moral right and wrong.  Instead, 
we ought to treat the social contract as merely a heuristic device by which right and wrong are 
discovered/revealed.
114
  This means that there is some conception of moral right and wrong that 
is independent of the social contract.  Furthermore, the authority of the contract is no longer 
grounded in our agreement to it.  The authority of the contract comes from the extent to which it 
reveals correct moral principles.  Power and rationality no longer play fundamental roles in 
constituting the contract, either.  The moral principles, if they are morally correct principles, 
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discuss here.  See Rowlands (2009, 152 58) for a discussion of the Hobbesian remnants in Rawlsian 
contractarianism.  Rowlands ultimately takes the view that it is the Kantian core of Rawlsian contractarianism that 
makes the view plausible and that the Hobbesian remnants are simply unfortunate and unnecessary.  Ibid, 128.  
Viewing Rawlsian contractarianism as a reflective procedure for revealing the proper substantive moral 
A Theory of Justice, see Nagel (1973), so I 
am not too concerned with treating Rawlsian contractarianism as strictly Kantian in nature here. 
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reflect the morally right thing to do.  Viewing the social contract as a heuristic device to reveal 
correct moral principles, then, leaves open the possibility that we have duties to non-rational 
individuals based on the content of the underlying moral principles that the contract reveals.  
 In Kantian contractarianism, the original position and the veil of ignorance are heuristic 
115
  There has to be a conception of what 
counts as a morally arbitrary property that ought to be removed from the contractors when they 
go behind the veil of ignorance and reason towards the maxims of society.  The choice of the 
original position will produce different moral maxims and our intuitions regarding those maxims 
may provide insight into the correct or best original position to choose.  So, there is a kind of a 
circular flavor to a Kantian contractarianism.  But this is exactly what Rowlands wants to draw 
out: the original position and veil of ignorance as heuristic devices do not represent some 
objective state of affairs, but instead represent a kind of reasoning process by which certain 
hypotheticals are undertaken, evaluated, tweaked and sent back, and re-evaluated until something 
that resembles morally correct principles emerges. 
In determining what the original position ought to look like, we can recall that the 
original position is supposed to address the power concern that we see in Hobbesian 
contractarianism.  The original position removes those properties from the contractors that most 
represent undeserved power disparities among humans (e.g. race, sex, social and economic 
status).  If we conceive of the original position as a heuristic device, Rowlands contends that it 
also removes the rationality condition.
116
  Because the original position is itself informed by the 
principles it produces, there is no reason to think that the original position produces only rights 
for those who have rationality and participate in reasoning from the original position.  Recall the 
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purpose of the rationality condition in Hobbesian contractarianism: you only give up freedom if 
you get so  because there are no 
moral principles besides those chosen by the contractors.  Of course, you only get that restraint 
from entities that are capable of acting on reasons.  Once we have assumed there is a pre-
contractual moral base  that the original position reveals, the rationality condition is no longer 
necessary because the moral base provides right and wrong prior to the principles that result 
from reasoning from the original position. 
Indeed, it is this moral base that Rowlands claims makes a clear contractarian case for 
animal rights.  Once we start removing properties from the contractors in the original position 
that are undeserved, commonsense leads us to the conclusion that rationality is an undeserved 
property as well.
117
  After all, we enter the world without rationality.
118
  Many human beings 
leave the world having had their rationality slowly eroded away.  Accidents can occur at any 
time that could strip us of our rationality, either temporarily or permanently.  We all know of 
these possibilities and realities.  It would be irrational not to include them in the original position.  
Because (1) we have been without rationality in the past (this is a fact of nature) and (2) we are 
very likely to be without rationality again through no decision of our own (at least no direct 
decision), possessing rationality, like possessing a particular social or economic status or being 
of a particular gender, is not something we are responsible for possessing.  And so it is an 
undeserved, morally arbitrary property and should be bracketed from the original position.
119
 
Let us suppose this reasoning is compelling.  We lack more than rationality at different 
points in our lives.  There are times where we are unconscious.  There are times when we are just 
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anything from the past (except perhaps childhood or young adulthood).  At some point, all of us 
cease to be a living, functional unity and must give our organic bodies back to the life processes 
from which they sprang.  Perhaps belief, memory, consciousness, even sentience should be 
bracketed from the original position.   
To define a boundary of undeserved properties that are morally relevant to the original 
position, Rowlands introduces a new principle, namely that the original position be restricted to 
entities that an occupant of the original position could rationally worry about being.
120
  So, 
properties that are possessed by entities that a contractor could rationally worry about being are 
morally relevant for the sake of limiting the abstraction of the original position away from 
humans.  For example, only sentient entities care about what happens to them.  Non-sentient 
entities like rocks and trees do not care what happens to them, so we need not be concerned with 
imagining that we are, e.g., trees in the original position.  So, sentience is the line at which we 
draw the original position.  The contractors must conceive of themselves as sentient creatures.  
the line of sentience destroys the coherency of the original position.  The coherency challenge to 
the original position has been made in the past under the (implicit) assumption that the original 
position is some kind of metaphysical position that we actually inhabit rather than a hypothetical 
perspective-taking.
121
  However, even as a matter of hypothetical perspective-taking, it is 
difficult to have any robust conception of what it is to be merely a sentient creature.  One of the 
things about hypothetical perspective-taking among humans is that other humans can 
communicate in language what it means to be of a different gender, race, or socioeconomic class 
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in human society.  Through this communication, we can better take on the perspective of being 
 (undeserved) advantages that we may possess in reality.  
Neither marginal human cases nor animals can similarly communicate what it is to be in their 
shoes, so to speak.  So, to extend the original position to include such individuals leaves the 
contractors wondering about taking the perspectives of marginal human cases and animals with 
not much guidance as to what that life looks like inside of living it.  I think this is why Rowlands 
relies on the notion that animals do not want to suffer or be killed,
122
 because we can make those 
conclusions from our observations of  external avoidance behaviors.  But we really do 
not know what life looks like from the internal perspective of animals, and it is possible this is 
not even a coherent question to ask because animals do not have a conception of being 
wronged.
123
  They have a good-for and bad- as far as we know, 
they do not see the world as one in which they are being treated rightly or wrongly. 
 argument for animal rights is that it does not actually 
provide a ground for animal rights.  Both   clearly provide 
grounds largely unexplained the moral 
base that the original position heuristic is supposed to illuminate.  All that Rowlands says is that 
he rejects the Moral Law (traditionally Kantian) as the moral base and considers the principle of 
equal consideration to constitute the moral base.
124
  But this still leaves unanswered where the 
moral base comes from and what justifies it.  I think this also threatens the contractualism as 
providing anything other than an epistemic procedure for determining the content of our moral 
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 See Rowlands (1997, 245); Rowlands (2009, 162 74). 
123
 This might not be categorically true across all animals.  Some non-human primates might have rudimentary 
conceptions of fairness.  However, to the extent this is true, it is not a widespread capacity across animals, and it still 
does not provide us a very robust understanding of the view from mere sentience. 
124
 Rowlands (2009, 128). 
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maxims.
125
  If contractarianism is just the epistemic procedure for elucidating the content of the 
equal consideration principle, it may not be a deontological moral view.  Indeed, it may not be a 
moral view at all.  The moral view is the argument that grounds the equal consideration 
principle, not the contractarian argument that equal consideration requires such and such.  I am 
sure there is more to say about the relationship between our epistemic procedures for 
determining the contents of the moral maxims and our grounds for the moral maxims 
themselves.  However, I must leave such a task to future work.  Before concluding this chapter, I 
want to briefly discuss what we get, as a pragmatic matter, from these three animal rights 
arguments. 
IV. ANIMAL RIGHTS 
 I had previously mentioned that the deontological views provide grounds for our moral 
obligations and also provide us procedures for determining the content of those moral 
obligations.  
grounding morality and determining the content of the moral maxims is not always sharp.  To the 
extent that the grounding of morality does not provide the content of any of our moral 
obligations, such a view is not held by the animal rights theorists I have discussed here.  Regan, 
Korsgaard, and Rowlands all argue that animals have moral rights and then proceed from that 
argument to demonstrate what the content of at least a few of those rights are.  So, the animal 
rights theorists at least implicitly take their arguments grounding our obligations to animals as 
establishing some particular animal rights.  For illustration purposes, I will consider the case for 
vegetarianism, i.e. animals have the right not to be killed for food and eaten, through the lens of 
each of three animal rights arguments. 
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 See ibid. 
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 For Regan, a particular human practice of treating animals in a certain way is prohibited 
when it treats animals as a mere means to our ends.  So, the question of whether we can raise and 
slaughter animals for our food comes down to whether this practice treats animals as a mere 
means to human ends.  Simply put, it does not matter how we treat animals that we wish to 
slaughter for food, to raise animals for food is quintessentially to treat them as a mere means to 
our ends.  It views animals as renewable resources to satisfy human eating preferences.  Whether 
those preferences are based on claims of habit, taste, culture, nutrition, or economics does not 
change that humans are using animals as a mere means to their ends by eating them.
126
 
 For Korsgaard, humans are obligated to treat animals as ends-in-themselves, as functional 
unities for whom things can be good-for or bad-for because when we act rationally we take as 
good those things that can be good-for natural, functional unities.  This means we are obligated 
to treat animals in ways that are consistent with their natural good.  The question then hinges on 
whether death is consistent with the natural good of the animals that we want to rear as livestock 
to eat.  For Korsgaard, death is not part of natural good because it is not something that 
is sought out as an end of action by animals or humans.
127
  Death will vary in badness-for 
animals along a continuum of cognitive sophistication.
128
  The more cognitively sophisticated an 
animal is, the worse-for that animal death becomes.  So, we cannot raise and slaughter animals 
for food consistent with treating animals as ends-in-themselves, but we can prefer the death of an 
animal over the death of a human. 
 For Rowlands, we must place ourselves in the original position, where we do not know if 
we will possess rationality or even be human in the actual world and ask ourselves what we 
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 See Regan (1983, 330 53); Regan (2003, 97). 
127
 Korsgaard (2018, 28). 
128
 Ibid, 62 63. 
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would want that world to look like.
129
  We must reason within the bounds of nature as we know 
it, i.e. we cannot reason from an original position that denies that some living creatures must eat 
other living creatures to survive.  So, we may end up being a human, an animal reared and eaten 
by humans, or an animal not reared and eaten by humans.  We evaluate the practice of humans 
rearing and eating certain animals from all three perspectives, analyzing what is gained and lost 
for each type of individual should the practice be permitted or prohibited.  If eating animals is 
prohibited, animal lives are not ended and humans have to give up certain pleasures of the palate.  
If eating animals is not prohibited, animal lives are ended in large quantities to satisfy human 
pleasures of the palate.  In the former world, a vital interest is respected at the cost of a trivial 
interest.  A contractor in the original position, not knowing whether he will be a human or an 
animal desirable for human palates, 
130
  Therefore, the human 
practice of raising and killing animals for food should be prohibited.  
 This is, admittedly, a fairly rough sketch of how the three moral arguments for animal 
  
Interestingly, all three views cannot help but also mention the problems around factory farming.  
I suppose it is hard not to simply because of how much suffering that factory farming causes.  
But the animal rights views are supposed to stand apart and beyond the utilitarian view, which 
can advocate for the abolition of factory farming on the grounds that it causes an enormous 
amount of suffering.  The animal rights views maintain that even if all the suffering were 
removed from the practice of raising animals for humans to eat, there would still be a problem 
because it is not the suffering itself in factory farms that is the morally salient point for a 
deontological theory.  I think that Korsgaard puts the point best: 
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 See Rowlands (2009, 162 74). 
130
 Ibid, 167. 
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The question is not about just numbers and consequences.  It is 
about you and a particular animal, an individual creature with a life 
of her own, a creature for whom things can be good or bad.  It is 
about how you are related to that particular creature when you eat 
her, or use products that have been extracted from her in ways that 
are incompatible with her good.  You are treating her as a mere 
means to your own ends, and that is wrong.
131
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have explored the role of rights in the big three moral theories: 
consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.  I concluded that rights, conceived of as 
Hohfeldian relations, are accommodated best by deontological views because deontology readily 
tem.  I then examined three 
-centered (loosely) Kantian view, 
- I briefly 
discussed how each of the three animal rights views might defend the claim that animals possess 
claim-rights against us that we not raise and slaughter them for our food. 
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 Korsgaard (2018, 223). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 I do not doubt that my reader may be frustrated that at this point, I still have not made a 
clear case for or against animal rights.  My primary reservation comes from the fact that I have 
not addressed the conflicts of rights that will arise in the context of animal rights.  A plausible 
animal rights view has to address the conflicts of rights problem.  Without a theory on how to 
evaluate conflicts of human and animal rights, an animal rights view fails to be action-guiding.  
Furthermore, each conflict between human and animal rights could be raised as an objection to 
the claim that animals have rights in the first place.  Therefore, I want to briefly outline the 
concerns that I would address if I were developing a full theory to address the conflicts of human 
and animal rights.  I will proceed in three parts.  First, I will discuss the concern that animal 
rights may not be strong enough to be properly considered rights.  Second, I will discuss the 
concern that animal rights may be too strong, undermining rights as a mechanism by which 
humans realize their freedom of self-determination.  Finally, I will conclude with a comment on 
why I think animal rights do get it right in important ways, notwithstanding the conflicts of rights 
problem.
1
 
 To begin my discussion that in the face of conflicts, animal rights may lose their force to 
be appropriately considered rights, I must describe the rights conflict.  The debates in this area 
often revolve around necessity cases,
2
 
3
 as an example of an 
animal rights necessity case.  The lifeboat case is as follows.  Suppose four humans and a dog are 
shipwrecked and clinging to a lifeboat for survival.  Suppose the lifeboat can only hold four of 
                                                 
1
 I will be limiting my discussion to intrapersonal conflicts of rights, i.e. conflicts of rights that apply to the same 
moral agent.  Interpersonal conflicts of rights, where moral agents may have contrary obligations over the same 
action, can certainly arise in the case of human and animal rights conflicts, but I will not discuss them here.  See 
Hurd and Moore (2018, 324 28) for a discussion of the distinction between intra- and interpersonal conflicts of 
rights. 
2
 See, e.g., Frederick (2014, 376); Oberdiek (2008). 
3
 Regan (1983, 351 53).   
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the five individuals (or suppose that the five individuals have been in the lifeboat for weeks and 
must kill one to eat for the others to survive).  An animal rights view that does not resolve 
conflicts of rights leaves the moral agent with no guidance on how to act in this situation.
4
  
 the moral agent must allow herself to be 
cast overboard (or eaten) for the dog to survive.  Such a result would produce a very strong right 
for the dog, but it is unpalatable to many that a human be morally required to sacrifice her life for 
an animal.
5
  On the other hand, perhaps the moral agent is permitted to cast the dog overboard 
(or eat the dog) to save her own life.  If that is the case, then does the dog really have a moral 
right not to be killed (or eaten)? 
 Before touching upon the competing solutions to this problem, I want to touch upon the 
precise nature of the conflict of rights being presented to the moral agent.  The conflict looks like 
this.  Generally, moral agents have bilateral privileges to act as to others so as to preserve their 
own lives.  
preserve their own lives.  This is the bilateral privilege that the moral agent has in the life-saving 
drug case to prefer to give herself (or her child) the life-savi
child).  In the life-
give them the life-saving drug 
life-saving drug.  In the lifeboat case, however, the dog ostensibly has the claim-right not to be 
killed (or eaten).  
others so as to preserve her own life, the act that we mean is to kill (or eat) the dog.  That is the 
                                                 
4
 This could be an outcome.  It is possible to argue that in necessity cases, all moral bets are off. 
5
 Although notably, if we replace the dog with a fifth human, the criminal law does not allow the fifth human to be 
cast overboard or eaten to save the other four.  The right of the fifth human is not violable or overridable by the 
rights of the other four to pursue their own survival.  See Regina v. Dudley and Stephens.  The deontologist will rely 
on the causing/allowing -saving 
drug but impermissible to toss the fifth human overboard (or to eat the fifth human). 
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only way that the moral agent can act so as to preserve her life in the lifeboat case.  So, now it is 
clear, the moral agent is under a conflict of duties.  Her bilateral privilege means that she has no 
duty to kill (or eat) and no duty -right says the 
moral agent has a duty not to kill (or eat) the dog.  It is logically inconsistent to maintain that the 
moral agent has a duty not to kill (or eat) the dog and simultaneously does not have a duty not to 
kill (or eat) the dog.
6
  The moral agent should either have a duty or not, otherwise how is the 
duty supposed to guide the moral agent ? 
There are two general approaches to this problem.
7
  One approach is to interpret the 
s duty not to kill (or eat) the dog as a pro tanto duty.
8
  This means that the duty and 
claim-right override other considerations in most circumstances.
9
  However, there are 
exceptional circumstances where the duty and claim-right are justifiably overridden.  In most of 
those circumstances, overriding the pro tanto duty will produce a duty on the rights violator to 
compensate the claim-right holder for the violation of claim-right.  This (usually) occurs in 
necessity cases where lives are saved by violating property rights.  Finally, in relatively rare 
circumstances, a pro tanto duty may be overridden without producing a duty to compensate.  
to reveal the location of a nuclear bomb underneath Manhattan.  The relative rarity of such 
threshold cases is taken to be sufficient to maintain that pro tanto duties and claim-rights really 
                                                 
6
 to  
7
 I limit my discussion here to two contemporary conflicts of rights theories.  There is much more to be said about 
the force and conflicts of rights than I have said here.  See, e.g., Waldron (1989) (discussing a resolution of the 
conflicts of rights based on how the interest theory generates waves of duties for particular claim-rights); Nozick 
(1974, 30 33) (conceiving of rights as side-constraints on action which would resolve certain rights conflicts). 
8
 Pro tanto is distinct from being merely prima facie.  Pro tanto duties (and their correlative claim-rights) really are 
duties (and claim-rights) even when they are overridden by other considerations, whereas prima facie duties (and 
claim- 53).   
9
 What I am going to describe as the pro tanto view can be ascribed to Frederick 93) pro tanto view.   
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do possess the categorical force of duties and claim-rights, even though they may be justifiably 
overridden.  
Regardless of whether we think the pro tanto approach solves conflicts of human rights, it 
is not particularly helpful in resolving human and animal rights conflicts.  First, animal rights do 
not appear to contain claim-rights that are readily compensable.  Whether or not it is even 
coherent to talk about compensating an animal for violating his claim-right, the human actions 
that animal claim-rights are targeting are not particularly compensable actions.  For example, we 
cannot compensate any individual for torturing them and then killing them for food.  While the 
law places monetary values on permanent dismemberment and disfigurement, such 
compensation does nothing for, e.g., an ex-laboratory animal who now has to live out the rest of 
her life with permanent physical harms (and pains).  So, this means that animal rights are either 
accorded because there are no overriding circumstances or violated because the circumstances 
are so significant that the claim-right may be overridden without compensation.  Perhaps for 
experimentation on animals, the former holds: knowledge gained through experimenting on 
animals is not sufficient to override their claim-rights.  But, the lifeboat case does not come out 
in favor of the dog, but in favor of the human.  So, the former cannot hold for the lifeboat case.  
This means that the lifeboat case must be a case of the latter where the circumstances are so 
-right without compensation because 
compensation is impossible.
10
   
Indeed, this is how Regan and Korsgaard come down on the lifeboat case.  The dog can 
be tossed overboard (or eaten).  It is a greater harm for the human to die than for the dog to die 
because how bad death is for an individual is a function of 
                                                 
10
 Notably, such circumstances are not akin to the threshold circumstances that the third option is supposed to 
capture in the pro tanto view.  The lifeboat case would rule in favor of the human even if it was one human versus 
one dog. 
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11
  I think it is hard to ignore 
the fact that this readily comes across as just another form of speciesism.  It categorically places 
animal life below human life.  At the risk of sounding ludicrous, it reeks of a fear to defend the 
radical implications that an animal rights view should entail.
12
  Furthermore, what is left of the 
animal rights view then is just the call to abolish human practices where the human interests 
being satisfied by those practices do not outweigh the animal interests being dissatisfied by those 
practices.  We can get this result through a straight preference utilitarianism that appropriately 
weighs human gustatory satisfaction (and hunting and trapping satisfaction, and knowledge 
acquisition satisfaction) against animal suffering in these practices.  We can even address the 
problem of painless killings by recognizing that the animals we raise for food do exhibit 
behaviors indicating a preference to continue living which preference we would dissatisfy by 
ending their lives prematurely, even if such endings were painless. 
The other approach to resolving cases like the lifeboat case is to specify either the 
circumstances during which the right holds or the content of the right with enough precision that 
the apparent conflict is revealed to be no conflict at all.  We might call the former external-
condition specificationism and the latter internal-condition specificationism.
13
  Regardless, the 
idea is that claim-rights and duties are absolute, and any apparent conflict disappears once the 
conditions upon which the claim-right holds (external)
14
 or the content of the action of the claim-
                                                 
11
 Regan (1983, 351); see also Korsgaard (2018, 61 67).  It is curious to me how quickly the animal rights theorist 
Chapter Four, rights are 
supposed to stand in opposition to justifying actions on the outcomes they produce. 
12
 So what if animal lives are less rich on human standards as to what counts as a rich life?  They are certainly not 
less important to those animals who live those lives.  Each livin
Just because we think others live simpler lives for themselves does not make them expendable.  Would we toss the 
blade counting human overboard because his life does not appear to mean as much to him as 
means to her? 
13
 Frederick (2014, 380). 
14
 See, e.g., Schafer-Landau (1995); Thomson (1990). 
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right (internal)
15
 are fully described.  So, the lifeboat case is solved in this way.  First, t
claim-right ceases to exist when it-is-the-dog-or-the-human circumstances hold (external 
specificationism).  Second, t -right is only a claim-right against the moral agent not 
to be killed (or eaten) when-it-is-not-the-situation-of-the-dog-or-the-human (internal 
specificationism).  In both cases, for the human to throw the dog overboard (or eat the dog) is no 
-right.  The dog has no claim-right. 
 The animal rights views I have explored in this project do not address the possibility of 
adopting a specificationism to resolve the human and animal rights conflicts.  However, it should 
be fairly obvious that specificationism would require a theory of the boundary of animal rights.  
In developing that theory, what drives where the boundary lies between respecting human 
interests and animal interests?  If it is something like the number and variety of preferences, then 
we are back in the same position as we were with the pro tanto view.  Animal rights will be 
relegated to second class rights,  except rather than being justifiably overridden in conflicts 
with human rights, they will be considered to have disappeared completely from the moral 
landscape. 
 On the one hand, these concerns roughly translate into the idea that animal rights are not 
strong enough if we resolve conflicts in these ways.  On the other hand, because animal rights 
are really claim-rights (protected by immunities), I have concerns that they are too strong and 
disrupt the way in which claim-rights and bilateral privileges work over the scope of human 
relations.
16
  Part of this project in the rights theory discussion was to rehabilitate the importance 
of bilateral privileges even when those privileges are not strictly protected from interference by 
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., Oberdiek (2008).  
16
 This approach rejects the possibility of the conflict I discussed above.  It takes the position that the logic of the 
Hohfeldian relations precludes the moral agent from simultaneously having no duty not to kill (or eat) the dog and 
having a duty not to kill (or eat) the dog.   
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claim-rights.  While all privileges are technically protected by the perimeter of general 
obligation, it is bilateral privileges, not the claim-rights, that represent human discretion and 
freedom.  It is in this world of bilateral privileges that the majority (if not all) of our most 
important projects related to our agency and self-determination 
undertaken. For the most part, we do not have claim-rights that others not interfere with the 
actions that constitute such S projects.  We have claim-rights that others not falsely imprison us, 
assault us, kill us, claim-rights on the perimeter of general obligation, but generally, we have to 
operate in a world of other bilateral privilege holders acting in pursuit of their S projects without 
being able to claim against them that they change their actions so that we can act.  To the extent 
we have claim-rights against more specific interference with certain actions, such claim-rights 
operate similarly to the perimeter of general obligation (just at a more specific scale): they 
facilitate the -determine how 
their lives go.  The discretion is still important beyond the claim-right we hold against others. 
 So, what then is the problem with animal rights?  As a matter of Hohfeldian logic, animal 
rights negate human bilateral privileges.  Animal rights are duties on human moral agents where 
there might not have been duties.  Because these bilateral privileges play an important role in 
humans self-determining their lives, we ought to be at least aware when they are negated by the 
existence of claim-right.  Such negations reduce the sphere of freedom for humans and increase 
the sphere of obligation.  When the tradeoff occurs between humans, one human is made freer 
and obtains greater discretion while another is made more restricted.  In the case of animal rights, 
however, increasing the sphere of obligation plays no role in increasing any humans  discretion 
and freedom to self-determine the way their lives go.  In the tradeoff between humans and 
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animals, humans simply end up more restricted.  No one is made freer in terms of autonomous 
self-determination.
17
   
 Part of the shortcomings of such a concern with animal rights is that animal rights are not 
so prolific that humans would have not freedom.  There are lots of ways that we can exercise our 
discretion and craft S projects that do not depend on treating animals as mere resources.  
Furthermore, the animal rights theorist might be able to avail herself of some of the agent-
 intending/foreseeing, 
doing/allowing,
18
 to define the scope of animal rights in ways that make the loss of human 
discretion exactly appropriate to strike the correct moral considerability owed to animals.  To 
fully resolve this (or even conclude that the concern is resolvable) is not within the scope of this 
project, but the groundwork I have discussed here would be valuable to such a discussion. 
 With these reservations in mind, there can be no doubt in my mind, however, that animal 
rights do get something fundamentally right about grounding a meaningful moral considerability 
for animals.  Rights can be coherently maintained despite the fact that nature will not permit 
every creature to achieve its good (or flourish).  It does not trouble a rights account that much 
Good that could be achieved in nature is left unsatisfied.
19
  It is not the job of moral agents qua 
moral agents to fight against nature in this regard.  This is a point that utilitarianism just misses.  
There is nothing inherently bad (or inherently good for that matter) about failing to maximize the 
use of or failing to be perfectly efficient with scarce resources.  All life is finite, and many lives 
                                                 
17
 The concern perhaps goes something like this.  Extending rights to non-humans is just to recognize that non-
humans have claim-rights against humans.  But extending claim-rights necessarily curtails human freedom by 
imposing duties and removing discretion (i.e. bilateral privileges).  Because claim-rights among humans facilitate 
human freedom by creating the conditions for the possibility of exercising bilateral privileges, extending rights 
beyond humans becomes self-undermining. 
18
 See Moore and Alexander (2007). 
19
 Kant did not think that we could achieve the Good through moral action alone unless we had faith in a God that 
made the laws of nature align with our moral laws.  See Korsgaard (2018, 111 12).  Abandoning any appeal to any 
conception of a God, it is hard to see how there is even a conception of an absolute Good in nature.  See ibid, 154.  
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are supported only by the sacrifice of many other lives.  In extending our morality beyond 
humans, all that matters is how we humans treat other living creatures.  However nature comes 
down on each living creature, it is not our place to interfere or substitute judgment as to how it 
ought to be.  In this way, a rights account of the moral considerability of animals is not 
narcissistic or egoistic; rather, it is almost a form of humility.  We do not step in and impose our 
conception of how the world should be on animals.  Rather we are obligated (categorically) to 
respect animals as pursuers of lives that are good for them, regardless of what we think and 
regardless of whether or not they will achieve that good (with or without intervention from us).  
This is the kind of respect that parents give their children when their children grow up into 
adults.  It is the mark of being accepted and treated as an equal.  That is an animal rights view I 
could get behind. 
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